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Abstract 
This thesis employs a multi-level governability approach to explore ways of alleviating 
uncertainty in fisheries governance outcomes, with particular attention to conservation 
measures. A system perspective that provides a holistic and comprehensive view of a 
fisheries system is accompanied by an analysis situated at the people-level which 
accounts for individual viewpoints. At the system-level, the governability assessment was 
undertaken to investigate system complexity that confounds governance outcomes. At the 
individual-level, the study uncovered conservation awareness and inclination of fishery 
stakeholders to discuss how. their conservation principle relates to illegal fishing practices. 
The results highlight several areas of governance challenges in the Southeast Arm fishery 
of Lake Malawi that may limit the success of governance measures, including those 
aimed at mitigating illegal fishing. Hence, acknowledging and navigating around the 
limitations would be a step towards achieving a more reliable governance function. 
Further, potential for achieving fisheries conservation among stakeholders was shown, 
suggesting individual principle's relevance in achieving conservation governance 
outcomes. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Plate 1.1 An early morning scene at one of Kadango's beaches 
Plate 1.2 A large beach in Kadango in the dry season harbouring unused boats 
This chapter introduces the study by describing the challenges faced in the fisheries and 
considering them as a governance issue. Through this approach, two stand-alone, but 
related, study aims are brought forward. The case study location, the Southeast Arm of 
Lake Malawi, is then briefly mentioned, followed by the research questions and specific 
objectives. Finally, the organization of the thesis gives a reader an overview of what lays 
ahead. 
1.1 Describing the problem 
1.1.1 Challenges infisheries 
Fishery resources have been in decline in terms of abundance, size and diversity in the 
last several decades (Pauly eta/. 1998; Worm et a/. 2006; Stobutzki eta/. 2006; FAO 
2007). Large, high-value fisheries targeted under single-species management regime are 
prime examples of species being driven to extinction (Jackson et al. 2001; Myers and 
Worm 2003). It is estimated that more than 75% of world fish stocks have been either 
fully- or over-exploited with possibility of depletion (FAO 2007). Accordingly, in the last 
few years the production level of marine capture fisheries has plateaued fuelling the 
suspicion that maximum potential of capture fisheries has hit a ceiling (F AO 2007). 
Meanwhile, aquaculture production continues to expand at a rapid rate accounting for 
most of the increase in the fish production but not without signi-ficant environmental and 
social concerns (Primavera 1997; Paez-Osuna 2001). 
2 
The decline of fishery resources is faced with a horde of other inter-linked challenges, 
three of which are degradation of ecosystem health, social and economic hardship of 
fishing communities and resource-dependent populace, and the issue of social justice 
(Chuenpagdee et al. 2005). Aquatic ecosystems around the world have been exposed to a 
varying degree of anthropogenic disturbances resulting in pollution, eutrophication, 
physical destruction of habitats and invasion of alien species among others. Affect d 
ecosystems are wide-ranging, which include near-shore environments such as estuaries 
(Nixon 1995), coral reefs (Hughes 1994; Pandolfi et al. 2003) and seagrass beds (Hall et 
al. 1999), offshore environments such as benthic bottoms of continental shelf and slope 
(Chuenpagdee et al. 2003; Edinger et al. 2007), deep-sea environment (Hall-Spencer et 
al. 2002; Roberts 2002) and inland lakes and river system (Allan et al. 2005; Ogutu-
Ohwayo and Balirwa 2006). In addition, social and industrial restructuring of fishing 
sector brought on by the widening reaches of globalization have frequently been 
attributed to creating negative social and economic impacts and hardship to fishers and 
fishing communities, many of whom are in developing countries that depend on fish for 
their livelihoods and as a source of income (Sinclair and Ommer 2006; Ommer et al. 
2007; OECD 2007). Further, the ensuing integration into the global fisheries "value-
chain" have produced a compounding effect in the marginalization of generally poor and 
Jess-powerful fishing populace with an implication on social justice (Chuenpagdee et a/. 
2005; Primavera 1997). The issue of social justice in fishery delves into the imbalance of 
power among various actors involved in the governance (Jentoft 2007). Also, regulations 
that bring about unfair access rights to resources as well as the North-South inequality in 
terms of fish consumption and food safety are all matters deeply connected to social 
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justice. As a result, despite decades worth of governing effort, well-managed fisheries 
that are both biologically, economically and socially viable are still rare. Disappointment, 
dissatisfaction, finger-pointing, resentment and outcry have been the mainstay of fisheries 
realities. 
1.1.2 Difficulty ofgoverningfisheries 
Evidently, governing the fisheries has not been easy, and such difficulty has been a 
pervasive theme in the natural resource governance discourse (Ludwig et a/. 1993; 
Cochrane 2000; Pauly et a/. 2002; Dietz et a/. 2003). Several explanations have been put 
forward, each offering its own piece of the puzzle to promote a deeper und rstanding of 
the issue. For example, uncertainty of science and the policy-science divide (Ludwig et 
a/. 1993, Bradshaw and Borchers 2000; Kinzig eta/. 2003) have been two related themes 
that highlight this governance tribulation. Other perspectives point to an inability to 
reconcile multiple objectives that exist in fisheries (Charles 1992; Cochrane 2000), a 
blanket approach to management solutions relying on disciplinary technical fixes 
(Degnbol et al. 2006), faulty paradigms that incorrectly describe the relationship between 
humans and natural resource base (Bundy el al. 2008), and failure to recognize and 
embrace natural and human non-linearity and uncertainties surrounding natural resources 
(Folke et al. 2002). In a more fundamental sense, the management/planning problem uch 
as fisheries resource governance is inadequately conjured up and treated as a 'tame' 
problem (Rittel and Webber 1973; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). Letting alone the 
fuzzy socio-political and normative aspect and considering only the natural system side, 
controversies that add to the ongoing difficulty still prevail. While a general consensus on 
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the depleting trend of fisheries resources worldwide exists (F AO 2007; Worm eta/. 2006; 
Hilborn et a!. 2003), the extent of the decline and the degree of urgency relating to the 
depletion is greatly debatable (Essington et al. 2006; Hilborn 2007). In addition, the 
characteristics of complexity, diversity, dynamics and scale issues are deep-rooted in 
fisheries, and this condition renders fisheries governance an inherently difficult task 
(Kooiman et al. 2005a). 
1.1.3 Uncertainty in governance outcomes 
The high difficulty of managing and governing fisheries is reflected in the uncertain 
nature of govemance outcomes. For instance, marine protected areas (MPAs) is a widely 
advocated and practiced form of fisheries management set up to tackle the difficulty of 
governing a certain spatial range of fisheries system, whether to manage the diversity of 
fish stocks, to protect sensitive habitats or to bring up stakeholder involvement. Yet 
despite the elevated degree of knowledge and experience in conjunction with careful 
planning and design, MP As outcomes are nothing but uncertain, owing to the complex 
variables involved, such as oceanographic, socio-economic and institutional factors 
(Allison et a/. 1998; Le Quesne 2009; Charles and Wilson 2009). Also, where and under 
what conditions co- or community-based management of fisheries resources works and 
where it does not has intrigued many practitioners and academics, generating much 
interest and scholarly speculations ( cf. Wilson et a/. 2003; Nielsen et a/. 2004; Blaikie 
2006; Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2007). A varying degree of success and failure 
experienced in different co-management initiatives under diverse circumstances was seen 
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unintended and surprising to the governing authorities around the world. Only m 
hindsight, challenges were diagnosed and lessons were learned. 
Generally speaking, governors can be awash with confidence and optimism about 
implementing a certain policy measure because of its high rate of success elsewhere or its 
popularity with resource users, and therefore feel optimistic that the intended effect will 
occur. As seen in numerous cases, however, governing outcomes cannot be simply 
guaranteed given the various challenging and complex parameters involved in the 
governance of natural resources. All the emerging perspectives on natural resource 
governance such as adaptive (co-) management (Folke et al. 2002; Armitage et al. 2007) 
and interactive governance (Kooiman et al. 2005a; Bavinck et al. 2005) are grounded 
upon the recognition that a cautious and sensitive approach to governance is almost 
mandatory and that it should be enabled via learning, adaptation, and open and principle-
based interaction. 
1.2 Study aim 
Much uncertainty in governing outcomes transpires because system knowledge is mostly 
limited and imperfect and understanding about fishery stakeholders and their values is 
poor. For instance, achieving conservation may be an overambitious goal when little 
information exists about system complexity or if fishers ' values do not align with the 
tenets of conservation measures. The outcome of any governance effort can never be 
predicted with sheer certainty. However, it can be made more reliable if key unknowns 
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are addressed and taken into consideration for governance decisions in a reasonable and 
responsible manner. One way of reducing uncertainty in governance outcomes, therefore 
lessening the difficulty of governing, is to explore the following two stand-alone, but 
related, questions: (1) whether the governing system is capable of delivering intended 
outcomes from a proposed governance measure in light of system complexity; (2) and 
whether governance measures correspond to the understanding and the worldview of 
those being governed. These two questions are not randomly drawn. Instead, they are 
prompted and become substantiated through the use of the concept, 'governability' , an 
expression of how governable a human-in-nature system is (Kooiman 2003). In this 
sense, they represent two govemability questions at two different scales; the first one 
aims at learning about the system-wide perspective, while the second one focuses on the 
people-level. The concept of governability will be discussed in-depth as the thesis 
progresses. 
Using a Lake Malawi fishery as an illustration, this study employs a multi-level approach 
(i.e. system and individual), conesponding to the two threads of the study aim proposed 
above, in alleviating some of the uncertainties when delivering conservation measures. At 
the system-level, the governability asses ment matrix is used as a tool to gauge the 
capacity of the governing system in addressing broad governing needs and demands 
present in the fisheries system. In doing so, a better understanding about system 
complexity and the challenges faced in fisheries governance can be obtained. At the 
individual-level, as with the narrowed scope of looking at individuals rather than the 
whole system, a specific issue of illegal fishing and conservation is taken as the main 
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focus. Illegal fishing and non-compliance widely occur in Lake Malawi impeding 
conservation goals. Hence, the damage schedule approach is applied to learn about 
stakeholders' internal obligation towards fisheries conservation (Chuenpagdee et al. 
2001, 2003). Specifically, the study aims at examining the extent to which conservation 
measures strike a chord with the resource users and community members. This can also 
be viewed as a governability issue, since the degree to which people comply with 
conservation measures greatly hinges on the deep-rooted support of target groups, and 
also because the governability of the wider system in turn influences the underlying 
support of target groups towards those measures. On the whole, the study intends to show 
that the utilization of the multi-level governability approach focusing on a system 
perspective as well as accounting for an individual viewpoint can help mitigating 
uncertainty in governance outcomes by revealing useful insights about a fisheries system, 
which may not emerge from conventional governance assessments. 
1.2.1 First approach: governability assessment at the system-level 
Despite the ongoing difficulty, fisheries worldwide have been managed and governed at 
various capacities, which are not necessarily at the level by which governing actors can 
effectively deal with the identified governance needs and demands. What happens if a 
governing system is expected to handle a governance issue that is beyond its capacity? 
Such attempt would likely lead to unfulfilled or undesirable governing outcomes, which 
would bring more realism into the governance process, adapting expectation to actual 
experience. At the same time, a growing friction, conflicts and dissatisfaction would also 
likely persist. Moreover, there can also be occasions where capacity is not well-known in 
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governance situations but instead it is merely assumed without much deliberation. In this 
instance, underestimated or overblown capacity would be unfit to properly deal with the 
governance problem at hand, cultivating uncertainty about the outcomes, leading to a 
likely failure and in the end further increasing the aura of difficulty associated with 
fisheries governance. 
It is argued here that the difficulty facing fisheries governance is connected to the usual 
tendency to misjudge the capacities of the governing systems, or to undervalue the 
inherent and constructed complexity of the natural systems and of people that are being 
governed, and to under-appreciate the intricate interactions among these systems. For 
example, fisheries management authorities in many places are mandated to do more than 
what is possibly allowed by the available financial and human resources. Similarly, the 
capacity of a fishing community in becoming a productive partner in a co-management 
regime is often exaggerated. Also, instead of being guided by the precautionary principle, 
the fisheries ecosystem is routinely approached with unwarranted confidence, which 
emits a false faith that the inherent unpredictability associated with the ecosystem will 
play an agreeable hand to hwnan governing efforts. This tendency of overestimated 
governance capacities on the part of governing system and underestimated governance 
needs on what are being governed (in this case, fish and fishers) would likely lead to the 
setting up of unrealistic goals and the inappropriate design of governing institutions. 
Whether such tendency stems from unchecked optimism or socio-political pressure to 
deliver an ideal result, the message is clear: inaccurately-assessed or hurriedly-assumed 
9 
governance capacities and needs would pose an added uncertainty and difficulty to the 
process of governing fisheries. 
What is needed is a candid assessment of governance capacity and needs so that fisheries 
governance can be approached with more realistic measures and goals. One such 
framework is offered by the concept of governability (Kooiman 1993; Kooiman and 
Chuenpagdee 2005). It rests on the idea of a perpetual balancing process between 
governing needs and demands on the one hand and governing capacities on the other 
(Kooiman 1993). Hence, governability is proposed as the measure of the overall capacity 
of a particular fisheries system with regard to achieving realistic governing goals. The 
assumption is that there are limits to how governable fisheries systems are and what level 
of governance capacity they can achieve in terms of meeting the needs and the demands 
of a fishery (Jentoft 2007). For instance, governing challenges may be seen as too great 
for the limited capacity of a governing system. This case would make the particular 
fisheries system less governable. On the contrary, high governability may be inferred for 
a fisheries system where a given governing capacity is faced with relatively low needs 
and demands of those being governed. Further deliberations on this concept have led to 
the development of a systematic scheme of assessing governability (Chuenpagdee et al. 
2008; Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2009; Mahon 2008). This study aims to refine and 
operationalize the conceptual framework through an application to a real-world fishery. 
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1.2.2 Second approach: individual's underlying principle concerning illegal fishing 
and fisheries conservation 
Illegal fishing and non-compliance of regulations poses a serious problem to fisheries 
around the world. It is a governance issue that has a wide implication to all scales of 
fishery. From an inland artisanal fishery in a developing country to a large industrial-scale 
one in the high seas, this is a common concern for those who are involved in the 
governing of fisheries. In this sense, it can perhaps be considered as one of the key factors 
influencing a fisheries ' governability. Manifested through various means such as 
poaching, use of destructive fishing methods, discarding, high-grading of species, zoning 
violation and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, its overall effect threatens 
the integrity and the health of the ecosystem as well as the socio-economic basis of those 
who depend on the very resources. Over the years, a range of fisheries management 
practices and studies have reported its widespread nature and deliberated on ways to 
improve the situation (F AO 2001; Flewwelling eta/. 2002; Crawford el a/. 2004; Sumaila 
eta/. 2006; Hauck and Kroese 2006; Agnew eta/. 2009). 
The overarching policy response to this issue has been the promotion of deterrence by 
heightening enforcement and posing threats of severe sanctions thereby increasing the 
expected monetary costs of violation, in order to raise the level of compliance among 
fishers (Hatcher et a/. 2000). This measure has its theoretical basis on the neoclassical 
thinking which underpins the economic models of criminal behaviour (Becker 1968). It 
assumes that fishers are utility maximizing individuals driven by self-interest whose 
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decision to whether or not engage in illegal fishing is primarily determined by expected 
payoffs and penalties (cf. Sutinen and Gauvin 1989; Sutinen et al. 1990; Furlong 1991). 
However, this kind of policy measure has proven to be extremely expensive and difficult 
to implement. It demands a large quantity of financial and human resources to ensure its 
effectiveness, and when such demand cannot be easily met, as commonly observed in a 
resource-stretched developing world fishery, implementation often suffers and 
consequently so do the ecosystem and the conservation efforts. Even the advanced fishing 
nations equipped with higher enforcement capability and stringent regulatory sanctions 
are not always successful in deterring illegal fishing in their own Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) or in the shared regional waters. Moreover, much empirical evidence in 
fisheries has shown that this economic perspective alone cannot adequately explain the 
whole non-compliance behaviour (Sutinen et a!. 1990). Examples found outside of the 
fisheries sector which illustrate high compliance despite characteristically low 
enforcement and sanctions, such as the low rate of tax evasion (Elster 1990), fwiher 
supports the notion that achieving the optimal level of compliance should involve much 
more than regulatory compliance based on the deterrence model. 
Inspired by the seminal work of Young (1979) and Tyler (1990) who have highlighted the 
importance of normative factors such as legitimacy, social norm and morality on the issue 
of compliance in the public policy domain, fisheries studies have also begun to identify 
normative factors as playing a crucial role in influencing compliance behaviour among 
fishers (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; Charles et al. 1999; 
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H0nneland 1999, 2000; Hatcher eta!. 2000; Jentoft 2000; Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003; 
Gezelius 2004). Co- or participatory management concept popular in the fisheries 
management literature and in practice is precisely an attempt to advance this normative 
aspect through raising legitimacy and fostering social norms (Jentoft 1989; Jentoft and 
McCay 1995). The arising consensus is that policy intervention should be shifted towards 
paying greater attention to these normative factors. 
In line with this thinking, the second part of this research considers the underlying moral 
aspect embedded in conservation to connect with individuals involved in a real-world 
fishery. It attempts to gain a better understanding of the individuals' inclination towards 
conservation measures, widen our appreciation of the link between illegal fishing/non-
compliance and governability, and at the same time to add to the current policy discourse 
on illegal fishing. Although frequently mentioned in the literature as one of the important 
normative factors, a fisheries study that focuses on the moral aspect is rare. This rarity 
potentially arises from the slippery nature of studying such topic from both the conceptual 
point of view as well as the methodological one. In this study, individual principle 
relating to fisheries conservation was chosen to represent the moral dimension involved in 
illegal fishing. Principle is central to governance theory as it is one of the fundamental 
notions forming a normative dimension of governance (Kooiman el al. 2005). A detailed 
conceptual elaboration on 'responsibility to conserve' principle (or shortly conservation 
principle) is supplied in Chapter 3. 
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No established quantitative methodology for examining one's moral principle is readily 
available. Although the field of cognitive psychology has developed tests that measure 
the stages of moral development in an individual, they have a different focus and a 
broader scope than what is intended here. In order to provide an indication of the 
conservation principle held by various stakeholders, this study relies on the damage 
schedule approach (Chuenpagdee et al. 2001), which has been shown to reliably elicit 
stakeholders' judgments on environmentally damaging activities and resource losses. This 
approach is deemed suitable for assessing something as intangible as one's underlying 
principle, and the relative simplicity in its methods also presents an advantage. The 
inferred conservation principle of the stakeholders would show how their internal 
tendency is oriented towards fisheries conservation in the context of illegal fishing. 
Further, the revealed insights can suggest policy direction towards improving the 
likelihood of realizing conservation goals - a way to increase governability in this 
important governance outcome. 
1.3 Southeast Arm of Lake Malawi fishery as a case study 
A Lake Malawi fishery situated in the southeast end of the water body called the 
Southeast Arm (SEA) was chosen as an appropriate case location for this res arch for the 
following reasons: (1) illegal fishing is observed to be rampant and it is contributing to 
the decline of fisheries resources (Bulirani 2005; Banda et al. 2005a) (2) historically, a 
policy response to deal with the illegal fishing issue has been through the enforcement of 
regulations and the threat of sanctions (Hara 2006), (3) participatory management has 
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been attempted in the last 10 years but with limited success (Njaya 2007, 2008), and (4) 
due to the limited availability of financial and human resources in managing the fisheries, 
an alternative policy exploration is urgently needed. This largely small-scale fishery 
provides an important source of livelihoods, income generation and animal protein for 
many Malawians. However, the changes in species composition and catch size coupled 
with depleting inshore stocks in recent decades have intensified concerns among the 
governing authority and fishing communities. 
The SEA as the study area offered major advantages in terms of logistical and expert 
support due to the connection established with the Sustainable Fisheries for Food Security 
(SFFS) project administered by the Marine Institute in St. John' s, Newfoundland. The 
SFFS project is an Associalion of Universities and CoJleges of Canada (AUCC) -
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funded capacity-building project 
aimed to strengthen the fisheries officer training curriculum in Malawi as well as to reach 
out to selected fishing communities on urgent issues such as fish spoilage. Therefore, this 
study greatly benefited from the existing network of partnership and working 
relationships with key institutions in Malawi such as the Department of Fisheries (DoF) at 
the national level, the Malawi College of Fisheries at the regional level, and the Beach 
Village Committees (BVC) at the community level. 
1.4 Research questions 
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The fundamental aspiration of this study is to explore a way to deal with uncertainty in 
the outcomes of governance measures, which are required to alleviate the challenges 
facing the fisheries. A conceptual direction I take in this thesis is towards investigating 
governability of a fisheries system; in other words, by learning to whjch degree and in 
which areas a fisheries system is governable and, if possible, how it can be made more 
governable. This was to be facilitated by the two broad objectives of the study: to reveal 
inherent and constructed needs and demands of the fishery as governing limitations and 
highlight the capacity of the governing system as potentials for addressing those 
challenges; and to uncover stakeholder's internal tendency towards conservation in 
relation to illegal fishing activities through an examination of one's underlying principle. 
In promoting these broad objectives, two research questions were formulated, 
1. Where and to what extent do governing capacity and governing challenges 
exist in the fisheries system of the SEA viewed through the application of the 
govemability assessment framework? 
2. Can any plausible linkages between individual conservation principle and 
illegal gear use be uncovered to provide empirical support to the view that 
one's conservation principle has potential to influence one's fishing choice 
and behaviour? 
Answering the first question would give us a general, system-wide account of the knotted 
aspects of the system that lend the fisheries less governable. It would also provide some 
clues about the illegal fishing situation and conservation efforts taking place in the SEA 
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fishery, as any governance issue (including illegal fishing) is in many ways dependent on 
the inherent and constructed system characteristics. Answering the second question would 
generate more direct findings that can be specifically linked to the governability and 
uncertainty of conservation measures in the fishery. 
1.5 Research objectives 
Following the research questions, six specific research objectives were pursued. They 
were: 
1. To identify aspect(s) of the SEA fishery that are more governable, or less 
governable, based on the assessment scheme of governability; 
2. To assess the level of awareness about the damaging impact of fishing 
activities among stakeholders and deduce about their conservation 
understanding; 
3. To gauge the level of inclination towards conservation among stakeholders; 
4. To identify the level of agreement between various stakeholder groups on the 
topic of Question 2 and 3; 
5. To explore any plausible linkages that may exist between individual 
conservation principle and illegal gear use, through the development and 
application of"conservation principle category"; and 
6. To make policy inferences based on the examination of the conservation 
principle in regard to addressing the concerns of illegal fishing 
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1.6 Organization of the thesis 
This thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overall picture of the 
fisheries issue under consideration and introduces the aims, research questions and 
specific objectives. Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the SEA fishery, including its 
geography, history, main target fish species and illegal fishing practice, in order to 
provide a place-based context with which the discussion of the subsequent chapters can 
be conceived. A review of theoretical foundations is presented in Chapter 3 delving into a 
range of literature from governance, govemability to fisheries compliance. This chapter is 
intended to provide a theoretical context for the research as well as to explain the 
conceptual thinking that sets the basis for the design of the method used to examine the 
conservation principle in this research. Chapter 4 describes the mixed methods research 
utilizing both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. The govemability 
assessment framework forms the major qualitative data method along with informal 
interviews and field observation. Quantitative data was collected following the damage 
schedule approach via the use of paired comparison questionnaire survey. Secondary data 
of various sources, such as journal articles, government reports and theses, was also 
consulted. 
The next two chapters present the analyses and the results. Chapter 5 reports the findings 
of the system-level govemability assessment applied to the SEA fishery. It provides a 
holistic description of the research site and the fisheries system according to the 
govemability assessment matrix in order to answer the first research question. Also, the 
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ways in which the various levels of the system-level govemabilities determined through 
system properties may affect the illegal fishing situation is discussed. Chapter 6 delves 
into the issue-specific investigation of the govemability of illegal fishing and 
conservation principle by analyzing questionnaire survey data and displaying the results. 
The final two chapters bring together the results of the research to reflect upon the 
findings and make policy inferences. Chapter 7 is dedicated to the interpretation and 
discussion of the questionnaire survey results with the aid of supplementary information 
gathered from other forms of data collection methods. The chapter also puts forward 
several policy suggestions that may provide a direction as to how to move forward with 
the governance options regarding fisheries conservation in the A. Moreover, it 
attempts to weave together the two levels of governability measurement in order to 
generate an integrated discourse about the overall govemability of conservation measures 
and illegal fishing in the SEA. Chapter 8 recaps the research objectives and discusses the 
lessons learned from examining the two research questions. In addition, the central 
theoretical objective of dealing with uncertainty of governance options, with particular 
attention to conservation measures, is re-traced reflecting on the theory, study results and 
discussions presented in the thesis. Finally, several recommendations are made to point 
towards future research needs. 
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Chapter 2 Southeast Arm Fishery of Lake Malawi 
Plate 2.1 A fisher in a dug-out canoe (Photo credit: Nigel Allen) 
Plate 2.2 An mbuna feeding on a rocky substrate 
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2.1 Geography 
Malawi is a land-locked country bordering Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania (Figure 
2.1 ). With over one-fifth of its surface covered with water, Malawi is blessed with a great 
range of fishing grounds contained witrun. The major water bodies are Lake Malawi, 
Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River, Lower Shire River, Lake Chilwa and Lake Chiuta. 
The biggest and the most important is Lake Malawi, which is the third largest lake in 
Africa with the surface area of about 28,800 km2• Lake Malawi can be further divided 
into seven sections largely coinciding with the district administrative boundaries, wruch 
are, from north to south, Karonga, Nkhata Bay, Likoma, Nkhotakota, Salima, Mangochi 
(Southwest Arm) and Mangochi (Southeast Arm) (Banda et al. 2006). The Southeast Arm 
(SEA) is a semi-opened water body located at the southern end of the lake (Figure 2.1). 
The surface area of the SEA is estimated to be 2,000 km2 or about 8.3% of the entire lake 
(Hara 2001). 
As part of the Great African Rift Valley, shorelines of Lake Malawi are typically rocky 
and extend steeply down to water depths of over 200 m very quickly (F AO 1993 ). In 
contrast, the SEA exhibits relatively shallow water depth of Jess than I 00 metres, with 
predominant presence of sandy and muddy bottoms (Crul 1997). Furthermore, the 
blowing of seasonal south-easterly trade winds in winter (May to August) causes 
upwelling and the mixing of entire water column, which help bring up the nutrient-rich 
bottom waters to the euphotic zone. Enabled by the favourable limnological 
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characteristics, the SEA enjoys high biological productivity making the SEA one of the 
primary sources of fish in the country for generations. 
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Figure 2.1 Map of the Southeast Arm of Lake Malawi. Also shown are the Upper Shire 
River and Lake Malombe to represent Malawi ' s southern aquatic system. 
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2.2 A brief history of the fishery 
In the 19111 century and before the end of the First World War, the fishery in the SEA, and 
most likely everywhere else, was regarded under the common-property regime regulated 
by family heads, village heads and chiefs, although no exclusive property or tenurial 
rights were established (Chirwa 1996; Kasulo and Perrings 2006). The communities along 
the shore enjoyed nearly unlimited rights and access to the lake resources. The 1920s saw 
the beginning of a transformation in fisheries from being a subsistence endeavour to a 
commercial activity, as fishers were observed taking a large quantity of fish using traps 
and lines near the southern end of the S A and taking it to the markets in major towns 
such as Zomba and Blantyre. The fishery shifting into a commercial venture was echoed 
by the development of large-scale commercial/industrial fishing enterprise in the area. 
The SEA is one of the few areas in Malawi which has seen a viable large-scale 
commercial fishing, which was begun in the 1930s by European entrepreneurs and has 
flourished for nearly half a century (McCracken 1987; Chirwa 1996). The 1940s saw two 
major developments in the fisheries governance of the SEA. First, 'indirect rule' was 
introduced by the British colonial government which established the Traditional 
Authority structure and handed the traditional leaders (e.g. chiefs) the responsibility of 
handling all government activities at the local levels, such as settling civil disputes and 
collecting taxes and fees. This system continued even after the independence in 1964, 
with the traditional authority structures still standing (Njaya 2007). Secondly, in 1946, the 
Department of Fisheries was instituted by the colonial government, and the first fisheries 
regulation in Malawi - Fisheries Ordinance - was published in 1949 (Hara 2006). Up 
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until then, the colonial intervention in fisheries matters was marked with ambivalence and 
ineffectiveness. McCracken (1987, p.429) notes of the governing situation during the 
colonial era by saying: 
Particularly striking was the relative lack of colonial intervention in fish ing despite the 
fact that in other areas of the economy elaborate controls were constructed over 
marketing and production. Pre-colonial rulers often associated themselves intimately with 
the fate of the fishing industry, preparing charms to ensure good yields and prohibiting 
fishing at ce11ain times of the year. 
In 1950s, a large contingent of Malawian capitalist fishers set up fishing businesses in the 
area upon their return from South Africa or South Rhodesia (McCracken 1987). In 
addition, a close proximity to major town centres such as Zomba and Blantyre has also 
helped fish trading and marketing activities to blossom. By this time, even the small-scale 
fishing already held a strong commercial nature, rather than the one of subsistence. 
In the period following the independence in 1964, the fisheries sector was under the speJJ 
of the development/modernization agenda, led by Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda who ruled 
the country for 30 years until 1994 in a one-party political system. The Banda regime' s 
high degree of central government intervention also reached the fisheries sector 
jumpstarting various development initiatives such as production-oriented modernization 
policies, moving fisheries offshore, centralized fish marketing system, and fish culture. 
However many of these top-down initiatives supported by donor assistance were seen as 
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problematic due to the neglect of small-scale fishing and fishers, who in fact make up a 
large majority of the SEA fishery (Allison et al. 2002). Some externally-driven 
technologies were successful, however. Plank boats promoted by the Department of 
Fisheries began to replace dugout canoes. Also, the introduction of nylon gillnets 
improved the efficiency in fishing, while smoking kilns from West Africa improved fuel-
efficient in fish processing. Overall, the fishing industry in Malawi expanded 
substantially during the second half of the twentieth century (McCracken 1987). 
Today domestic fish production in Malawi comprises over 70% of the national animal 
protein intake. It also provides employment to more than 300,000 people and supports the 
livelihoods of 10% of the population 1• In addition, the fisheries sector contributes 4% to 
the total Gross Domestic Product (GoM 2007). Figure 2.2 displays the catch trend of the 
entire Lake Malawi and the SEA from the period of 1976 to 2000 comparing to the 
national yield. Despite its small size to the entire lake, contributions from the SEA have 
always been high. As can be judged from Figure 2.2, from 1976 to 2000, the SEA 
contributed to the yearly average of 42% of the total production from Lake Malawi and 
25% of the national production (Weyl 2005). The importance of fishing in the SEA and 
how it can be sustained are systematically uncovered as part of the govemability 
assessment detailed in Chapter 5. 
1 The population of Malawi is estimated to be 12.3 million in 2005 (GoM 2007). Given that Mangochi 
district which entirely encompasses the SEA had a projected population of796,272 for the year 2000 (Hara 
200 I), the author cautiously approximates the number of people inhabiting in the SEA area to be around 
500,000. 
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2.3 Target fish species 
There are several major fish species targeted in the SEA. While some species have gained 
importance in more recent years, one species has garnered utmost popularity and fetched 
high value for many decades, thereby immensely influencing management interventions 
in the process. Oreochromis spp. is a genus of large tilapiine cichlids with a local name of 
chambo. This genus has 47 species (Froese and Pauly 2009), but the three endemic 
species that make up the chambo stock in Lake Malawi are Oreochromis squamipinni , 
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0. karongae and 0. lidole as shown in Plate 2.3. They are demersal species found in 
shallow waters of Jess than 50 m deep (Banda et al. 2005a). Chambo primarily feed on 
phytoplankton, although zooplankton is also present in their diet. They exhibit a unique 
breeding pattern, uncommon in other 'tilapia', by being maternal mouthbrooders in 
collective nesting grounds at depths of 5 to 40 m. After release from the mouth of the 
female parent, juveniles migrate to nursery grounds in shallow waters. They remain in 
this area until they are large enough to join the main stock in deeper water. Sexual 
maturity happens at about 24 em and takes about 3 years (F AO 1993; Banda et al. 
2005b ). It is speculated that, once the stock becomes depleted, such biological 
characteristics of chambo may pose a greater difficulty for the quick recovery of the 
stock, especially compared to other popular tilapiine species such as 0. niloticus (Banda 
et al. 2005b ). 
A large variety of fishing gears has been employed to target chambo. Small-scale 
fisheries mainly use gill net, beach seine net and open-water seine net called chilimira, 
and large-scale fisheries use mainly trawls and purse seine (Banda et a/. 2005a). The 
shape and operation of beach seine and chilimira is illustrated in Appendix A. The 
chambo are the most preferred and valuable food fishes in Malawi and have directly and 
indirectly supported livelihoods of many local people. Also, a number of technical studies 
carried out over the years reflects a concentrated attention on the chambo stock including 
Lowe's two-year study on the biology of chambo in as early as 1945 (Lowe 1952) and 
Food and Agriculture Organization-led study on further biological and socioeconomic 
knowledge on the management of chambo, which ran from 1988 to 1992 (FAO 1993). In 
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the 1990s, however, the suspected consequence of perennial over-fishing appeared true 
(Figure 2.3) and the population collapsed causing widespread concern and urgent 
management interventions in order to induce the recovery of the chambo stock. Yet, little 
sign of recovery has been observed to date 
Plate 2.3 Comparison of 
Oreochromis squamipinnis, 
0. karongae, and 0. Lidole 
(top to bottom) (Source: 
http://malawicichlids. com/turnOO 1 
_oreo_sq_ka_li.jpg photo credit: 
George F. Turner) 
In the meantime, fishers have intensified the catching of smaller, less-valuable species to 
sustain their fishing-related ways of living, which has emerged as the major fishery 
resources of the area that are increasingly being marketed and consumed (Figure 2.3). 
They are anchovy-like small pelagic species called usipa (Engraulicypris sardella), 
various species belonging to haplochromine cichlids such as kambuzi (Lethrinops spp., 
and Otopharynx spp. among others) and utaka (Copadichromis spp.) (FAO 1993). These 
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three fish groups currently make up much of the total biomass of the fishery resources in 
the area. Another fish group that is of significance is colourful, rock-dwelling ornamental 
fishes, locally called mbuna. They are part of an extremely diverse family of 
haplochromine cichlids, and hold particular importance in the aquarium fish trade as well 
as the tourism sector. Plate 2.4 displays the appearance of each of the fishery resources 
identified above. 
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Plate 2.4 (a) Engraulicypris sardella, usipa; (b) Copadichromis virginalis, one of the 
many species that make up utaka stock; (c) Otopharynx tetrastigma, one of the species 
that are referred to as kambuzi; (d) Pseudotropheus tropheops, one of the many species 
that are referred to as mbuna (Source: a http:!/ http://www.akvastranky.unas.cz/malawi.html) 
(b: http://research.yale.edu/peabody!CICHLIDICK/copadsp1.jpg) 
(c: http://research.yale.edu/peabody/C!CHL/DIQZJtetrastg.jpg) 
(d: http://www.fishbase.orglimages/species/Pstro_uO.jpg) 
2.4 Illegal fishing practice 
Historically, regulations govermng the SEA fishery have been largely based on the 
findings of biological and ecological investigations, which have led to the enactment of 
provisions that emphasize biological concerns such as breeding habits and size limits 
(Hara 2006). As follows, prior to the early 1990s, conservation or preservation was the 
main paradigm with which the regulations were aligned (Donda 2005), and this condition 
has set the basis for defining recommended fishing practices versus illegal fishing. Thus, 
in principle, abiding by such regulations (i.e. practicing only the legally-allowed fishing 
operation) can be, in fact, seen as promoting conservation. Despite the intent, illegal 
30 
fishing was widely practiced, and the insufficient regard to the socio-economic or cultural 
dimension of fishing in the formulation and implementation of the regulations wan begun 
to be perceived as a major reason why the efforts to curb illegal fishing have proved to be 
ineffective (Hara 2006). In the 1990s, co-management regime was introduced to bring up 
the involvement of resource users in management and enforcement of fisheries 
regulations. However, to this date, for various reasons, some of which will be 
systematically explored in this thesis, effective means to minimize the extent of illegal 
fishing have failed to take hold. 
In the SEA fishery, the most common forms of illegal fishing are u e of destructive gear 
gear modification2, fishing without proper license and fishing eason/zoning violation 
(Bulirani 2005; pers. observation). One form of gear that has been a major contention in 
the SEA fishery is an open-water seine called nkacha, whose shape and operation is 
illustrated in Figure 2.4. Originally devised and used in nearby Lake Malombe, there has 
been unprecedented increase in the use of this gear in Lake Malawi since the mid-1990s, 
particularly in the SEA, as nkacha fishers would migrate to the S A following a closed 
season in Lake Malombe or simply seeking a better catch elsewhere (Manase 2001). This 
poses a serious concern since the operation of this gear in Lake Malawi is prohibited 
according to the regulations on account that the gear destroys nursery grounds for 
important fish stocks, including chambo (GoM 2000). Currently in the SEA, there are 
certain beaches where nkacha operation is harboured and concentrated. In these beaches 
2 This can take several fonns : smaller mesh size; enlarging the length or width of the gear; or alternative 
design of the gear such as attaching a small trawl net at the end of a beach eine to catch non-selective ly, 
locally called kandwindwi. 
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there appears to be weak political wiiJ to comply with the regulations as well as a lack of 
formal enforcement capabilities. As the case of nkacha succinctly exemplifies, illegal 
fishing is a multi-dimensioned issue that intricately involves both the natural, social and 
governance aspects. Combined with its wide-ranging nature in type and occurrence, it 
remains a major topic that needs to be duly addressed in promotion of conservation goals. 
An in-depth examination of illegal fishing in the SEA from a governance perspective wiiJ 
follow in the subsequent chapters. 
A B 
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Figure 2.4 Shape (a) and operation (b-f) ofnkacha net (Source FAO 1993) 
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Chapter 3 Theory and Conceptual Background 
Plate 3. 1 Fish caught by its gill in a beach seine 
Plate 3.2 Chambo harvested from an experimental cage culture in the SEA 
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The theoretical background for this thesis is presented in six components throughout this 
chapter. First, I start out with the introduction of the emerging idea in fisheries 
governance called interactive governance, which forms the theoretical backbone for the 
entire study. This is where the research ideas and motivation find their origins. Following 
that, two key concepts of interactive governance, governability and meta-governance, are 
examined in detail. Fisheries literature are reviewed in the next two sections focusing 
especially on the moral dimension and compliance. In the last section, I offer a model that 
conceptualizes how conservation principle is developed and used in this research. 
3.1 Interactive governance 
Governance is a concept that has been around for a long time. From its origin in the 
Greek medieval time with the verb kubernan (to pilot or steer), it has branched into 
several discourses such as public policy and administration, international relation , 
comparative politics whose focus lies on how to bring about economic development and 
democratization into parts of the world, and more recently corporate governance (Kjrer 
2004). Although no single, unifying definition of governance exists, some common ideas 
emerged in the last few decades to give it a reasonably coherent meaning. Governance is 
seen as something more than government and beyond management (Rhodes 1996; Stoker 
1998). In other words, it includes other actors and processes that are placed outside the 
narrow realm of government and the daily management routine. In this sense, private 
actors such as the market and civil society as well as non-governmental organizations 
have a crucial role to play. Governance is also conceived as an interactive process which 
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involves various forms of partnership because no single actor has the knowledge and 
resource capacity to tackle problems unilaterally (Kooiman 1993). The mode of 
interaction captured in the above stipulation is often manifested in the form of a network 
involving multiple interdependent actors with capability to self-organize. For this reason, 
Rhodes ( 1996) posits that governance is about managing networks. 
The interactive governance for fisheries captures these key notions and provides a unique 
perspective on how fisheries governance can be viewed and tackled under the given 
challenges facing the fisheries (Kooiman et al. 2005a; Bavinck el al. 2005). Its premise 
lies in the belief that ecological-socio-political systems imply interactions, and 
interactions are the fundamental conditions for the existence of those systems (Kooiman 
2008). In this sense, any fisheries or human-in-nature system can be characterized and 
evaluated by the concept of interaction whether through the presence or the absence of 
interactions, or the types and the nature of interactions, or the actors involved in 
interactions, or finally the speed at which interactions happen and hindrances that exist to 
impede its vigour. The conceptual exploration of this perspective has come to the fore in 
recent years through collaboration by the FISHGOVNET members 
(www.fishgovnet.org), which is composed of academics and practitioners around the 
world, whose interdisciplinary deliberation was grounded in Kooiman's concept of 
governance (Kooiman 1993; Kooiman 2003). The interactive governance is defined as: 
the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve societal problems and 
create societal opportunities. It includes the formulation and application of principles 
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guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them (Kooiman et a/. 
2005a, p.17). 
Stemming from this definition, interactive governance, first of all , recogmzes that 
fisheries are characteristically diverse, complex, dynamic and operative at various scales. 
Hence, diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale issues of fishery systems become 
fundamental building blocks of a governance structure, and therefore must be carefully 
scrutinized in assessing governance potential (Jentoft 2007). Interactive governance 
employs the terminology of 'system' and applies it to a fishery. Shown in Figure 3.1 a 
fishery system is distinguished into three sub-systems, which are ' system-to-be-
governed' , 'governing system' and a web of interactions between the two systems called 
'governing interactions' (Jentoft el al. 2007). System-to-be-governed refers not only to 
the natural and the socio-economic systems, but also to the governing system itself as an 
object of governance. Governing system entails those who are involved in the governing 
of fisheries and their sphere of actions - be it the state, the market or civil society but 
more likely a combination of the various actors. Governing interactions are a pattern and 
process of interactions between the governing system and the systems-to-be-governed 
that constitute the push and pull of certain governing forces such as power and consent 
that shape how fisheries governance materializes. 
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System properties 
Diversity 
Complexity 
Dynamics 
Scale 
Interactive attributes 
Representation/Participation Information/Communication 
Learning/Adaptation Appreciation/Collaboration 
System variables 
Components 
Relationships 
Interactions 
Boundaries 
Figure 3.1 Fishery system made up of governing system, system-to-be-governed and 
governing interactions; system properties, system variables and interactive attributes are 
also presented (Adapted from Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2009). 
Interactive governance adopts the perspective that governance is multi-dimensional and 
both analytic and normative. Figure 3.2 displays the three sets of governance attributes. 
First, elements are the images, instruments and actions used in governance. For example, 
'Malthusian overfishing' (Pauly 1997) is an image of a problem in fishery, which may 
lead to the use of instruments such as marine protected areas (MPAs) or individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs), and subsequent actions. Secondly, modes of governance 
concern the structural form of a governance undertaking such as self, hierarchical and co-
governance. Self-governance is characterized by the minimal intervention of central 
governing authority and enabled by the capacity of the governed to self-organize. 
Hierarchical governance, on the other hand, is about central planning and rigidity, while 
co-governance attempts to share the role of governing between the governors and the 
governed. Thirdly, the layer at which the governing elements take place and the modes 
constructed is presented as the three orders of governance. The first order deals with day-
to-day fisheries management activitie required to solve societal problems and create 
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societal opportunities. The second order refers to the institutional design and set-up that 
enables the first order processes. The third, or meta-, order stipulates that fisheries 
governance should be grounded on certain values, norms and principles. In other words, 
activities involved in the first and second order governing as well as the governing 
interactions should be guided and directed by the underlying principles and values that 
are held by the governing players. This is where governance can have its normative 
appeal, and in fact, the interactive governance proposes that normative principles guiding 
the governance process should be made explicit so that they can be explained, defended, 
discussed and evaluated as part of the governing interactions (Kooiman and Jentoft in 
press). 
Elements of Governance , 
• Image 
• Instrument 
• Action 
i 
Diversity Intention Governing Orders 
.,, 
Complexity Interactions • First H Governability Dynamics • Second Scale • Meta-Structure .... 
~ 
Modes of Governance 
• Self 
• Hierarchy 
• Co-
Figure 3.2 Schematics of interactive governance showing attributes that are involved in 
governing of a fisheries system (Source: Kooiman and Chuenpagdee 2005, p.325) 
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So far, the interactive governance approach has been largely discussed in a conceptual 
manner and in the broad context of world's fisheries. While Mahon (2008) has applied it 
to examine three fisheries in the Caribbean, and Chuenpagdee and Jentoft (2009) 
borrowed the case of the Gulf of Thailand fishery in their govemability analysis, being 
formally put together only in recent years with the publication of Fish for Life, interactive 
fisheries governance has not been extensively supported through empirical studies thus 
far. As a result, the practicality of the interactive governance approach has been 
cautiously undermined by some, claiming that this approach is only of interest and use to 
an academic circle (Symes 2006; Annala 2007). Future empirical studies that test and 
push the boundaries of the theoretical base are expected to improve its applicability and 
acceptance. 
3.2 Governability 
Figure 3.2 displays govemability as a stand-alone, yet interconnected, entity that both 
feeds into and is fed by the governance attributes. The concept of governability was first 
articulated in Kooiman (1993) succinctly summed up as the adjustment and balancing 
process between governing needs and governing capacities. The needs roughly represent 
social-political problems that arise in a society, while the capacities are viewed as 
' solutions' that are acted upon to satisfy those needs. He proposed that needs are not 
solely the domain of society, that is, needs also arise in the realm of governn1ent. 
Similarly, capacities are not only held by the government, but they are also found in the 
society, for example, in the fishing communities and in nature. He put an emphasis on an 
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interactive communication and decision-making process, through which needs and 
capacities can be integrated and matched with each other. 
Amidst a series of further deliberation, the govemability concept has begun to gam 
maturity and develop into something that can be more systematically approached, as 
shown in Kooiman (2003). Governability is posed as an overarching (composite) quality 
of a social-political entity. By this, he meant that it can be a starting or culminating point 
of the discussion on governance of a certain society or a fishery because, in a sense, all 
features involved in governance ultimately influence governability and vice versa. In 
other words, system properties such as diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale issues 
exhibited in a system as well as those aspects that make up the system such as governing 
modes and elements all play a role in shaping the level of govemability (i.e. they all 
interact with and influence the level of 'fit' between needs and capacities). Assessing this 
level of fit in a manner that is practical in a real governance setting would provide a 
strategic viewpoint from which to analyze a certain governance situation and therefore 
may prove advantageous in improving its governance. 
An initial attempt to move the concept of governability from theory to practice IS 
enclosed in Kooiman et al. (2005a) as the interactive governanc was given a more 
specific (yet still fairly broad) context - fisheries. A chapter by Kooiman and 
Chuenpagdee (2005) presents a crude measurement scheme that assesses a 'northern' 
fishery, a 'southern' fishery and aquaculture enterprises, as shown in Table 3 .1. While 
this assessment relied on high degree of generalization which does not hold much weight 
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in influencing real-life policy per se, it was an important characterization that paved the 
way for future studies. Jentoft et al. (2007) in examining MP As and their relation to 
governance under the light of governability, Chuenpagdee et al. (2008) in assessing the 
governability in capture fisheries, aquaculture and coastal zone, Mahon (2008) of three 
fisheries in the Wider Caribbean, Bavinck and Salagrama (2008) of captures fisheries in 
the Bay of Bengal, and Chuenpagdee and Jentoft (2009) of the Gulf of Thailand fisheries 
are all recent important extensions in advancing this research issue while producing 
alternative insights into their respective fisheries which may not emerge from 
conventional fishery assessments. Nonetheless, governability assessments thus far are still 
largely rooted in theory, and conducted based on authors' expertise and knowledge about 
the studied fishery rather than being set up as a more structured empirical study that is 
rigorously researched. 
Table 3. 1 Scoring governability for hypothetical examples of northern and southern 
fisheries and aquaculture enterprises (Source: Kooiman and Chuenpagdee 2005, p.348) 
Criteria A 'Northern ' A 'Southern ' Aquacultural 
fishery fishery enterprises 
Representation of DCD*/scale L H M 
Rationality of fits of elements M L H 
Responsiveness of modes M H L 
Performance of orders L M M 
Overall L H M 
*DCD = Diversity, complexity, dynamics; H, M, L = High, Medium and Low 
The need to make the governability framework more applicable for assessment and 
comparison purpose is underscored in the latest refinement of the governability concept 
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(Kooiman 2008). Many predict that this will be a long-term research task that is likely 
arduous and requires a high degree of collaboration and interaction between various 
thinkers and practitioners. The govemability assessment conducted as part of this thesis 
research is a step in the direction of operationalizing the concept. What is unique this time 
is that governability assessment was conducted as a (quasi-) empirical study that involved 
literature review, informal interviews and field observation. The governability assessment 
of the SEA fishery adds value to the continuing discourse through encouraging further 
research on the subject and providing some practical insights on the fisheries governance 
in the study area. 
3.3 Meta-governance 
The articulation of the third order of governance, 'meta-governance', or governing of 
governance, is where it has been identified as the most distinguishing and innovative, yet 
also potentially controversial, facet about the interactive governance (Symes 2006; 
McGoodwin 2007). Symes (2006), in reviewing Fish for Life notes that the "firm 
foundations in ethical values and carefully articulated governing principles" (Symes 
2006, p.ll6) on which interactive governance bases its focus is a pioneering notion that 
could lead fisheries governance to a new height. Meanwhile, McGoodwin (2007) cautions 
that the utmost focus on ethically-grounded, humanistic-minded governing principles may 
be criticized by skeptics as overly ideal and therefore the meta-governance concept may 
face resistance from certain participants in the fishery. 
42 
- ---------~-~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~-------------
The explicit attention on meta-governance stems from the acknowledgement that 
governance is value-ridden from top to bottom (Kooiman 2003). It rests on the idea that 
while governing and governance may be seen largely as an analytical concept, what 
governs the governing is highly normative. Hence, this implies that one cannot escape nor 
should not ignore the normative aspect involved in governance since it lays a foundation 
for all governing activities whether they are day-to-day management tasks, policy 
formulation or institutional restructuring. To facilitate the connection to this meta-
perspective, interactive governance offers a set of norms or criteria to judge governance 
with. Rationality is a norm for evaluating the three governing elements, image, instrwnent 
and action. Responsiveness is a criterion for reviewing the governance modes, while 
performance is the yard-stick to judge the orders of governance. However, Kooiman 
(2003) notes that these meta-principles are his personal choice as a 'meta-governor', and 
the essence of interactive governance follows that other suitable normative notions of 
meta-principles conceived by others should come forward and be made explicit so that 
they can be discussed and negotiated as part of regular governing interactions. 
Looking at the meta-principles in fisheries context as detailed in Kooiman et al. (2005b), 
interactive governance stipulate that sustainability should be the guiding principle for 
image formation, although sustainability can be a weary concept that is open to varying 
degrees of interpretation. Efficiency should be the main criterion for choosing an 
instrument. Whether it is economic, environmental or social efficiency that governors are 
most interested in, instrwnents that maximizes the desired benefits and minimize the cost 
should receive high penchant for governing use. Action component should be guided by 
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precautionary principle to safely deal with uncertainties intrinsic to any fisheries and to 
reduce the occurrence of unacceptable or undesirable situations. 
For modes of governance, respect is suggested as a meta-principle for self-governance. 
Respect for the autonomy of collections of individuals and their institutions can go a long 
way to ensure that self-governing capacity of groups is upheld. In the context of fisheries, 
a local management regime by resource users requires respect from government officers 
and other user groups to achieve the advantages of self-governance such as lesser cost and 
utilization of local ecological knowledge. Such respect, however, should come with 
reciprocity as "autonomy is not a principle people can claim, without also taking the 
autonomy of others into consideration (Kooiman eta/. 2005b, p.273)". Inclusiveness is a 
meta-principle for co-governance. Co-governance is about sharing governance 
responsibilities between the fishing community and the government. Inclusion of 
different stakeholders to the decision-making table would mean raising legitimacy and 
participation by having diverse views represented and fostering the spirit of collaboration. 
However, mere inclusion that is shrouded in power imbalance or subject to an unfair 
process should be guarded against. Instead, co-governance regime must try to ensure 
meaningful inclusion of various stakeholders. Lastly for the mode, equity is particularly 
well-suited to guide hierarchical governance. Through both procedural equity and 
outcome equity which promote fair procedures and equitable distribution of costs, 
benefits, hardships and burden-sharing, hierarchical governing interventions could garner 
adequate legitimacy to ensure effective functioning. 
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With the premise that performance is a concept that binds the three governing orders, 
effectiveness is first conjured up as the meta-principle for first-order governing, by which 
day-to-day management tasks geared towards problem-solving and opportwlity-creation 
are appropriately evaluated. Second-order governing which entails institutional 
framework and structural aspects of governing interactions should be approached with 
legitimacy in mind, since it is generally assumed that a high degree of legitimacy towards 
the governance structure will have a greater chance of achieving its goals. Finally, moral 
responsibility is called in to guide the process of third-order (meta-) governing. There will 
inevitably be moral dilemmas and hard-choices in the way of governors. How they decide 
to deal with the moral conflicts and inconsistencies is often a critical issue that has 
substantial consequences to governance situation, in turn affecting the rest of governance 
actors. In this sense, taking responsibility for the specific governing interactions and how 
governance subsequently unfolds appears to be the most fundamental normative principle 
that will set the standard for governing of governance. Overall, the vital role that meta-
governance occupies in the whole interactive governance perspective is succinctly 
summed as such: "ethical and moral questions are the essence of the governance domain. 
They are not only part of meta-socio-political interactions, but in a final sense, they are 
also the foundations of these interactions (Kooiman eta!. 2005b, p.281 ). This view serves 
as the initial motivation for taking an interest in the moral dimension in this research. 
A further elaboration provided by Kooiman and Jentoft (in press) distinguishes four 
variables relevant in the meta- or normative discourse, which are values, norms, 
principles and choices. The distinction is not clear-cut, as one can imagine. However, it 
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may still be a useful exercise to make sense of the meta-governance scheme by breaking 
down into components. It is conceptualized that values give rise to norms, which in turn 
establish principles, which then shape choices and therefore behaviours (Figure 3.3). In 
this scheme, values are the most fundamental notions, while choices/behaviours represent 
the most applied and specific. Principles are conceived as an intermediate position that is 
still founded in the general notions of what is right or wrong, but applied in the sense that 
it has a direct association with the choices and behaviours that the governance actors 
make. Norms hold a hint of practical overtone derived from values while linking to 
principles. Here, a relevant example would be seeing sustainability as a value, natured-
centred environmental ethics3 as a norm, conservation as a principle and compliance of 
regulations as a choice/behaviour. 
Value Norm Principle Choice/ 
behaviour 
t t t t 
(e.g. sustainability nature-centred view conservation compliance) 
Figure 3.3 Schematics of normative ideas m meta-governance process (Adapted from 
Kooiman and Jentoft in press) 
Hard choices that frequently tum up in fisheries are value-ridden (Bailey and Jentoft 
1990). More specifically, it is the incompatibility and incomparability of the values at 
3 In this nature-centred ethics, all living organisms are seen as deserving moral recognition, as opposed to 
human-centred environmental eth ics which is sole ly focused on human happiness (Kooiman eta/. 2005b: 
267). Another norm which could be deduced from susta inabi lity is 'sustainable development' (cf. Sachs 
1999). 
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stake that make the choices so hard. The examples of having to make difficult choices are 
plentiful in fisheries. What should the governors choose (or prefer more) between small-
scale and large-scale fisheries, between short-term development and long-term 
development, between innovation and precaution, between aquaculture development and 
capture fishery restoration, or between centralization and decentralization (Bavinck et a!. 
2005)? These inevitably necessitate moral and political considerations (Bailey and Jentoft 
1990), for these choices can often produce winners and losers, leaving equity and 
sustainability and other hordes of values on the line. Underlying and implicit values, 
norms and principles are always involved in these tough choices, but they are usually 
hidden from the speeches of the governors, from the voices of the citizens and from the 
decision-making table. 'Habermas argues that moral discourses are needed to solve 
interest- and value conflicts: values and norms have to be compared and tried out against 
each other before one can come to a decision' (Habermas as quoted by Smeng 2006, 
p.159). 
3.4 Moral dimension in fisheries and in other sectors 
Despite its fundamental position in governance, there have only been a limited number of 
studies that examines moral dimension in fisheries. Gezelius (2004) investigates the 
connection between morality and two commonly-distinguished scales of fishing, namely 
subsistence or small-scale operations, and large-scale commercial operations. Through a 
comparative study of two fishing villages from Norway and Newfoundland, the study 
highlights that illegal fishing activities, such as poaching, done for food fishery is morally 
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safe and acceptable by the surrounding members of the village, while illegal fishing 
associated with commercially-driven, large-scale operations is subject to a tougher 
standard of morality by others in the village, who could demand external sanctions to be 
imposed on such 'greedy' fishing practices. A corollary to this finding is that moral 
principles to abide by the rule of law for the sake of fisheries conservation can be forgone 
if illegal fishing is done for subsistence purpose, or as a dire income source, or as a 
desperate measure of basic survival. S0reng (2006) draws upon 'communicative 
rationality' theorl to explore the importance of moral discourse in the communication 
design of a co-management regime. Using a case study from Norway, she contends that 
moral discourses, through which various stakeholders can build a common understanding 
of the differences in values and interests, are necessary to infuse normative fundament to 
the decision-making and, in due course, to raise the legitimacy of a co-managem nt 
regime among various stakeholder groups. 
Nevertheless, looking at the wider fisheries sector, progress has been made in 
substantiating and codifying the moral dimension involved in fishing and fishing-related 
activities, with particular attention paid on the principle aspect. The best-publicized 
product is the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (F AO 1995). In the provision, it 
states that "The right to fish carries with it the obligation to do so in a responsible manner 
so as to ensure effective conservation and management of the living aquatic resources." 
(ibid. p.4, italics added). Mangel et al. ( 1996), Costanza et al. ( 1998) and F AO (2005) all 
4 Habermas ( 1990) Moral consciousness and communicative action, and Habermas ( 1996) Between facts 
and norms 
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make a similar assertion on the users' responsibility to use the resources in a manner that 
protects and conserves the ecosystem, as summarized in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Summary table of written provisions that emphasize the 'responsibility to 
conserve' principle and their sources 
Provision 
"The right to fish carries with it the obligation to do so in a 
responsible manner so as to ensure effective conservation 
and management of the living aquatic resources." 
"The concept of 'right to use the resources' must be 
changed to the 'privilege to use the resources. ' ... The 
intention of this principle is to make clear that 
demonstrating that resource use will not be damaging is 
the responsibility of those who want to use it." 
"Access to environmental resources carries attendant 
responsibilities to use them in an ecologically sustainable, 
economically efficient, and socially fair manner." 
"Responsibility for the biosphere, which concerns the 
interconnections of all life forms and the protection of 
biodiversity ... This principle combines ethical reasoning 
based on rights and on consequences for human welfare, 
as well as on individual virtues and duties to respect the 
environment." 
Source 
F AO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries, General 
Principle 6.1 , FAO (1995) 
Principles for the Conservation of 
Wild Living Resources, Principle 
Ill, Mangel et a/. ( 1996) 
Principles for Sustainable 
Governance of Oceans, Principle 
I, Costanza eta/. (1998) 
Fundamental principles of 
bioethics, F AO (2005) 
Outside of the fisheries sector, the meaning of moral principles and how it shapes 
individual behaviour have been studied for a long time from variOus angles (e.g. 
economy, psychology and sociology, and political science), which provides substantial 
evidence that the moral dimension is an irrefutable and stand-alone element shaping one' s 
choice and behaviour (Etzioni 1988; Goodin 1980; Mansbridge 1990). 
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There has been a substantial body of research that rejects the prevalent neoclassical 
notion that human economic behaviour is solely explained by self-interest. Instead, they 
present a more complex view of behaviour arguing that it should be more accurately 
viewed as quasi-rational, taking duty, commitment and affection into account (Sen 1977; 
Mansbridge 1990; Thaler 1991). Among them, highlighting how people's behaviour is 
systematically and significantly affected by moral factors is put forth by Etzioni (1988). 
He posits that people pursue (at least) two irreducible "utilities" or two sources of 
valuation: pleasure and morality. In his words, 'people do not seek to maximize their 
pleasure, but to balance the service of two major purposes - to advance their well-being 
and to act morally" (ibid. p.83). A simple model shown in Figure 3.4 succinctly illustrates 
hjs theory. Evidence of altruistic acts is readily available through the case of voting 
behaviour, voluntary work, and refusal to free ride, which are inconsistent and often 
incomprehensible with the basic premise of neoclassical thinbng. How one' s moral 
values can 'stand on its own' is based on the denial of pleasure in the nan1e ofprinciple(s) 
evoked, and in the process the values are internalized mearung 'individuals see the values 
as their own and not as external conditions to which they merely adapt' (ibid. p.46). This 
argument provides a strong theoretical support for the feasibility of relying on the moral 
dimension to curb illegal fishing, as Hoffman (as cited by Etzionj, 1988, p.46) states that 
' once internalization has taken place, individuals pursue what they consider to be a moral 
line of behaviour even in the absence of external sanctions' . Etzioni ' s view on how moral 
commitments can influence behaviour, independent of economic factors , is consistent 
with Kooiman and Jentoft' s meta-governance process conceptualized in Figure 3.3 . 
Merging the two viewpoints seems to suggest that once one' s values based on morality 
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become internalized, moral commitment is borne to elicit behaviour that is in harmony 
with evoked principles. 
Moral 
Commitments 
Behaviour 
Economic 
Factors 
Figure 3.4 Two pillars of utilities affecting individual behaviour (Source: Etzioni 1988, p . 
64). 
Schwartz (1968a, 1968b, 1970), coming from the angle of sociology and psychology, 
posits that activation of moral norms in individuals to produce behaviour that is congruent 
with a given norm depends on the awareness of interpersonal consequences related to the 
welfare of others and ascription of responsibility for the actions and their consequences. 
First, being aware that particular actions have consequences for the welfare of others is 
the first step leading to a moral decision-making. Schwartz argues that without 
recognition of such consequences, one would not perceive him/herself to be facing a 
moral choice at all (Schwartz 1970). Secondly, once becoming aware of potential 
consequences, one must accept responsibility for the actions and their consequences. In a 
morally-relevant situation, one may ascribe responsibility to the self or may evade 
responsibility by ascribing it to others. Schwartz confirms in his studies that both these 
two 'tendencies' are necessary for enabling a positive correlation between subscribed 
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moral norms and actual behaviour, and therefore the presence of the tendencies do 
increase pressure to behave in accordance with the moral norms that the individual 
endorses. In his reasoning, major barriers to acting in conformity with the moral norms 
are also identified, which are, "the absence of the resources and opportunities needed to 
conform (e.g. interpersonal skills and spatial proximity) and various countervailing 
motives (e.g. selfish interest)' (Schwartz 1970, p.131 ). He adds that " the presence of 
countervailing motives renders the process of moral decision making more complex." 
(ibid. p.l31 ). 
Coming from a political science viewpoint, Goodin (1980) distinguishes three ways of 
formally representing moral principles in order to appeal to them to help enforce social 
policies. One views morality as simple prudence and enlightened self-interest, while 
another depicts it to be an internalized norm which typically tacks onto an ordinary utility 
function as another type of consumption good. According to the latter view, both egoistic 
and moralistic considerations are compared, juggled and substituted on a same plane, 
even if the latter is weighed more heavily in the equation. This viewpoint has been how 
the moral aspect and principles have been treated in the many past fisheries compliance 
studies ( cf. Kuperan and Sutinen 1999, Sutinen el al. 1990, Charles et a!. 1999; Furlong 
1991 ; Hatcher eta/. 2000). The third model takes morality very seriously meaning ' they 
may be formally set apart from more mundane objects of desire by repudiating the use of 
instrumental rationality in situations requiring a moral response' (Goodin 1980, p. 136). 
He argues that tapping into this strongest form of moral principles for social policies can 
produce a significant least-cost benefit in enforcing policy demands. However, he also 
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notes that they are extremely susceptible to becoming polluted by less pure motives such 
as material incentives, and therefore policies must be designed in such a way as to avoid 
the pollution. The present study opts to view the moral principle associated with 
conservation in this light, instead of applying it to the utility theory as other studies have 
done. In this context, assessing the presence and/or the relative strength of the 
conservation principle in the various stakeholders and learning about its relationship to 
other possible motives such as material incentives may lead to gaining a better 
understanding of the illegal fishing situation in Lake Malawi. 
3.5 Fisheries compliance literature 
3.5.1 Two perspectives on compliance- instrumental and normative 
This section reviews the fisheries compliance literature that delves into the issue of 
individual illegal fishing or non-compliance of regulation. The study of compliance had 
an initial point of departure in the criminal behaviour of economic individuals. Inspired 
by the work of Adam Smith5 and Jeremy Bentham6 who reasoned that individuals in 
pursuit of economic self-interest could yield criminal behaviour necessitating the concept 
of deterrence to reduce crime, there followed numerous studies7 that linked crime and 
economic circumstances (H0nneland 1999). In the 1960s, a formal theoretical framework 
that views criminals as any other individuals attempting to maximize personal utility was 
5 Smith ( 1759) The theory of moral sentiments, and Smith ( 1776) An inquiry into the nature and causes of 
the wealth of nations 
6 Bentham ( 1789) An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation 
7 Such as Songer ( 1916) Criminality and economic conditions, and Fleischer ( 1966) The economics of 
delinquency 
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established by Becker's economic analysis (Becker 1968). Stemming from this 
neoclassical thinking that underpins the economic models of regulatory compliance, the 
prevailing framework has been to regard fishers as utility maximizing rational agents, and 
the calculation of relative gains and losses as the primary factor detennining compliance. 
Some of the early fisheries compliance studies that follow this lineage are Sutinen and 
Gauvin (1989), Sutinen et a!. (1990) and Furlong (1991 ). Therefore, heightened 
enforcement and the threat of sanctions have virtually been the only policy responses in 
deterring illegal fishing around the world (Hatcher et al. 2000). 
Contrary to what the neoclassical deterrence model prescribes, in reality, the probability 
of getting caught is usually low, and the penalties generally are not large relative to the 
illegal gains (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998). In addition, high penalties are not always 
feasible because the judiciary and legislature may oppose excessively severe sanctions 
perceived to be too high for the committed crimes. Yet, much empirical evidence has 
shown that a high portion of fishers (50% to 90%) normally comply with regulations 
despite such shortcomings (Sutinen and Gauvin 1989; Sutinen et a!. 1990). The examples 
of high compliance despite characteristically low enforcement and deterrence are also 
commonly found outside the fisheries sector, such as the low rate of tax evasion (Elster 
1990). Realizing that the neoclassical perspective alone is not adequate to explain the 
whole compliance behaviour, several studies have embarked on accounting for this 
'irrationality' by incorporating other factors into the compliance framework (Kuperan and 
Sutinen 1998; Sutinen and Kuperan 1999, Charles et al. 1999; Hatcher et al. 2000). These 
other factors - legitimacy, morality and socialization- are similar to some of the meta-
54 
-----------------------
principles elaborated earlier (in section 3.3), and have appeared in, and much articulated 
by, disciplines such as psychologl and sociology. 
Tyler (1990) introduces the terminology of 'instrumental perspective' and ' normative 
perspective' in distinguishing these two strean1s of arguments. Instrumental perspective is 
synonymous with the Becker's framework that assumes individuals as rational agents 
driven by self-interest and responding to payoffs and penalties. The key factors 
determining compliance are the severity and certainty of sanctions. The normative 
perspective, on the other hand, emphasizes that individuals are influenced by what is just, 
fair, appropriate and morally right. The arising consensus in the fisheries circle as well as 
elsewhere is that the normative perspective plays a crucial role in influencing compliance 
behaviour among fishers and therefore policy intervention should be shifted towards 
paying greater attention to this aspect. 
3.5.2 Sources of (or factors affecting) compliance 
Several versions of typology already exist drawing upon seminal works of Young (1979) 
and Tyler (1990), which identify moral dimension as one of the determinants of 
compliance (see Sutinen and Kuperan 1999; Hemneland 1999; Nielsen 2003). Depicted in 
Figure 3.5 is a simplified framework that outlines four different channels through which 
compliance with fisheries regulation can take shape. Also illustrated in Figure 3.5 is with 
which perspective, instrumental or normative, each of the four channels aligns. A review 
8 A large amount of literature exists. See Kohl berg ( 1969), Levine and Tapp ( 1977) for cognitive theory, 
and Akers ( 1985), Aronfreed ( 1968) for social learning theory 
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of fisheries compliance literature indicates that one's internal conviction driven by moral 
principle(s) is a legitimate source affecting fishers' compliance behaviour, and this 
finding corroborates with the assertions originating from the aforementioned discourses 
(section 3.3 and 3.4). 
Sources of 
compliance 
Perspectives on 
compliance 
Self-
interest 
Deterrence 
(sanctions) 
Inducement 
Social 
pressure 
Internal 
convictions 
I . Legitimacy: 
obligation towards 
an external 
authority 
2. Moral principle: 
obligation 
towards one's 
personal sense of 
what is morally 
right and wrong 
Figure 3.5 Simplified typology showing sources of compliance and perspectives guiding 
them 
Self-interest as well as deterrence and inducement come from an economic approach 
elaborated in Becker (1968) viewing individuals as utility maximizing agents under the 
scarcity of resources. Individuals are likely to comply with the regulation if their self-
interest happens to correspond with the aim of the regulation. In this case, obeying the 
regulation, in fact, furthers one' s quest of maximizing personal gain. On the contrary, if 
one's self-interest is found inconsistent with the regulation, then deterrence through 
enforcement and threat of sanctions, and/or inducement using awards and incentives can 
be employed to channel the individual's utility-maximizing penchant into compliance. 
Next, social norm or pressure can both add to the instrumental and normative perspectives 
according to Tyler (1990). Social group' s incentives and disincentives such as social 
approval or withdrawal of respect can function in the same manner as do public 
56 
inducement and sanctions representing the instrumental perspective, while group 
influence can be internalized in individuals' minds to produce an effect that is similar to 
voluntary compliance which is part of the normative perspective. Yet, in the 
disappearance of the group influence, it can be suspected that one may easily revert back 
to non-compliance. 
The final component is voluntary or internalized obligation to comply. This normative 
source of compliance can be further drawn into two sub-components. One is the 
discussion of perceived legitimacy of the governing authority and appropriateness of the 
regulations, which translates into an individual's obligation towards an external authority 
(Jentoft 2000; Nielsen 2003). A question such as 'do you try to follow the regulations of 
federal fisheries authority even if you think that they are wrong?' is a relevant question in 
investigating the topic of legitimacy. The other is personal morality which is an 
internalized obligation to pursue one's personal sense of what is morally right or wrong. 
In this sense, voluntary compliance takes place despite inconvenience or lack of reward 
because one has internally converted constraints into preferences (Etzioni 1988). 
While the current thinking is that more support and focus should be aimed at exploring 
the normative aspect as it has shown the potential to realize a high degree of compliance, 
both the instrumental and normative perspectives are seen needed to most effectively 
handle the issue of illegal fishing and non-compliance. Coercive enforcement, for 
example, is apt to deal with the chronic, flagrant violators, to whom moral obligation and 
social pressure have little effect on their behaviour. The presence of such a group of 
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fishers, if left unchallenged, is likely to be seen as unfairness and/or ineffectiveness in the 
compliance mechanism thereby undermining the normative basis of those who act 
according to their moral conviction and social norms (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Sutinen 
and Kuperan 1999). Therefore, notwithstanding the rising importance of boosting 
legitimacy and applying moral suasion, the instrumental perspective remains an essential 
feature in any compliance regime. 
3.6 Conceptualization of conservation principle 
Focusing on one specific source of fisheries compliance (i.e. moral principle), this step 
involves the development of a conceptual framework to enable an examination into the 
conservation principle of the stakeholders in the Southeast Arm. The conceptualization 
process can be viewed as a bridging element that connects between the theory and the 
methodology. Hence, it would provide a direction as to which methodology may be best 
suited to carry out the research. 
How the conservation principle is being conceptualized in this study, in many ways, 
resembles how Schwartz has structured his model of moral decision-making ( cf. Schwartz 
1968a, 1968b, 1970). Coinciding with Schwartz, this study also proposes that two 
components are necessary in forming conservation principle in individuals - the adequate 
levels of conservation awareness/understanding and the inclination towards promoting 
conservation. The first component refers to an adequate level of awareness or 
understanding about conservation, as shown in Figure 3.6. The assumption is that the 
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internalization of the conservation principle can only take place if one has sufficient 
understanding of which activities promote conservation and which hinder it. Only after 
the fishers are aware of the potential consequences of various fishing activities, then they 
can internally determine whether a certain activity is the right thing to do or not. Without 
sufficient understanding, a fishing choice or behaviour would come about in a haphazard 
fashion driven by instincts or other innate motives, not as a matter of principle. This may 
explain why fisheries managers everywhere often strive to ensure that all stakeholders, 
especially fishers, achieve an adequate level of conservation knowledge through 
education and awareness raising. A relevant set of knowledge would include information 
on various fishing activities as well as on the aquatic ecosystem, but more importantly, 
the kind of impact those fishing activities can have on the ecosystem would be a crucial 
piece of knowledge that could enable attaining an overall understanding. From this 
conception, this study asks which fishing activities are judged to be more damaging to 
fisheries resources in the SEA in order to assess the awareness level of stakeholders in 
regard to fisheries conservation. This component bears great similarity to Schwartz's first 
attribute focusing on one' s awareness of consequences, which his study statistically 
established the relationship that being aware of the consequences of one's action activates 
moral norms, thereby permitting them to influence action (Schwartz 1968a). 
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Figure 3.6 Conceptual diagram showing how the conservation principle is positioned in 
relation to theory and survey design. Theoretically, principle is straddled between value 
and choice/behaviour as an intermediate step. The operationalization of the concept 
occurs through two components that make up the conservation principle. Aside from 
principle, other factors also influence individual 's choice and behaviour. 
The second component is about the inclination towards fisheries conservation. Even if the 
stakeholders hold sufficient understanding on how to proceed with conservation, it i 
necessary to confirm that they do in fact value conservation. For example, if the industrial 
polluters are asked whether they understand the ecological consequences of discharging 
toxic effluents into a coastal system, many would perhaps say yes. Hence, it is generaJly 
not the lack of understanding about facts and knowledge but the lack of genuine 
inclination towards conservation that keeps the polluters from forming a strong 
60 
conservation principle. In this study, stakeholders' preferences towards conservation-
oriented community programmes are assessed in order to find out how much importance 
they attach to conservation. This component is similar to the second attribute of 
Schwartz's model, ascription of responsibility, in the sense that both represent the next 
step in the internal processing of moral norms after one holds sufficient awareness of 
consequences of potential actions. However, the main difference lies in that 'ascription of 
responsibility' is already embodied in the meaning of conservation principle as was 
stipulated to signify ' responsibility to conserve' earlier in section 3.4 (also see Table 3.2). 
The conservation inclination is, therefore, about specifically how much individuals see 
this responsibility as something that is fulfilled out of anticipatory virtue, pride or 
personal satisfaction. In short, this study is under the proposition that when an individual 
acts knowingly and willingly despite inconveniences or the opportunities to do otherwise, 
an individual is said to be acting out of his/her principle. Hence, acting to protect fisheries 
ecosystem and resources knowingly and willingly to fulfill one's moral responsibility 
despite certain needs and inconveniences such as livelihood concerns or economic 
motives can be considered practising conservation as a matter of principle. 
Detailed explanations of the design of the methods derived from this conceptual 
understanding are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 describes and analyzes contextual 
information concerning fisheries conservation and illegal fishing in the SEA using the 
governability assessment matrix. In Chapter 6, the assessment results of the two 
components are viewed in relation to each other using a categorization scheme in order to 
obtain useful inferences about the conservation principle. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
Plate 4.1 Capacity building session on post-harvest fi sh spoilage 
Plate 4.2 Questionnaire survey being conducted with the help of a translator 
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This chapter begins by describing the general design of the mixed method data collection 
approach, focusing on the two levels of govemability assessment. It then proceeds to 
explain the selection of the SEA as a case study location on the grounds of theoretical 
sampling. Next, the four methods used in this study are described one-by-one in 
subsequent sections. The details about how the questionnaire survey was designed and 
conducted are also presented. 
4.1 Mixed method data collection 
This research employed mixed data collection methods. It offers several advantages over 
the use of any single method. First, it affords opportunities to capitalize on the strengths 
of some methods to counterbalance the weaknesses of other methods. For example, 
'combining survey methods with other less structured methods may lend the flexibility 
required to generate new insights into the people we study' (Axinn and Pearce 2006, 
p.l3). Also, use of multiple methods can produce a more comprehensive empirical record 
about a topic than either quantitative or qualitative research alone and help reduce non-
sampling error by providing redundant information from multiple sources (Creswell and 
Plano Clark 2007). More specific to this research, qualitative data was sought and 
analyzed in order to enrich and explain the quantitative results. Basic research design 
follows a process outlined in-Figure 4.1. Also displayed is to which methods the two 
levels of governability assessments correspond. Four types of methods utilized in this 
study are review of secondary sources and archives, questionnaire survey, semi-
structured/unstructured interviews and direct observation. As shown in Figure 4.1 , results 
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from one method feed into the other, providing supplementary information and 
facilitating the interpretation of the findings. For instance, information gathered from 
informal interviews with key informants can help guide the formulation of contextually 
appropriate and sensitive survey questions. Similarly, the results of the damage schedule 
can suggest areas of focus for subsequent direct observation in order to fill in the 
knowledge gaps and aid the result interpretation process. 
Quant-{ 
it alive 
Quali-
tative 
Assessing governability at the individual-level 
Paired comparison Data analysis 
questionnaire based on the 
survey damage schedule 
First phase I Second phase 
I 
Direct observation 
I 
Informal interviews1with key informants 
I . ( unstructured/s~m 1- tructured) 
Review of literature 
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sources 
Result interpretation 
based on quantitative 
results augmented by 
qualitative results 
f---
Data analysis -
r-r. Govemability 
assessment matrix 
Assessing governabi/ity 
,_ at the system-level 
Figure 4.1 Research design used in this study involving mixed methods 
4.2 Selection of case study 
-, 
The selection of case study followed a theoretical sampling approach (also known as 
purposive sampling), which allows the researcher to choose a case because it illustrates 
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some feature or process in which he/she is interested in accordance with some theory the 
research subscribes to (Silverman 2005). Here, the assumption is that if a case is chosen 
in terms of what the theory stipulates, the case would be relevant to a wider population 
who shares the same theoretical base. The theoretical context for this study is the 
occurrence of illegal fishing amidst attempts to control it through enforcement and other 
measures. 
Through contacts with the Sustainable Fisheries for Food Security (SFFS) project of the 
Marine Institute of Memorial University whose project scope involves working with the 
governmental bureau responsible for fisheries as well as two fishing communities in 
Malawi, the feasibility of choosing the Southeast Arm of Lake Malawi was raised. An 
extensive consultation with the two fisheries officers from the Department of Fisheries in 
Malawi, who were visiting the Marine Institute on a project mission in October 2007, 
revealed a complex picture of fisheries reality in the SEA. A co-management regime was 
tried with mixed success, illegal fishing is widespread, and the government possesses 
limited resources to effectively monitor and deter it. In addi tion, fishing villages are 
generally associated with poverty and low capacity to effectuate positive changes. 
Finally, alteration in catch composition and size coupled with a subsequent decline in 
catch value has had a compounding effect adding to the governance challenges in the 
region. Therefore, according to the criteria of theoretical sampling, the SEA of Lake 
Malawi provides an appropriate case study, the insights from which can likely be 
applicable to the wider universe. More specifically, assessing the governability of the 
SEA was anticipated to produce a fresh look at the governance situation by uncovering 
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governing needs and capacities in a systematic fashion, serving as a template for other 
future governability studies. For the second part of the thesis, frequently reported 
occurrence of illegal fishing amidst limited availability of enforcement resources sets the 
stage for the alternate exploration into the issue through the conservation principle. On 
the whole, the prevailing situation in the SEA is intriguing, and the tremendous support 
and encouragement of the project staff in both St. John's and Malawi made it feasible to 
conduct the study. 
4.2.1 Study villages 
Since 2005, the Sustainable Fisheries for Food Security (SFFS) project has been ongoing 
in this area with two beneficiary fishing villages, Kadango and Chapola, established as 
project sites as shown in Figure 2.1. The vi II ages are located on the eastern side of the 
SEA and on the western side of Lake Malombe, respectively. The connection with the 
project provided a point of entry in terms of choosing a study village. After a consultation 
with the project coordinator, the local fisheries officials, and the review of preliminary 
information on the two villages, Kadango was chosen as the focal study site, and 
subsequently the SEA as the main water body for several reasons. First, fish stocks of 
Lake Malombe are in great decline while the fishing situation in the SEA is believed to be 
faring better (Weyl 2005). Subsequently, fishing activities are likely more active in 
Kadango in the SEA than Chapola in Lake Malombe. Njaya (2008) indeed notes that 
fishers and traders in the recent years have flocked to the eastern shore of the SEA since it 
is believed to yield better catches. Furthermore, the disparity in the liveliness of fishing 
activities was being reflected in the general socio-economic image of the two villages 
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through notable differences in areas like the tidiness in the children's clothing and 
cleanliness of the village streets, with Kadango appearing more orderly than Chapola 
(pers. conun. Moret). Based on these reasons, Kadango and the SEA were chosen as the 
main study area of the study. 
It should be noted that while Kadango was the primary study site, Mpwepwe on the 
western side of the SEA was also selected as the secondary site, as it houses the Malawi 
College of Fisheries, a local partnering institution of the SFFS project. This facility is 
where I was based during the 4-month fieldwork period that span between April and July 
of 2008. Although Mpwepwe is not the centre of everyday fishing activity in the area9, 
active fishing villages are nearby and easily reachable. Hence, those fishing villages on 
the western side of the SEA such as Kela, Mpemba, Maldeco and Namiasi were included 
as supplementary study sites in order to get a wider perspective on fisheries governance in 
the SEA. 
4.3 Review of secondary sources and archives 
Before and throughout fieldwork, I reviewed the avai lable literature on Lake Malawi and 
especially on the Southeast Arm fishery. Lake Malawi is a relatively well-researched 
water body. Numerous studies have been conducted with a prevailing focus on natural 
9 For the most part, it is a village built around the college. Therefore, it is composed of campus buildings 
and housing for the lecturers and staff. It has a couple of beaches, however, as it sits by the shore. The 
beaches are used for sporadic fishing and landing activities as we ll as for other daily necessities such as 
washing and laundry. 
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science topics such as hydrology, limnology, fish biology and stock assessment. While 
there exists some amount of archival data that explores the social, economic, historical, 
cultural or institutional dimension of the area and the fishery, its availability and 
accessibility seems to be low. Hence, there has been a call for more emphasis on 
conducting and utilizing social science studies (Hara 2006). Aside from the published 
work such as book chapters and journal articles, grey literature and other hard-to-obtain 
materials such as government reports, proceedings of regional symposium, internal and 
contract reports were also consulted via contacts with the SFFS project team of Marine 
Institute in Canada and visits to the Department of Fisheries libraries in Malawi. The 
literature review included, in rough categorization: 
• Limnology and hydrology (Crul 1997; Bootsma and Hecky 1993; Irvine and 
Waya 1999) 
• Biology and stock assessment (Darwall and Allison 2002; Genner and Turner 
2005; Lowe-McConnell 1993; Turner 1995; Turner et al. 1995; Banda et al. 
1996; Weyl et al. 2005; Thompson et al. 1996; Kanyerere 2000; Phiri et al. 
2001) 
• Fisheries management (lui-Larsen et al. 2003; Chisale 2006; Kasulo and 
Perrings 2006; F AO 2003; Ogutu-Ohwayo and Balirwa 2006; Lake Malawi 
Fisheries Management Symposium - Weyl and Weyl 2001 ; Chambo 
Restoration Strategic Plan - Banda et al. 2005b) 
• Governance/institutional analysis (Hara 2001 ; Njaya 2007; Scholtz et al. 1998; 
GoM 2005) 
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• History of fisheries in and around the SEA (McCracken 1987; Chirwa 1996) 
• Socio-economic analysis (Allison and Mvula 2002; Seeley and Allison 2005; 
GoM 2007; Munthali 1997) 
• Government fisheries policy document (Annual frame survey - Banda et a!. 
2006; National - GoM 2001) 
4.4 Governability assessment matrix (system-level) 
As stipulated in the previous chapter, the governability concept was to be operationalized 
by applying the assessment framework to a case study. Governability assessment 
framework is regarded as a data analysis method that offers a systematic way to structure 
and analyze collected data. Its use serves two key purposes. First, it is used as a method to 
systematically describe the multi-faceted dimensions of the case study. Obtaining a 
comprehensive and systematic understanding of the natural, socio-economic and 
governing system, and the interactions and relationships among them, would help 
facilitate an effective investigation of the research in question. The framework could, 
thus, be a valuable way of capturing and making sense of the complexity embedded in the 
fisheries issues. Second, assessing governability is used as an analytical tool to reveal 
areas of bottlenecks in governance in terms of where the challenges might lie, where the 
governing limitations spring from and where governance capacity and potential could be 
found . The rest of this section illustrates what the framework entails and how it was 
carried out. 
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The governability assessment framework is a matrix for the evaluation of the three sub-
systems - natural, socio-economic and governing system - based on sets of criteria (Table 
4.1 ). The assessment of the natural and socio-economic systems reveals the needs and 
demands of what is being governed, while that of the governing system descriptively 
portrays the capacity held within the system. The governing interactions are the 
facilitating element between the two systems which works as a lubricant that ensures 
smooth functioning of governance mechanisms. If a governability assessment of a 
particular fishery indicates low governability, for instance, it may mean several things 
depending on the site-specific details revealed in the assessment. It may be that the 
management authority has low governing capacity to tackle the problems it must deal 
with. Alternately, the low governability may arise due to the highly complex and erratic 
nature of the ecosystem which cannot be easily controlled or predicted, or the prevailing 
dismal socio-economic condition of fishing communities that stalls much progress of the 
governing interventions. Likewise, low govemability may stem from inadequate or little 
goveming interactions that prevent governing capacity from properly engaging with the 
demands. In either case, the assessment result may point to suggestions in improving 
governance by adjusting or re-thinking various components such as governing goals and 
institutional framework. 
Assessing governability involves asking specific questions to examine the particularities 
of the fisheries system under consideration. For example, an examination of inter-
linkages between species, habitat and the system productivity forms a relevant inquiry 
which could reveal the complexity nested in the natural system. Here, a challenge is in 
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selecting what to examine in each cell because what we could consider as potentially 
relevant for governability is nearly limitless. Kooiman (2008) suggests that interactions 
should be the guiding focus of the inquiry. Asking specific questions in a systematic 
manner, by paying special attention to the intrinsic and constructed system properties and 
the interactions between them, is the beginning of the diagnosis of governing potentials 
and limitations. Having the information (answers to the questions) in the assessment 
matrix can be a useful step to document the information in a meaningful way, making it 
possible to trace and track governability. It is worth noting that governability is not a 
static quality, but rather it changes constantly subject to external as well as internal 
factors to a societal entity or system (Kooiman 2003). Likewise, governance capacity and 
needs assessed through this framework would also be subject to a perpetual change 
influenced by the governing interactions taking place in the overall system. For instance, 
governing capacities of a particular fisheries system assessed 10 years ago may differ 
from the current situation, and therefore may not be entirely relevant to the present-day 
governing deliberations. Alternatively, the framework can be applied to capture system 
features in two different time periods for a comparative analysis providing an opportunity 
to learn from past experiences. In dealing with this aspect, the framework relies on 
dynamics, one of the four system properties, to provide a platform for infusing trends and 
change drivers to the overall approach. 
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Table 4.1 Governability matrix of the Southeast Arm fisheries of Lake Malawi (Source: adapted from Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 
2009) 
System 
System-to-be-governed 
System Interactive Governing 
properties Socio-economic properties Governing system attributes interactions Natural system 
system 
Diversity Types of habitat; level Different fishing Diversity Various formal and Representation/ Extent of 
ofbiodiversity in fish sectors; fishing units informal fisheries participation participation and 
species; cichlids and stakeholders; level authorities; representation, 
of specialization in institutions; their roles particularly by 
fishing villages and mandates fishing villages 
Complexity Inter-linkages Multiple livelihood Complexity Hierarchical structure; Information/ Means of 
between species, strategies; subsistence decentralization and Communication communication; 
habitats and the agriculture; HIV/AIDS; devolution; effectiveness of 
system productivity kinship and community relationship between information flow 
relationship; underlying BVC and other 
principles and values institutions; witchcraft 
Dynamics Physical and Fluxes in fishing Dynamics Changes in the Learning/ Occurrence of 
hydrological drivers customs and activities; governing institutions, adaptation learning and 
such as seasonal changes in the 'fish initiatives and adaptation in SEA 
winds; biological chain'; larger societal measures; past results; fisheries 
characteristics of transformations main drivers 
cichlids; catch trends 
Scale atural boundaries of Intra-, inter-community Scale Political and Appreciation/ Level of 
the water body; well- boundary; social and administrative collaboration collaboration; need 
bounded or open economic boundary; boundaries; regional for appreciation of 
system in both spatial mobility of fishers; scale vs. finer scale in diverse interests 
and temporal terms; connection to regional use; geographical and underlying 
spatial range of fish events and globalization scale of governing values 
species in the SEA institutions 
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To further illustrate the system properties, diversity is about the heterogeneity of 
components and elements that constitute a system. Complexity is concerned with the 
relationship and interdependency between those components. Scale deals with the overlap 
and presence of multi-layered, interlinked boundaries. Scale matching within and across 
the natural, social and governing systems is believed to ease the governance process in 
that the magnitude of governing objectives and interventions are better fitted to the "true" 
features of the systems-to-be-governed. The governing interactions are assessed 
according to four pairs of interaction attributes. They are representation/participation, 
information/communication, learning/adaptation and appreciation/collaboration. 
Generally speaking, a high level of system properties present in the sub-systems (e.g. high 
diversity or high dynamics) would make the systems less governable, therefore giving 
rise to low governability. This is in recognition that the more diverse, complex, dynamic 
and complicated with scale issues they are, the more difficult it is to govern their 
functioning (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2009). However, governability is also affected by 
the level of governing interactions. Interactive governance theory argues that more 
spirited kind of governing interactions could raise governability by potentially navigating 
around these limitations. In other words, a system with high level ·system properties may 
still be governable if the level of interactions between the governing system and the 
system-to-be-governed is high and effective. Through this process, it is expected that the 
system can be made more governable. 
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4.5 Questionnaire survey (individual-level) 
4.5.1 Measuring mora/judgment 
Although the moral dimension has been a much discussed topic from many disciplines, 
developing a valid and reliable measurement has been a challenging task. However, the 
field of cognitive psychology provides us with a major progress in quantitatively 
assessing an aspect of morality in individuals. Lawrence Kohlberg' s Moral Judgment 
Interview method was the first breakthrough which relies on the presentation of moral 
dilemmas followed by open-ended, probing interviews to assess individual ' s cognitive 
stages of moral judgment (Kohlberg 1958; Colby and Kohlberg 1987). The Defining 
Issues Test by James Rest has originated from Kohlberg' s model, but instead utilizes a 
written survey based on a Likert-scale rating and ranking of moral dilemmas to achieve a 
similar objective (Rest 1979). Although their work has seen a wide application to many 
fields of study, including a fisheries study which examined the moral development of 
Malaysian fishers as part of a bigger research focusing on the non-compliance fishing 
behaviour (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998), several limitations preclude the suitability of 
applying these methods to the current study. 
First, both the Kohlberg' s and Rest's method tests and measures the degree to which an 
individual is capable of applying moral principles to decision-making. In this scheme, 
one's higher moral judgment stage determined in the test implies higher developed 
capacity to engage in moral behaviour when faced with a moral dilemma (Lind 1989). To 
do so, their methods present multiple scenarios that describe different moral dilemmas. 
This is because the focus oftheir methods is an individual ' s composite cognitive capacity 
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in responding to various moral dilemmas. However, critics have raised the possibility that 
individuals react differently to different dilemmas depending on their familiarity and 
experience with a particular scenario (Elm and Weber 1994). In this study, a particular 
concern is the conservation principle in the context of illegal fishing. Hence, their 
methods may prove to be overly in-depth and detailed for the purpose of this study unless 
a significant methodological adaptation is made to isolate one principle. Furthermore, 
both Kohlberg and Rest qualify their concept of ' morality' as something that involves 
social interaction, and hence they exclude individual values that do not affect other people 
from the scope oftheir conceptualization. Rest (1979, p.20) admits that 'perhaps it would 
have been clearer if this research area had been labelled "fairness judgment" instead of 
"moral judgment'" . Elm and Weber (1994) explains that both their models heavily draw 
upon a concept of justice. On the other hand, the study contained in this thesis does not 
concern with the cognitive stages of moral judgment, nor one's reasoning about moral 
dilemmas. Instead, it is interested in revealing whether moral principle could be inferred 
from a choice situation, given specific contexts focused on the conservation principle. 
Also, it is mainly about individual environmental ethics, i.e. moral responsibility towards 
natural things, although it is believed that conservation has a far reaching consequence to 
the well-being of other human beings in the long run. 
4.5.2 Tlte damage schedule approach 
The survey method used in this study draws upon the damage schedule approach 
(Chuenpagdee 1998; Chuenpagdee eta/. 2001 ). A damage schedule is envisioned as a set 
of policy instruments similar to payments and sanctions that could be used to discourage 
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damaging activities and compensate for resource losses. It collects public judgments on 
the relative importance of resource losses or the relative harmfulness of certain activities 
causing the losses. The assessed preference or judgments is presented in the form of an 
interval ranking scale, which works as a non-monetary indicator of the severity of 
resource losses or the impacts of the damaging activities. The result can aid policy makers 
in developing appropriate policy strategies to prevent certain activities, create a 
compensation scheme for resource damage, and deter accidents such as oil spills and 
discharge pollution. Further, the developed damage schedule offers policy makers a 
platform to involve local communities in the management of resources and directly 
incorporate their inputs in policy design, since the schedules are based on the knowledge 
of resource users and on people' s preferences and judgments about resources and their 
importance, as well as those of scientists and managers. Chuenpagdee eta/. (2001, p.254) 
succinctly states that 'given the complex nature of coastal resources and the limitations of 
current monetary valuation methods, the use of a predetermined schedule of sanctions and 
incentives that reflect the community's sensitivity to the imp01tance of different changes 
in resource conditions may offer a useful approach' . 
The damage schedule approach has been applied to several fisheries and coastal related 
studies over the years. The original application was to examine coastal development 
issues surrounding shrimp farming and tourism in Southern Thailand (Chuenpagdee el a/. 
2001). Chuenpagdee el al. (2002) sought the opinions of community members in Mexico 
to reveal local judgments about the severity of damages to coastal habitats and the impact 
of activities that may cause the damages. A more elaborated set was developed to assess 
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the relative severity of collateral impacts of the fishing gears commonly used in the 
United States (Chuenpagdee et al. 2003). Environmental damages in the urban coastal 
setting of Singapore were the subject of the study by Quah et al. (2006), who then used 
the resulting scale to derive willingness-to-accept compensation amounts for 
relinquishing top environmental concerns. This quantitative valuation approach, 
developed to measure one' s judgments and preferences on environmental damages and 
harmful activities, appears well-suited to the assessment of something as intangible as 
one's underlying moral principle, and therefore was chosen as the method of individual-
level govemability assessment. 
4.5.3 Pairetl comparison 
The damage schedule approach relies on the use ofpaired comparison survey, which is a 
simple method being frequently used to attain a ranking scale. Its basic unit is the 
comparison of two objects, A and B, and the comparison is presented to one or more 
judges. The term 'object' is used to cover what is being compared such as treatment or 
stimuli, while judges mean survey respondents (David 1988). This method has proven 
useful in situations where the objects to be compared can be judged only subjectively, 
such as in taste tasting, colour comparison, or personnel evaluation, particularly 'when it 
is impossible or impractical to make relevant measurements in order to decide which of 
the two objects is preferable' (David 1988, p.1 ). The method has been widely employed 
by psychometricians through studies like Thurstone (1927). In more recent time, fields of 
application have expanded to include acoustics, animal ecology, economics 
epidemiology, food science, sports and others. Furthermore, its use in eliciting public 
77 
preferences and judgments in an environmental study setting has been justified by a 
number of studies which employed this method with a similar intention (Peterson and 
Brown 1998; Rutherford et a!. 1998; Chuenpagdee et a!. 2001; Rudd 2001; Wattage and 
Mardle 2005; Quah et a!. 2006). The method begins with establishing a set of objects 
under the theme of a particular study, whether it is resource losses, damaging activities or 
community programmes. The objects are presented in pairs to each respondent who is 
asked to make a choice between them. This will continue one after the other until all 
possible pairs are exhausted. Standard notation denotes N as the total number of objects, 
while the total number of respondents are denoted as k. For each respondent, the total 
number of all possible pairs is N(N-1 )/2. Under normal circumstances, each object has the 
same probability of being selected as all objects are paired an equal number of times. 
There are at least three key advantages of using paired comparisons. A fine judgment can 
be better achieved in a binary setting especially when objects are deemed to have subtle 
differences. The usual difficulty that faces a simultaneous ordinal ranking of all N objects 
can be lessened, because there are only two objects in each choice pair, reducing the 
effect of confounding extraneous influences caused by the presence of other objects. 
Secondly, the paired comparison method produces an interval scale in which the 
numerical differences between the objects have an arithmetic meaning. It shows the 
spread of the objects in a scale, and is useful in explaining how much one object is more 
preferred than others in the numerical terms. The third advantage offered in the paired 
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comparison method is that it provides a way to check for intransitivity10 in the 
respondent's choices by means of counting the number of circular triads (Dunn-Rankin 
1983 ). A circular triad refers to an intransitive response where, in the paired comparison 
of three objects, x, y and z, x is preferred to y and y is preferred to z, but z is preferred to 
x. In this case, one circular triad (z being preferred to x) has occurred (David 1988). 
There are several causes of circular triads, one being systematic inconsistence, which can 
arise when respondents are faced with complex, multidimensional objects such that they 
focus on different dimensions for different pairs (Chuenpagdee et al. 2001 ). Other 
potential causes for intransitivity include indifference, guessing, incompetence or simple 
errors on the part of respondents. Beside the intransitivity, other issues need to be paid 
attention to in designjng a paired comparison survey. If the differences between objects 
are not easily discernible or if N is too big, paired comparison can become very tiresome 
and prolonged leading to respondent exhaustion. Therefore, it is important to limit the 
number of questions in a survey (Rudd 2001 ). 
4.5.4 Experimental design 
In trus study, two sets of paired comparisons were developed (Figure 3.6). One gauges the 
level of conservation awareness of respondents in relation to which fishing activities are 
more damaging to the fisheries resources in the SEA, while the second set assesses 
respondents' preferences towards conservation-oriented community fisheries 
programmes. There are seven objects included in each set, as listed in Table 4.2, giving 
10 Intransitivity refers to a relationship between three e lements such that the relationship holds between the 
first and second elements and between the second and third elements, yet it fails to hold between the first 
and third e lements. 
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the total number of21 pairs for each set. They represent site-specific fishing activities and 
the community programmes that are relevant in the SEA. They were developed based on 
existing literature including the fisheries regulation, direct observations during field visits, 
informal interviews with key informants, and the results of several rounds of pre-tests. 
The lists were also verified with a group of fishery managers in the SEA to ensure that 
these activities and programmes indeed best reflect the concerns of the stakeholders in the 
regiOn. 
Table 4.2 Objects for each paired comparison set 
Set A: Fishing activities 
• Catching juvenile fish 
• Fishing using mechanized gear 
• Fishing using gears that disturb lake bottom 
• Fishing in offshore deep water 
• Fishing using non-selective gear 
• Too many people fishing in one area 
• Fishing in spawning area 
Set B: Community programmes 
• Protect fish habitat and fish species 
• Promote scientific research on lake fisheries ecosystem 
• Provide micro-credit loans to expand fishing-related work 
• Help reduce fish spoilage during catching and processing 
• Promote small-scale community fish cage culture 
• Ensure fishing access for local fishers and communities 
• Provide ownership of resources to local communities 
Responses to the first set, Set A, produce a scale which identifies from the most damaging 
fishing activity to the least damaging one as respondents perceive it. It is an indication of 
their level of understanding about the fisheries and lake ecosystem, which may enable 
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voluntary engagement in conservation-oriented fishing practices. As shown in Table 4.2, 
the objects are void of any specific details. For exan1ple, there is no number indicating the 
degree of mechanization in ' fishing using mechanized gear' , and any mention of a 
specific fishing gear is avoided. This was to minimize strategic voting of the respondents 
by basing the comparisons on the concept - or the image - of the fishing activities and 
not on the specifics that may conjure up certain attachment to their own fishing activities. 
One exan1ple of paired comparison used in the Set A is displayed in Figure 4.2(a). 
(a) 
(b) 
In your opinion, which ofthese two activities do you consider 
more damaging 
to the fishery resources in Southeast Arm of Lake Malawi? 
Catching juvenile fish 
A 
Fishing during 
spawn1ng season 
8 
If a programme were to be implemented in your community, 
in your opinion, which of these two programmes, A or B, 
do you prefer? 
Programme to 
Promote small-scale 
Community fish cage 
culture 
A 
Programme to 
protect fish habitat 
and fish species 
8 
Figure 4.2 Sample paired comparison question drawn from (a) Set A and (b) Set B 
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The second set, Set B, results in a scale which reveals respondents' extent of inclination 
for fisheries conservation. The set was designed such that two community programmes 
that directly promote conservation, but at various levels, are included in the choice pairs. 
These programmes are presented to the respondents in a hypothetical sense as something 
that could be implemented but with no promise. This was to prevent immediate 
expectation from influencing their choices. An example of paired comparison used in the 
Set B is displayed in Figure 4.2(b ). 
4.5.5 Survey information 
The survey was directed at seven groups of respondents involving multiple locations 
within the SEA. Active fishing villages on the eastern shore of the SEA (e.g. Kadango) 
were chosen to be the main location in surveying the resource-dependent groups, i.e. gear 
owners, crew members, fish processors/traders and community members. The villages on 
the eastern shore currently feature very lively fishing activities since it is generally 
believed that this side of the water body yields better catch than the depleted western 
shore (Njaya 2008). Also, with its relative remoteness, and the shortage of infrastructure 
and tourism development, fishing still remains a key activity that supports the livelihoods. 
To investigate any potential disparity that may arise from the east-west geographical 
distinction, gear owners and crew members found on the western shore were added to the 
survey. Thus, together with the managers/scientists group, seven respondent groups were 
formed. The villages visited, as shown in Figure 2.1 , are Kadango, Ng'ombe 1, Ng ombe 
2, Namalaka and Mdoka (Machakwani beach) on the eastern side, and Kela, Mpemba and 
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Namiasi on the western shore. Upon entering each village, authorities of the village/area 
(e.g. village heads and/or BVC chairperson) were first visited to inform about the survey 
and seek their approval to carry out the research in their village. In all cases, they were 
supportive and gave their blessing. 
The survey with the scientists/managers group also took place in various locations around 
and away from the lake. Site visits were conducted to solicit participation. Sites included 
lake-side locations such as Malawi College of Fisheries, Fisheries Research Unit in 
Monkey Bay and DoF Mangochi District Office as well as more distant locations like 
DoF Headquarter in Lilongwe and Worldfish Center in Zomba. Respondents in this group 
comprise various government officials such as planners, researchers, statisticians, 
enforcement officers, lecturers, and also scientists from several nongovernmental 
organizations working in the field of fisheries. 
All 21 pairs from each set were included in the survey booklet making the total of 42 
pairs. The sequential order of the pairs in the booklet and the left-right position of the two 
choices in each pair were both randomly generated to ensure the uniqueness of each 
booklet and therefore to avoid any possible bias relating to ordering. In addition, one-on-
one survey setting was preferred, whenever possible, to minimize strategic bias that may 
arise out of social pressure or the fear of reprisal. Hence, most surveys were conducted in 
a quiet, sheltered environment in the absence of other community members. It was 
determined that random sampling using a defined list of respondents was not feasible due 
to concerns about the availability and reliability of a census database. Therefore, quota 
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sampling was employed to obtain the total number of 144 respondents with each group 
containing approximately 20 respondents. As per the process of quota sampling, each 
survey respondent was selected on the basis of convenience, accessibility and availability. 
An explanation about the survey was given to each potential respondent and consent to 
participate was solicited. Table 4.3 presents the demographic breakdown of the survey 
respondents. One may think that the small sample size of each group could reduce the 
reliability of the results of this study. However, as other studies of similar methodology 
and intent have shown (cf. Chuenpagdee eta/. 2003; Quah eta/. 2006; Bose and Crees-
Marris 2009), the general guideline is to ask whether having additional respondents 
would contribute to adding new information to the study. If the answer is ' no' , it can be 
argued that increasing the number of respondents would be of no pragmatic value from 
the criteria of both cost-effectiveness and time-efficiency (Bose and Crees-Morris 2009). 
As will be more thoroughly shown in hapter 6, the result of this study also conformed to 
the tendency observed in the other studies that in-group consistency was quickly reached 
with the small number of respondents ( cf. Table 6.1 ). 
The survey was conducted during daytime at locations that are familiar and comfortable 
to the respondents, such as beaches, their houses and processing areas. The average time 
it took to complete each survey was approximately 20 minutes. 
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Table 4.3 Breakdown of the paired comparison survey respondents 
Gear Crew 
Processors Community 
Gear Crew 
Managers/ 
owners members I Traders members owners 
members 
Scientists 
Total 
(East) (East) (West) (West) 
Total number of 20 20 20 
respondents 
20 21 17 26 144 
Male 20 20 7 8 19 17 21 I 12 
Female 0 0 13 12 2 0 5 32 
Age* 38 30 37 34 38 34 40 
Years of fishery 10 9 9 6 9 13 
experience* 
Years in 
5 6 3 3 3 13+ 
education* 
* denotes average value 
- not app licable 
4.5.6 Additional questions in the survey 
Aside from the two sets of paired comparison, 15 additional questions were included in 
the survey to gather information on mainly two fronts . First, basic personal, 
demographical information was acquired from each respondent. With the exception of 
respondent' s name to retain the anonymity of the survey, facts regarding age, ethnic 
origin, formal education level, village of origin, the nature of fishing-related occupation, 
the type of fishing gear owned or operated, and years of experience in fishing-related 
occupation were collected. As specified earlier, all questions remained voluntary as 
respondents were free to opt out from any particular question if they wished to. The 
second theme of the supplementary questions involved a broad spectrum of fisheries 
governance, briefly delving into such aspects like resource status, means of 
communication, and participation in policy formu lation. Notably, a question asked what 
the respondents perceived as the trend in the size of the fish population in the SEA 
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compared to a previous year. For those who thought that there were fewer fish, a further 
set of questions asked what were the causes of fewer amount of fish. The result of this 
question is presented and discussed in section 6.2.5 . A governance-related question about 
the envisioned role of fishing community vis-a-vis the fisheries authority (i.e. 
government) in formulating fisheries regulation was posed, whose result is shown in the 
section 6.2.6. These supplementary questions were presented in various formats such as 
multiple choices, choose-all-that-apply, and naming a place or an organization. The 
complete copy of the questionnaire booklet is presented in Appendix B. 
4.5. 7 Translator and translation 
The paired comparison surveys were intended to be a rigidly structured, self-administered 
questionnaire. However, given the reality of low literacy level, and especially little 
proficiency in English, among the community members, designing and conducting the 
survey relied on the assistance of translators. The initial design and the fine-tuning of the 
survey through rounds of pre-tests were aided by a senior lecturer at the Malawi College 
of Fisheries. He is of Yao origin, fluent in both Chiyao and Chichewa, two of the most 
widely spoken local languages, as well as English. English is one of the official languages 
in Malawi, and hence most official administrative and business proceedings are 
conducted in English. For the actual study in the villages, a native to Kadango with 
fluency in the local languages as well as being proficient in English assisted with the 
translation of the survey. This person has an extensive family kinship in the area with 
good language skills. He was also particularly well-versed in fishing matters as he had 
been a retired fisheries extension worker who held the position for over 15 years in 
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another part of Lake Malawi. The version of the paired comparison questionnaire used in 
the survey was written in both English and Chiyao, and the questions and the pairs were 
read out to each respondent by the translator. I travelled to all the survey locations (i.e. 
villages on the both sides of the water body) with the same translator who assisted in the 
enumeration of all questionnaires. This was to prevent any potential bias originating from 
using two different translators, and therefore to ensure an adequate level of consistency in 
the translation. With the managers and scientists, utilizing their high proficiency in 
English, surveys were self-administered without the help of a translator using the English 
version of the questionnaire. 
4.6 Informal interviews with key informants 
Informal interviews with key informants were carried out throughout the research period 
prior to as well as during the field visit. They were intended to provide qualitative, 
contextual information about the study area and the fisheries, aiding in the identification 
of key processes and issues, interpretation of data, and verification of survey results. 
Interviews were either unstructured or semi-structured done in an informal setting, thus 
allowing for greater flexibility and the breadth (Berg 2004). A total of eight individuals 
familiar with the SEA fishery and generally regarded to hold a high degree of expertise in 
a certain aspect pertaining to it were interviewed. Depending on the informants, different 
themes were focused on. Key informants and respective themes are listed in Table 4.4. 
All the interviews were conducted in English since their proficiency in the language was 
sufficiently high. 
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Table 4.4 Key informants for informal interviews; mam theme(s) explored m each 
interview; and location held 
Key informant 
Acting principal, Malawi 
College of Fisheries 
Director, Department of 
Fisheries 
Chief Planning Officer, 
Department ofFisheries 
Acting head, Fisheries Research 
Unit 
Traditional Authority Chief 
Former acting District Fisheries 
Officer (Mangochi district) 
Outreach officer, Department of 
Fisheries 
Acting District Fisheries Officer 
(Mangochi district) 
4.7 Direct observation 
Theme 
General topics on fisheries 
General topics on fisheries 
Participatory management; Mangochi fisheries 
by-law 
Fisheries research; stock assessment; fi sh 
biology and distribution 
Changing role of traditional leaders in fisheries ; 
hierarchical governance 
Mangochi fisheries by-law; governance 
structure; Beach Village Committee; local 
ownership of resources 
Micro-credit small loan programme available to 
members of fishing community 
Large-scale fishing operation; fish cage culture; 
inland fish ponds 
Interview location 
St. John' s, Canada 
St. John' s, Canada 
Mangochi, Malawi 
Monkey Bay, 
Malawi 
Makanjira, Malawi 
Mangochi, Malawi 
Mpwepwe, 
Malawi 
Mangochi, Malawi 
The study relied partially on direct field observation to collect qualitative information 
necessary to complete the analysis and to fill in the information gaps left by the two main 
methods. Field observation (or participant observation) is an established research method 
where a researcher situates himself/herself in the local context and takes part in the daily 
activities to learn about socio-cultural processes, patterns, relationships among people, 
and the organization of institutions (DeWalt and DeWalt 2002; Jorgensen 1989). As part 
of this research, activities such as walking, participating in fishing activities, attending 
social events, interacting with village members, and simply 'hanging out' were the main 
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mediums enabling direct observation. Photographs were taken with full discretion 
cognizant of ethics involved in taking photographs of human subjects and potentially 
infringement of their dignity and privacy. Hence, taking photographs was withheld until 
the author felt that adequate rapport was established or explicit permission was granted by 
the human subject of the photograph. 
By having myself (i.e. a foreign individual who is interested in collecting information) 
respectfully exposed to village members and fishers in the community, there is a greater 
chance that the familiarity and empathy towards me would grow. This was anticipated to 
help in soliciting interest during the questionnaire survey process. Staying at the village 
for weeks eating and moving about like villagers, in this case, had a positive effect on 
building trust and enhancing their acceptability of being part of the survey as respondents. 
Lastly, direct and participatory observation offers an added advantage of enhancing the 
quality of the interpretation ofthe survey data (DeWalt and DeWalt 2002). Therefore, it 
serves as both a data collection method and an analytical tool. 
A total of three weeks was spent in Kadango and in the nearby villages completing the 
questionnaire survey and engaging in direct observation. In addition, several day trips 
were also made to a number of villages in the SEA including Kadango for the purpose of 
general scouting, pre-testing and communication of preliminary results. Much of the field 
visit in Malawi took place in Mpwepwe while designing survey instruments, transcribing 
field notes, preliminary result interpretation and conducting informal interviews with key 
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informants. The remainder of the time was spent at various locations in Malawi 
conducting site visits to carry out interviews, surveys and observation. 
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Chapter 5 System-level Governability Assessment of the Southeast Arm Fishery 
Plate 5.1 Crew members of a fishing unit 
Plate 5.2 Crew members pulling in the net towards the shore 
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Chapter 5 presents the findings of the system-level governability assessment. 
Descriptively, it provides detailed information about the study site from wide-ranging 
angles that include the natural environment, socio-economic composition, governing 
structure and the relationship within and among these components. Diagnostically, the 
governability assessment offers a way to probe into the governance of fisheries in order to 
uncover the inherent and constructed limitations that exist in the system in terms of 
governing demands and capacity. It starts with a look into the natural, socio-economic 
and governing system in this sequence using the four system properties - diversity, 
complexity, dynamics and scale. This is followed by the examination of governing 
interactions according to the four interactive attributes. Next, a brief discussion that puts 
forward some practical suggestions is provided. Finally, the implications of the 
governability assessment results for the conservation principle are explored. 
5.1 System-to-be-governed 
5.1.1 Natural System 
Diversity 
Lake Malawi is part of the chain of the Great Rift Valley, making it deep and rocky in 
some parts and with little shoreline development. Lirnnological characteristics following 
this structure are that it is mostly oligotrophic, with a permanently stratified water layer 
and surface temperature of 23-25°C (Lowe-McConnell 1993). This condition generally 
limits the production of phytoplankton making it significantly less productive waters than 
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eutrophic lakes characterized by ample nutrient supply (F AO I993). The southern end of 
the lake including the SEA, however, features an area with a comparatively shallow depth 
of less than I 00 m and the presence of diatom ooze and muddy bottom to create a 
favourable condition for a productive tropical climate fishery (Crul 1997; Irvine and 
Waya 1999). In some pockets of the shoreline, reeds, macrophytes and other aquatic 
vegetation are present although a significant portion has been removed in recent decades 
for tourism infrastructure and development initiatives, affecting thus the survival of fry 
and juvenile fish (Bulirani 2005). In addition, an invasive aquatic weed, common water 
hyacinth (Eichhornia crassipes, Pontederiaceae) has been spreading to parts of the lake 
impeding boat navigation and depleting oxygen in the water column underneath (Phiri et 
al. 2001). 
Lake Malawi contains fishes of eleven families, which include catfishes (Bagridae and 
Clariidae ), minnows (Cyprinidae), elephant snout fish (Mormyridae ), and eels 
(Anguillidae and Mastacembelidae). But by far the most dominating family is Cichlidae 
(Ngatunga 2001). About 450-700 species of cichlid fishes are estimated to be found in 
Lake Malawi, with a high concentration in and around the SEA (Konings 1990, Turner et 
al. 2001, Genner et al. 2004). A large portion of the cichlids are colourful, ornamental 
haplochromine species locally called mbuna (Pseudotropheus spp. and other genera, 
Cichlidae) which dominate the rocky shores. The number of species found in Lake 
Malawi is disproportionally high in relation to the surface area. For example, the Nmth 
American Great Lakes have a vast surface area of 246,900 km2 (or almost I 0 times the 
size of Lake Malawi), yet contain only I73 fish species (Rohde 1998). Although Lake 
93 
Malawi boasts one of the highest species diversity among the freshwater ecosystems in 
the world, it still pales in comparison when put in the same rank with tropical coastal 
areas especially those containing coral reefs and seagrass patches. These latter ecosystems 
are said to contain, in global aggregate, at least 950,000 species (Reaka-Kudla 1997). On 
a whole the degree of diversity in the SEA is considered to be medium. 
Complexity 
The broad, shallow shelf of the SEA with its muddy bottom supports high demersal 
productivity much less common in other parts of the lake. In addition, the elongated shape 
of Lake Malawi that stretches north to south interacting with the seasonal southeast wind 
called mwera in the winter months (April to September) induces seasonal upwelling of 
nutrient-rich water to occur in the southern end, notably in the SEA. This effect causes 
mixing of nutrients and oxygen throughout the entire water column (N gochera 2001; Crul 
1997; McCracken 1987). Another hydrological factor affecting the productivity in the 
SEA isJhe annual variations of water level between the dry and the rainy season. A small 
volume of outflow through Upper Shire River results in a long flushing time equaling at 
750 years (Bootsma and Hecky 1993). Coupled with its large surface area, Lake Malawi 
is hypersensitive to the precipitation-evaporation effect markedly raising the water level 
by about four feet following the rainy season (Crul 1997; McCracken 1987). Increased 
water levels generally result in enhanced inflows of nutrients, which normally act as a 
boost in the ecological productivity of the system. Such mechanism shows a marked 
effect in the shallow and small water body such as the SEA, and it can increase 
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productivity to a considerable degree and lead to booms in the fisheries of certain species 
(Jul-Larsen et al. 2003). Furthermore, differences in primary productivity of Lake Malawi 
under various hydrological and meteorological influences were extensively documented 
in Bootsma (1993). While there seems to be an adequate understanding of the 
limnological and hydrological factors influencing fisheries, there is currently a lack of 
sufficient biological and ecological knowledge with regard to the natural fluctuation of 
resource productivity, inter-species interactions, distribution and migration patterns and 
breeding habits of several key fish species. For example, despite being two of the 
primarily targeted species that help sustain the Lake Malawi fishery, the biology and 
lifecycle of a small pelagic cyprinid locally called usipa (Engraulicypris sardella, 
Cyprinidae), and bombe (Bathyc/arias spp., Bagridae) are still poorly understood 
(Thompson et al. 1996). 
According to Kooiman (2003), complexity does not simply mean that something is 
difficult to understand, or complicated to handle. Crucial concepts like interaction and 
interdependency amongst the parts and how the parts relate to the whole can be an 
important addition to the inquiry of complexity. Although many unknowns and 
uncertainties still exist in the SEA fishery, it is spared from possibly other sets of 
complexity-generating factors seen in fisheries systems elsewhere such as the occurrence 
of severe storms and damaging waves and the presence of large predatory species. 
Therefore, a low-medium level of complexity is suggested for the SEA natural system. 
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Dynamics 
Propensity for a dynamic change in the natural system of the SEA seems to be high. 
Marked seasonal climatic variations in wind, temperature and precipitation set off a chain 
of environmental fluctuations which have a major impact on fisheries. Interacting with 
the climatic variations, seasonal upwelling and hypersensitive hydrologic budget are the 
two factors already discussed. Fish itself possesses several key characteristics that suggest 
a high potential for change. The most well-known evolutionary account of a dynamical 
change in Lake Malawi is the rapid speciation and adaptive radiation of mbuna (Turner et 
a!. 2001; Genner and Turner 2005). It is estimated that the explosive speciation which 
resulted in over 200 mbuna species is a relatively recent development that has taken place 
in as recent as the last 300 years (Lowe-McConnell 1993). In terms of biological 
characteristics, Cichlidae, which is by far the most prevalent family in Lake Malawi, has 
low fecundity and is K-selected. This contributes to the low recovery rate in case of a 
stock collapse (Ngatunga 2001). Particularly among all the cichlids, the most prized fish 
of a tilapiine kind in Malawi, chambo (Oreochromis spp., Cichlidae) shows slow-
maturing, mouth-brooding and habitat-dependent breeding traits (Banda et a!. 2005a) 
which make it vulnerable to a stock collapse in case of over-exploitation. As shown in 
Figure 2.3, the catch data from 1976 to 2000 has shown that while the chambo fishery 
(ti lapiines line) has, in fact, experienced a considerable decline in the SEA, catching of 
fast-growing and smaller haplochromine species and usipa has steadily grown to produce 
a stable level of total yield over the years (Turner 1995; Weyl 2005). The overall decline 
in the catches of larger fishes - tilapia, catfish and African carp (Labeo mesops, 
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Cyprinidae), combined with the increased yields of smaller species, suggest that catch 
trend is dynamic, not static, over a relatively short period of time. Similarly, the cases of 
subdued fishing pressure have also demonstrated the high propensity for change in stock 
size. For instance, low catches and illegal fishing practices triggered a one-year closed 
season for a pair-trawl fishery in 1992 in the area south of Boadzulu Island denominated 
as Area A. The closure of the fishery produced a marked impact on the stocks as, after the 
one-year ban, a rapid rebound in fish biomass was documented (Banda eta/. 1996). On a 
separate occasion, the average fish sizes of certain cichlids locally called mbaba 
(Lethrinops spp., Cichlidae) increased dramatically shortly after a properly observed 
closed season (Hara eta/. 2002). 
Welcomme (200 1) asserts that inland aquatic ecosystems are among the most vulnerable 
natural systems as the effects of all natural and anthropogenic activities are eventually 
collected and reflected in the quality of the water and what is contained within. The SEA 
is no exception to the pressure and stresses that include coastal erosion, removal of 
aquatic vegetation, disturbance of lake bottom and deforestation in the catchment area. 
Such anthropogenic interactions as well as the naturally-induced changes all add to the 
high dynamics of the natural system in SEA. 
Functions and interactions associated with a natural system are rarely contained in a 
single, clearly demarcated scale. Misidentification of or failure to recognize the 
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appropriate scale could result in inappropriate governing actions which may amplify the 
severity of the problem that the natural system is under rather than resolving it as 
intended (Cumming et al. 2006). Delineating the boundaries of natural system is 
relatively straightforward for lakes because structural/physical and functional boundaries 
naturally tend to align with each other (Post et al. 2007). Similarly, where there is a 
strong association between resource flow, community membership and physical 
boundaries, it creates systems that are well-bounded. Thus, suitable scales for well-
bounded systems are generalJy conceived with less difficulty. In contrast, open systems 
are exemplified by such water bodies with more amorphous boundaries in the likes of 
rivers and estuaries. In this case, scale matching is a more convoluted task. 
Aside from having clear boundaries as being part of a lake, the steeply shelving rocky 
shores at the northern extreme end of the SEA, which is where it connects to the rest of 
the lake, may act as a barrier to the movements of alJ fish species, perhaps with the 
exception of those found in the extreme deep waters or in the pelagic zone (Turner et a/. 
1995). In tem1s of hydrology and nutrient-cycling, the SEA displays distinct 
characteristics from the rest of the lake as discussed earlier. Furthermore, distribution of 
some commercially important fish species exhibits a prevalence of localized stocks that 
are contained and appeared to be shifting within the SEA (Turner et al. 1995; Kanyerere 
2000). Also, there is no conclusive evidence suggesting the existence of migration 
patterns of fish species through the Upper Shire River (F AO 1993). 
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Another dimension of scale that is of high importance to the issue of well-boundedness is 
temporal scale. At relatively long temporal scales, all ecosystems can be regarded as open 
systems as external inputs and outputs overshadow the internal mechanisms in the long 
run (Post et al. 2007). Lake ecosystems are considered well-bounded at temporal scales 
shorter than the residence time but open at temporal scales longer than the residence time. 
Residence time refers to an average time a substance resides within a system before 
draining out. Lake Malawi's residence time is estimated to be 140 years (Bootsma and 
Hecky 1993), which is a period of considerable length from a governance perspective. If 
one considers the temporal scale of typical human governing interventions where 
planning for one next generation is a near-absolute rarity, it appears safe to regard Lake 
Malawi as a well-bounded system according to this criterion. 
The examination of scale indicates that the natural system of Lake Malawi, and of the 
SEA in particular, has relatively we11-defined boundaries. Despite the SEA's physical and 
functional linkages to the rest of the lake, it is reasonable to set the natural scale of the 
SEA at the current physical delineation which traditionally and commonly denotes the 
SEA as a pseudo-isolated body of water. Therefore, the scale issue involved in the natural 
system appears to be low. 
5.1.2 Socio-economic system 
Diversity 
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The small-scale fishery in the SEA involves multi-gear and targets multi-species. It uses 
small vessels such as planked boats and dug-out canoes, while it can also be done without 
boat as in the case of beach seining. In the 2005 annual frame survey (Banda et al. 2006), 
10 types of gear were recognized as widely used. However, each gear can be easily 
modified in its design, size and operation depending on the targeted species and weather 
conditions. Hence, an existence of a large variation of improvised fishing gear is 
reasonably suspected. A fishing unit is typically comprised of a gear owner and 
crewrnembers hired to provide man-power in the actual fishing operation. The fishing 
units that dot the SEA waters may be residents of the surrounding area or they may come 
from other locations as part of the usual temporary migration pattern of' following a good 
catch'. In either case, gear owners often do not engage in fishing operations. Rather, they 
oversee the landings, the sale of the catch and the distribution of cash income with 
crewrnembers. They are essentially the 'boss' figure to the hired crewmembers and 
should be more accurately viewed as investors or managers, not fishers. 
Two types of large-scale commercial fishing are observed in the SEA. The first involves 
individually owned and operated pair-trawls, whose numbers in operation range between 
1 0 and 15 at any one time in recent years. The characteristics of this large-scale fishing 
unit are not unlike the small-scale counterparts except that the catch amount is bigger, 
investment at stake is higher, and that the ' investor-labourer' relationship is more 
pronounced. The second type is the large-scale industrial fishing by a company named 
Maldeco. It utilizes several stern trawlers to target multiple types of species available in 
the SEA and beyond, while the catch is mainly iced and transported to regional 
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distribution offices located in major town centres across the country in a centrally-
coordinated fashion. With the exception of the industrial-level fishing, all fish processing 
and trading is a greatly dispersed individual activity with few centralized mechanisms of 
channeling and distributing fish (Seymour 2001; Allison et al. 2002). 
A clear distinction between various fishing-related occupations is not easy to draw in the 
SEA. Fishers and villagers alike seem to display a low level of specialization which 
inhibits the creation of a more diverse socio-economic make-up in a fishing village. lui-
Larsen eta/. (2003) explains that fishing is often a part-time endeavour, and also mobility 
within fisheries as well as in and out of the fishing sector seems to be rife and fluid. For 
example, any non-fishing community member can intermittently enter into fish trading by 
buying from fishers on the beach and selling them at another place. Likewise, a gear 
owner can go fishing himself or alternately become a temporary crewmember of another 
gear owner, thereby blurring the distinction between owners and crew. Post-harvest 
arrangements also show a low degree of diversity in which two forms constitute the main 
processing activities - sun-drying and smoking. The extent of distribution of the 
processed fish is nation-wide eventually reaching all comers of the country, while the sale 
of fresh fish is limited to more immediate areas by bicycle or bus and to major markets by 
a small number of faster vehicles. In terms of demographic traits, although there are an 
increasing number of people of various ethnic origins and religions in the SEA, the Yao 
ethnic group associated with Islam religion is the large majority inhabiting the area. 
Subsequently, their language Chiyao is still spoken widely among people. Reflecting on 
the low socio-economic diversity in fishing activities and customs, which include labow· 
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relationship and post-harvest practices, as well as in major demographic characteristics, a 
low to medium level of socio-economic diversity seems appropriate. 
Complexity 
The socio-economic dimension of the fisheries system in the SEA is complicated with 
external factors such as poor living standards, the importance of subsistence agriculture, 
multiple livelihood strategies, gender disparity and the insidious effect of HIV/AID . 
Malawi is considered a developing nation by most conventional measures such as the 
Human Development Index 11 and the World Bank classification by income12. Set in a 
rural setting, fishing communities surrounding the SEA have long been deficient in 
proper education and health facilities, accessibility to safe drinking water, sound 
infrastructure, as well as in reliable and affordable energy sources. In a fishing village, 
although fishing is often a leading economic activity, it may not be the most crucial 
livelihood activity. Nearly every household grows maize or other staple crops in their plot 
of land for subsistence consumption throughout the year. Simply put, maize is the staple 
food that eradicates daily hunger while fish is a condiment, a source of animal protein. 
Therefore, in view of food security, the importance of staple food fanning cannot b 
overlooked. 
11 The HOI for Malawi is 0.437, which gives the country a rank of l 641h out of 177 countries with data 
(UNDP 2007). 
12 Malawi is classified as one of the 49 low-income economies (WorldBank 2009). 
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Income earned from fishing is often supplemented by other small-scale activities and 
trades carried out by family members including young children of age below 1 0 years. 
Remittances sent back from overseas employment in the region like South Africa also 
form a rather lucrative source of income for many villagers including fishers. In general, 
there is a high degree of interdependence among villagers as they rely on each other for a 
smooth socio-economic functioning through extensive kinship and community-oriented 
relationship as well as through activities like petty trades, informal loans between 
individuals and provision of moral support and social order. 
At present, the socio-economic picture is further complicated by another harsh factor -
the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Malawi 's HIV prevalence rate among 15 to 49 year olds 
continued to hover around 14% in 2006. In many African countries, however, fishing 
communities experience the prevalence rate nearly 4 to 5 times higher than the general 
population putting them an1ong the most vulnerable and the highest-risk group (Allison 
and Seeley 2004; GoM 2007). Factors such as geographic mobility and migration, 
availability of large sums of cash, a generally low level of education, coupled with the 
usually subordinate socio-economic status of women are all present in the SEA fisheries 
adding to the increasing vulnerability of fishing communities. It produces a detrimental 
effect on livelihoods at the household level as well as on the larger economy regionally 
and at the national scale. The combined loss of labour, income and productivity could 
easily lead to food insecurity and undermine household resilience. HIV I AIDS could also 
have a severe bearing on governance as it would reduce the capacity and the will of those 
who are affected in participating and committing in a long-term sustainable resource use 
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initiative (GoM 2007). Linked to HIV/AIDS, "fish-for-sex" transactions between female 
fish traders and male fishers arranged to secure a supply of fish for processing and sale in 
exchange of sex (Bene and Merten 2008) are a phenomenon that also exists in the SEA, 
further illuminating the complexity of the socio-economic relationships present in fishing 
communities. 
The internal mechanisms that influence socio-economic circumstances also deserve 
consideration. Normative concerns such as one's values, norms, principles and interests 
affect their socio-economic choices as profoundly as the external drivers discussed above 
(Kooiman and Jentoft 2005; Etzioni 1988). Not only that both the internal and external 
drivers affect the socio-economic reality, they also affect one another. Therefore, making 
sense of the internal complexity that resides within individuals in a responsible manner 
would also form an important step towards understanding the governance picture. For 
example, the issue of illegal fishing, one of the major ecological and socio-economic 
concerns confounding the SEA fisheries, could benefit from a careful examination of 
fishers ' values and moral principles regarding fisheries conservation, therefore providing 
alternate insights into this urgent governance challenge. Hara (2006, p. 429) argues that 
"in an area such as the Southeast Arm with multiple gear types, a variety of ethnic groups 
and different sectors, assumptions of shared norms and coincidence of interests need to be 
validated before any practical attempts to decentralize resource management". 
In summary, the socio-economic system contains several sub-components that give rise to 
high complexity. It is not simply ' poverty' that is at the heart of it all (Bene and Friend 
104 
- - --------- -----
2009), but the interaction of the many underlying intricacies, which must be understood 
and dealt with in order to properly address the challenges faced in the socio-economic 
domain of SEA's fisheries system. 
Dynamics 
The pace of conventional development can perhaps be a crude starting point to gauge the 
degree of socio-economic dynamics. Generally, the ' progress' has been lagging. For 
instance, a large segment of the villages surrounding the shoreline of the SEA are not yet 
a beneficiary of the regular electricity supply. Rechargeable car-batteries, portable 
generators and solar cells are sources of electricity that only a small portion of households 
can afford. Along with the slow-coming of the electricity, other change-inducing drivers 
have also been rather sluggish to permeate into the area. 
In the fishing sector, however, past evidence suggests that the fishing system holds 
relatively higher dynamic tendency. This can be seen from fishers ' responses to the 
changes occurred in the volume and composition of their catch. The prevailing form of 
gear has gone through a drastic transformation in the 1990s responding to the declining 
chambo fishery and instead targeting more abundant smaller species. This resulted in a 
large increase in the construction of an open-water seine called chilimira at the expense of 
decommissioning beach seines that target either chambo or small haplochromine species 
called kambuzi (haplochromis spp., Cichlidae) (Ngochera 2001; Hara 2006). Figure 5.1 
illustrates the shift in the number of the two gears, chili mira and chambo seine net, which 
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has taken place in the SEA. In addition, over the years, the number of fishers themselves 
has also fluctuated depending on the profitability of their catch or the availability of more 
favourable income prospects outside of the fishing sector (Jui-Larsen et al. 2003). A 
fluctuation in the number of gear owners in the SEA displayed in Figure 5.2 supports this 
view. Furthermore, another important dynamic factor is the widespread and near-
unobstructed movement of fishers to other villages or parts of the lake (Allison et al. 
2001). It is a common practice for fishers, fish processors and traders to move away from 
their original home for days, weeks or even months in order to make a better income from 
fishing work. These characteristics seem to indicate high potential for dynamic 
transformations within the fisheries sector. 
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Figure 5.1 Number of chilimira and chambo seine net in the SEA from 1981 and 1999 
(data for 1982 and 1987 are missing) (Source: Weyl 2005) 
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Despite these dynamics, the nature and modus operandi of fishing are essentially the 
same as a century ago. Similar style of small-scale fishery still dominates with only a 
handful of technical innovations taking root over the decades (Allison et al. 2002). In 
addition, the socio-economic relationships and the level of organization among fishers, 
the model of fish processing and trading, and the pattern of labour migration to outside 
sectors are not entirely different from what would have been observed in the colonial 
period (McCracken 1987; Chirwa 1996). The anticipated arrival of the regular supply of 
electricity to the rest of the villages in the SEA through road-side cables in the future and 
the continuing migration of young men to overseas bringing remittances and noticeable 
household wealth are seen as two of the main short-term drivers that could shift the pace 
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of societal dynamics. A more long-term dynamics will depend upon the macroeconomic 
changes induced by the general level of development happening in the country. Overall, 
the dynamics of the socio-economic system of the SEA fisheries is at a medium level. 
In the fishing villages surrounding the SEA, a long chain and extensive network of family 
kinship and community association are common. For instance, when there is a funeral in 
the village, as a gesture of respect, all business undertakings including shops and fishing 
activities are suspended following the decree of the village head. This kind of socio-
economic relationship also traverses the village bow1daries into the nearby villages 
through extensive kinship and social institutions like school and church. Hence, defining 
community and social boundary may be a tricky issue which requires a careful 
examination of social structure and relationship, as Agrawal and Gibson (1999) have 
elaborated. 
The fishers in Lake Malawi move easily from one beach to another with little 
jurisdictional and social constraints. The flux of fishers and fish processors is most often 
driven by the economic opportunities within fishing, but it is also sometimes linked to, 
and even somewhat regulated by, the prosperity and downturn of external sectors taking 
place outside the social and geographical boundaries of the SEA as well as the 
environmental variations (McCracken 1987; Jul-Larsen eta!. 2003). Historically, major 
events in other parts of the country, such as a boom in tea plantation in the Shire 
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Highlands and the rise of the First World War, have produced a significant demand for 
the production of fish and the growth of fish trading. Nowadays, as mentioned earlier, 
many young men migrate overseas and their remittances are channeled back to the SEA. 
This is another mechanism that has a broadening effect in the socio-economic scale, since 
the volatility of global market would also find its way to many households in the fishing 
villages through fluctuating remittances and return labour. That being said, the effect of 
globalization has not fully infiltrated into the SEA yet, particularly in many of the fishing 
villages. With the advent of more development activities and the growth of tourism in the 
area, it is anticipated that the socio-economic scale will likely expand. 
Although most day-to-day social and economic activities of the actors take place in the 
vicinity of the Jake, seen in a larger context it may be misleading to limit the socio-
economic scale to the immediate boundary congruent to that of the natural system. 
Caution must be exercised in conceiving the socio-economic scale, incorporating, for 
example, external factors and developments in the greater region as well as intra-/inter-
community relationship. Therefore, the scale issue in the socio-economic system of the 
SEA is considered to be medium. 
5.2 Governing system 
Diversity 
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The Department of Fisheries (DoF) was established in 1946 by the colonial government 
effectively shifting the mode of governing from the common property regime of the pre-
colonial time into that of centralized and top-down (Kasulo and Perrings 2006). Since 
then, the control of the fisheries resources was widely assumed to be held by the 
government. However, severe limitations of the central-state management of fisheries 
have been observed, which include weak legitimacy towards regulations, costly 
implementation and subsequently widespread illegal fishing. Hence, rather than being 
regulated as was the intention, the fishery has approximated an open-access system with 
little control over who can fish when, what and where. Realizing the limits, the DoF 
attempted to include wider and more meaningful participation of user communities in the 
governing of lake resources, as the potential benefits of participatory- or co-management 
were being recognized in and outside of the country. Enabled by a series of donor 
support, Participatory Fisheries Management was initiated in the SEA of Lake Malawi in 
I997 (Njaya 2008). From this, a formal institution, named Beach Village Committee 
(BVC), was created in each fishing village to fill the institutional void at the community 
level and facilitate the participation of resource users. The legally-mandated BVC's duties 
include management and monitoring of activities in the beach, prohibition of illegal gears, 
managing migrating fishers, and involvement in other pertinent local fishing issues (GoM 
I997; GoM 2000). The executive members of the BVCs are elected by fisher and 
community members. They are normally influential or well-liked individuals in the 
village who may or may not have participated in fishing-related work in the past. While 
the names of the committee members are registered with the DoF, they receive little 
official governmental acknowledgement and support, and therefore essentially remain as 
II 0 
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volunteers. Furthermore, relevant training opportunities are rare, and operating funds are 
virtually non-existent. Overall, there appears to be a general lack of aptitude and capacity 
to lead the BVCs, and inadequate incentives to fulfill their mandated duties. 
The DoF established District Fisheries Offices in all districts with natural fish resources, 
including Mangochi district. Reporting to the District Fisheries Officer, fisheries 
extension workers perfom1 extension and catch data recording services at the village 
level. Each of them normally oversees several villages and works with multiple BVCs in 
his/her assigned area. 
Along with the devolution of authority envisioned in the establishment of BVCs, another 
governance reform has been underway which aims to decentralize the governing authority 
to districts through the creation of District Assemblies. Each District Assembly would 
consist of elected councilors from each ward and integrate various ministries and 
departmental agencies at the district level into one administrative unit (GoM 1998). 
Furthermore, Area Development Committees (ADCs) and Village Development 
Committees (VDCs) were to be set up to govern sub-district and village affairs under the 
leadership of the Traditional Authority leaders. However, since proposed in 1998 the 
recurring delays in the election of councilors have prevented the District Assemblies or 
the sub-district structures from being functional, with most of the governing authority still 
concentrated at the government ministries and departmental agencies (Hara 2008). 
Nevertheless, the Mangochi District has been preparing for its wider involvement in the 
fishery sector by drafting fisheries by-laws (GoM 2005). With the seating of councilors 
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and the approval of the by-laws in the future, the Mangochi District Assembly is expected 
to play a greater role in the SEA's fisheries governance. 
Traditional governing institution in Malawi is denoted as the Traditional Authority (TA) 
administration. It is upheld by the three hierarchical levels of traditional leaders - village 
heads (-man or -woman), group village heads and chiefs. The land surrounding the SEA 
is split between five TA areas, named Mponda, Chowe, Nankumba, Namavi and 
Makanjira, each of which is governed by a hereditary chief. Aside from having an 
authoritative control over the village affairs such as land partitioning and settlement of 
civil cases, a village head also wields considerable power over fishing matters. Notably, 
granting permission to visiting fishers in exchange of a weekly tribute called mawe, and 
determining which fishing gears are allowed to operate from the village are two of the 
many relevant decisions rested on the village head. Village heads, along with all TA 
leaders, are viewed and approached with utmost respect. To say that ' a village head rules 
his/her village' is not entirely incorrect. This implies that aspirations of village heads, 
whatever it may be regarding the fisheries, is in many cases freely expressed and 
extended to the fisheries governance at the village level. 
Other governing institutions include Members of Parliament representing the area at the 
national level, and the Commercial Fishermen's Association, which exists to represent the 
opinions of a handful of powerful, large-scale fishing owners and operators. There are 
also non-governmental organizations promoting causes such as HIV I AIDS prevention, 
micro-finance and civic education. However, their influence in the governing of fisheries 
112 
appears to be limited. In the governing system, a diverse set of governing institutions 
exists at varying levels whose positions and interests do not necessarily complement each 
other. As a result, high diversity characterizes the fisheries governing system of the SEA. 
Complexity 
With such a wide array of actors and institutions involved in the governing of fisheries, it 
is perhaps no surprise that the SEA's governing system displays a complex picture of 
governance structure. Fisheries governance in the SEA presents a unique form of a 
hierarchical system, which attempts to link the formal governing institutions with the 
traditional ones as shown in Figure 5.3. The proposed decentralization scheme would 
install the TA chiefs in the District Assembly as non-voting, ex-officio members. Also, 
the set up of the ADCs and VDCs would formally involve the village heads and group 
village heads in the governance process. Already, all three levels of the TA leaders are 
receiving monthly allowances from the central government for the positions they hold and 
the duties they must fulfill under the command of the Ministry of Local Government and 
Rural Development. As the uncertain nature of their current linkages to the formal 
institutional framework persists, the level of accountability in the hierarchy also remains 
in doubt. The T A leaders follow the hereditary pattern of succession where each leader is 
appointed by hjsfher clan members, rather than democratically elected by the villagers. 
Moreover, the leaders' clan and associated senior elders resembles something of a 'royal 
family' who may pose to be authoritarian by wielding their power and influence, 
therefore further raising the issue of accountability as a major concern. 
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Figure 5.3 A possible institutional structure m the SEA with decentralization and 
devolution of authority. Shown are institutions (rectangle) and actors (rounded rectangle) 
as well as the nature of linkages. Currently, accountability linkages amongst traditional 
leaders as well as between them and the district- or national-level governing authority 
appear weak (adapted from Hara 2008) 
Hara (2008) states that a high sense of ambiguity exists concerning how decentralization 
of political and administrative authority is to be proceeded vis-a-vis devolution of sectoral 
management responsibilities. For example, in terms of handling fisheries issues at the 
village level, it is unclear how the BVCs (a sectoral co-management institution) and 
VDCs (a decentralization institution) should be related to each other. Vague legal basi 
and lack of a shared vision for decentralization have opened the door for various 
speculations as to how to move forward, that is, either the BVCs are to be disbanded and 
absorbed into the VDCs to allow for a more integrated management approach, or the 
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BVCs can be nested within the decentralization structure to become an advisory sub-
committee of the VDCs (Hara 2008). 
A further set of complex governance challenges are observed in the BVC's relationship 
with other existing institutions. The BVC is a concept initiated by the DoF and 
international donors, not something that is locally brought up (Njaya 2002). Hence, it 
tends to align itself with the government's position through basing their actions on the 
fisheries regulations and utilizing assistance from fisheries extension workers. However, 
as they are not employed by the government, they are neither directly connected to nor 
entitled to receive a regular and tangible support from the DoF. At the same time, as 
villagers themselves, they must rely on the village head for support to be seen as 
legitimate and to produce any tangible result. Hence, the BVC's influence and 
effectiveness in the management and monitoring of beach/fishing activities can be greatly 
undermined by a failure to secure a true commitment of the village head. This is not the 
way the BVCs were envisioned to operate in the first place. They were designed to be 
situated in the middle ground balancing the powers of both the DoF and the village head 
while working to assist local fishers (Hara et a!. 2002; Njaya 2007). The apparent 
disconnect from the DoF who propped up the BVCs in the beginning, has forced the 
BVCs in a position where their clout is weakened and their efficacy hangs on the 
cooperation of the village head. As a result, their independence and discretionary powers 
are diminished, and likely their legitimacy challenged by the fishers and the local 
community (Hara 2008). 
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Finally, witchcraft is an informal belief custom widely held by many Malawians 
including rural villagers, urban dwellers and even the highly educated and sophisticated 
social elites. This is likely another complexity-raising feature in the governing system, as 
it is believed to interact with the governance effort of the formal institutions as well as the 
TA administration. For example, many villagers believe that traditional leaders possess 
witchcraft, which could be used to inflict harm on ordinary villagers like themselves. 
Therefore, the mysterious aura of witchcraft power contributes to the upholding of the 
'untouchable' status of traditional leaders. It is also noted that decision-making capacity 
of some formal government personnel and even some of the traditional leaders 
themselves can be compromised in fear of retribution and vengeance. Shadowy power of 
witchcraft appears to be rooted strongly in the minds of 'governors' and 'the-governed' 
alike, and it is sure to play a role in the governing of the village-level fisheries. This 
partial understanding gives us enough evidence to grasp the high complexity embedded in 
the SEA's fisheries governing system. 
Dynamics 
The BVCs were set up in the SEA as a vehicle for encouraging the participation of 
resource users and to distribute the responsibilities for managing and conserving the 
fisheries resources (Njaya 2008). Through such co-governing mechanisms, it intended to 
produce an added effect of curbing illegal fishing activities and raising the level of 
compliance among the fishers. The idealistic conceptual design of the BVCs and the legal 
mandate given to ensure that the BVCs work as designed, however, have not been able to 
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guarantee lasting success in the implementation of the BVC as a governing institution. As 
stated earlier, the village head's lack of support in the activities of the BVCs would 
deprive the political backing necessary to raise the legitimacy of their actions in the eyes 
of fishers. Also, the DoF is too far removed from the reaches of an individual BVC to 
offer tangible support due to the sporadic line of communication and limited availability 
of resources. Although the creation of the BVCs in the SEA was a welcome gesture that 
holds great potential in its intention, the actual efficacy to bring about the changes 
necessary to improve fisheries governance seems to be deficient. 
One potential change that could reshape how fisheries are governed in the SEA is the 
implementation of the Mangochi District Fisheries By-laws. Through an iterative 
formulation process and an extended period of consultations with wide-ranging 
stakeholders including traditional leaders and fishers, the by-laws, at the time of writing, 
stand ready to be presented to the future-elected councilors for approval and 
implementation. This will provide a legal and operational basis for the Mangochi District 
Assembly to have a greater participation in the fisheries governance, and therefore offer 
an opportunity to cautiously experiment with a decentralized mode of governing in the 
SEA (GoM 2005; Njaya 2008). 
There have been few major initiatives that attempted to institute changes to the fisheries 
decision-making and management process in the SEA. Even for those that have been 
promoted, the inertia of the system exists to impede much of the progress. Thus, a low 
dynamic characterizes the governing system. Although the predictability offered by the 
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low dynamics would make the governing system relatively more governable, attaining a 
certain level of dynamics may prove to be beneficial in bringing about the desired socio-
political changes to the system. To do so, more spirited interactions in the governing 
process may be urgently needed to lift the current state away from the socio-economic 
and natural issues that confound the fisheries. 
Two broad perspectives can be applied to aid the understanding of the governing scale. 
One involves the multi-layered institutional structure, while the other is spatial based on 
the physical/structural and biological characteristics of the water body. First, a complex 
picture of multi-layered scales of governing institutions is identified in the SEA fishery. 
The largest scale is the domain of the DoF at the national level whose mandate 
encompasses all fishing activities in all water bodies in the country including inland fish 
culture using dug-up ponds. Historically it is the most powerful player with the most 
resources available to them, and they have maintained the perception as the governing 
body that is ultimately responsible for the fate of fisheries resources. At the regional scale 
is the District Assembly, who has been without a meaningful role in fisheries governance 
despite having the entire length of the SEA under its jurisdiction. With the 
decentralization taking full effect and the implementation of the fisheries by-laws in the 
future, the involvement ofthe District Assembly in the governance of the SEA fisheries is 
expected to increase. Three levels of the Traditional Authority operate at the village-level 
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scale. They are officially recognized by the central government as the local-level 
governing bodies who work directly within the communities. 
Alternately, governing scales can be explored through the lens of the physical and 
biological characteristics of the water body itself. Here, three levels of scale operating in 
the SEA are identified. The first governance viewpoint sees the SEA nested in the 
southern aquatic system (Figure 2.1), comprising Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River. 
Corresponding with the main chambo harvesting areas, this regional view has been 
solidified over the years as the scale of consideration for managing the charnbo fishery 
(F AO 1993; Banda et a!. 2005b ). This larger scale may also prove to be particularly 
advantageous when the Mangochi District Assembly increases its role in exercising 
governing authority, because the SEA, Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River all fall 
under the complete jurisdiction of Mangochi district. In addition, the whole inclusion of 
the SEA in one single district avoids potential inter-jurisdictional pitfalls often 
experienced by a water body shared by or split between multiple political jurisdictions. 
Secondly, the SEA itself is seen as one governing scale for the fisheries system, as the 
name itself already implies. It has an implicit connotation that the fishing activities taking 
place in this water body are aggregated and managed as a whole, and treated distinct from 
fishing matters of other parts of the lake. This level of scale has been applied in numerous 
occasions likely making it the most commonly used boundary. Lastly, a finer scale 
describing the SEA fisheries system has also been in use. Figure 5.4 shows the SEA 
divided into three sub-areas, Area A, B and C, as specified in the fisheries regulations of 
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2000 (GoM 2000). Area A is characterized with muddy/sandy lake bottom which slopes 
gently down to about 50 m near Boadzulu Island. Due to its high demersal productivity, 
this area has been intensely fished leading to the fully or over-exploited status (Weyl et 
a/. 2005). Area B contains the water depth of less than 100 m in which offshore, 
deepwater species like ndunduma (Diplotaxodon spp., Cichlidae) begin to appear. Area C 
features deeper water depth that ranges over 100 m. In this deeper part of the water body, 
it is speculated that there is potential for sustaining high level of exploitation, or even 
expansion, by targeting pelagic and deep demersal fish stocks (Banda et al. 1996; 
Seymour 2001). This set of finer scales has been the spatial basis for various management 
purposes such as stock assessment, prohibition of fishing gears and zoning scheme for 
large-scale fishjng operation. 
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Figure 5.4 Area division in the Southeast Arm used for various fisheries management and 
research purposes (Source: FAO 1 993) 
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These two broad categorizations of scale used in the governing system of the SEA are 
drawn up independently and used in disassociation with the other type of governing scale. 
The question is then whether there is a need to link these two scales together, either 
conceptually or in practice, such that governing scale issue is streamlined (Cumming et 
al. 2006) and therefore governability would be enhanced. If so, what would the end 
design look like and how should it be achieved? Does this necessarily imply that fishing 
areas are to be partitioned and matched with the jurisdiction of village-level governing 
institutions through the promotion of local ownership and limiting access, as done in 
other countries like the Philippines? Or a broader scale that takes a sweeping approach to 
management (e.g. coordinated from the district-level) would be a better fit? Quite likely, 
the design and implementation of an appropriate governing scale would be something of a 
thoughtful, lengthy experiment that requires a constant adjustment process. The scales of 
the natural and the socio-economic system will also need to be carefully consulted in 
formulating an appropriate governing scale. Overall, the scale issue involving the 
governing system appears to be high. 
5.3 Governing Interactions 
In the 1990s, Participatory Fisheries Management Program was aimed at bringing up the 
participation level of resource users in fishing communities by enabling the BVC (Njaya 
2007, 2008). It was envisioned that through this process the needs and the demands of the 
system-to-be-governed can travel up and down the interaction chain in a more flowing 
fashion, raising the responsiveness of the system and having the views of the system-to-
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be-governed more systematically and reliably represented. Such process of wider 
participation and greater collaboration would enhance the capacity to govern, since no 
single actor has the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle problems unilaterally 
(Kooiman 1993). After a decade-long implementation, however, active participation of 
resource users in the governance of SEA fisheries remains low, and consequently their 
concerns inconsistently represented. Instead, facing the frail status of BVCs, 
communication between resource users and the government seems to center around 
fisheries extension workers. The messages of the DoF are disseminated to resources users 
via fisheries meetings and other extension activities organized by them, and in return the 
opinions of the fishers are passed back up to the fisheries offices. Overall, the nature of 
the interactions in the SEA remains ad-hoc, haphazard and predominantly one-way from 
the governments directed towards fishing communities. 
Learning and adaptation is another important governing interaction. When the governing 
system takes the lessons of previous letdowns and breakdowns seriously, governing 
capacity in satisfying the existing demands can be expected to increase. An ongoing 
example from the SEA (and the whole lake) is averting the introduction of non-native 
species, such as Lake Tanganyika sardine (Limnothrissa miodon, Clupeidae), to Lake 
Malawi by the Malawian Government, after observing severe ecological alterations in 
other neighbouring lakes such as Lake Victoria (Allison et a!. 2002; Kaufman 1992; 
Ogutu-Ohwayo and Balirwa 2006). The recognition of the potential pitfall and adaptation 
of its governing accordingly has ensured that the high diversity of fish species in Lake 
Malawi is maintained to the benefit of the systems-to-be governed. 
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There are also times when governing interactions involve dealing with those needs and 
demands that cannot be easily reconciled or satisfied, such as livelihood concerns and 
value judgments. In such instances, sincere appreciation of each other's standpoints and 
interests that fosters collaboration and compromises can be seen as a kind of interaction 
that could ensure smooth functioning governance. As an example, governing instruments 
employed in the SEA fishery have had a strong ' technical' flavor whose basis lies in 
scientific studies. The prevailing measures, thus, include gear controls, licensing and 
closed areas among others. Although such technical instruments are usually seen to be 
compatible with the hierarchical governing structure present in the area, decades of 
widespread non-compliance of regulations by fishers (Bulirani 2005; Hara 2006) raise a 
concern as to whether they are indeed appropriate to meet the real demands of resource 
users. In this light, the enduring situation of non-compliance in the SEA can be seen to 
have resulted from the lack of meaningful collaboration between the socio-economic 
system-to-be-governed and the governing system. For both sub-systems to work together 
effectively in the governing of the fisheries, a genuine appreciation and understanding of 
the interests, motivations and values held by various stakeholders is deemed necessary to 
enable a true col1aborative process that can reconcile the underlying differences. 
So far globalization has shown limited reach in the fisheries system of the SEA. As a 
result, the lengthening of interaction chains and multiplication of interaction nodes often 
associated with the changes brought on by globalizing fisheries have largely been absent 
in the governing interactions in the SEA. The premise of governing interactions is that 
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govemability can be compensated or made more difficult depending on the nature and 
details of the interactions (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2009). Examining the governing 
interactions happening for the SEA fisheries system gives an indication that their current 
set-up is not greatly conducive to aiding governance. In other words, they leave much to 
be desired in terms of facilitating effective and smooth-functioning governing. Hence, 
low to medium governing interactions are suggested. 
5.4 Discussion 
The summary of the assessment findings is presented in Table 5.1. Both the degree of 
system properties observed in each sub-system and the inferred level of governability are 
shown. For the systems-to-be-governed and the governing system, high system properties 
(e.g. high complexity) are generally considered to be linked to low governability, whereas 
low properties would indicate that a system is generally rather more governable. The 
relationship between the level of system properties and the level of governability is seen 
to be reversed in the case of the governing interactions, since high governing interactions 
would induce high govemability in the system. It must be noted that the ratings given in 
the assessment represent a relative scale and therefore should not be taken in an absolute 
sense. For the systems-to-be-governed, complexity and dynamics are generally high, 
while diversity and scale issues display less demanding characteristics. Looking at each 
sub-system on its own, the socio-economic system exhibits high or medium level of 
system properties. The natural system appears to be a less demanding sub-system in terms 
of the inherently-held properties, thereby making it relatively more governable. Overall, 
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the high dynamics of the natural ecosystem and the high complexity embedded in the 
socio-economic actors deserve the most acute attention as they represent the most 
challenging aspect of governing the needs and demands present in the SEA fisheries 
system. 
Table 5.1 Summary of the assessment findings (system properties are shown m 
parentheses) 
System-to-be-governed 
Governing System Governing system 
interactions properties Natural system Socio-economic system 
(Medium) (Low-Medium) (High) 
Diversify Moderate-High (Low-medium) Moderate govemability govemability Low governability Low-Moderate 
(Low-Medium) 
govemability 
Comp/exily Moderate-!-! igh (High) (High) 
governability Low governability Low govcrnability 
Dynamics 
(High) (Medium) (Low) 
Low governability Moderate governability High governability 
Scale (Low) (Medium) {High) High governability Moderate governability Low governability 
Having assessed the system properties and identified the bottlenecks contained in each 
system-to-be-governed, governing goals can be carefully crafted to correspond with the 
realities of the particular fisheries. To do so, governor's action in dealing with those high 
difficulties and ultimately improving governability of the systems can be broadly 
classified into two main types. Governors can act consciously to reduce the difficulties 
associated with the system properties of a system-to-be-governed. While there are 
properties that cannot be readily altered by human governing actions such as the 
complexity of the natural system, for certain properties, like the scale of the socio-
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economic system, for example, a governing intervention could be set in motion to reduce 
the scale mismatches that typically confound management efforts. Alternately, governors 
can recognize the low governability embedded in the systems-to-be-governed and work 
around them by setting realistic governing goals permitted by the inherent difficulties 
faced in the fisheries. For instance, a recommendation put forth by Jul-Larsen et al. 
(2003) to let the dynamic environmental variations of the lake be the guiding rules in 
regulating access to fishery instead of instituting a governance mechanism that officially 
abolishes the open-access fishery can be considered a latter type of governing ac6on that 
fully respects the limits of the high dynamics in the natural system. 
Socio-economic complexity is identified as another major demand of the system-to-be-
governed in the SEA. Multiple drivers and factors are at play with potentially intricate 
relationships and interdependency behind them. Interactions with the natural system 
further complicate the socio-economic details, in the case of illegal fishing, for instance, 
as the resource-dependent communities strive to cope with their livelihood challenges. 
Overall, it results in the complicated socio-economic picture that is tricky to understand. 
To properly deal with the complex situation, a blanket approach that sees it as a 
straightforward 'poverty ' issue or within the purely economic terms should be avoided. 
Instead, respecting the high degree of complexity through taking the demands seriously 
would be the first step in demystifying the complexity. To do that, governance 
arrangements will have to be better tuned to the various factors involved. In particular, a 
meaningful consideration of the internal mechanisms, such as underlying values and 
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principles of the fishing community members, which have been mostly neglected, could 
prove to be beneficial in lessening the difficulties posed in the socio-economic system. 
Reviewing the assessment summary for the governing system (Table 5.1), generally low 
governability is observed with the exception of the dynamics aspect. This low 
governability associated with the governing system is a reflection of the low capacity on 
the part of the governing system, which, in a broader sense, includes the resource-
dependent community as well as the various levels of government. Limited availability or 
scarcity of financial and human resources appear to be the main cause of the low capacity 
in general. In addition, prevailing socio-economic conditions that disfavour the fishing 
communities is another well-cited reason that hinders the build-up of governing capacity. 
Given this reality, governing goals and actions must better reflect the level of 
governability experienced in the system. For instance, an adoption of internationally-
driven governance aspirations should be cautiously approached to avoid any overblown 
governing ambitions unsuitable and unrealistic for the SEA fisheries system. At the same 
_time, it is crucial that international donors and funding partners be better aware of the 
limitations present in the system and play a more supportive role in the governance 
initiatives or reforms taking place in the SEA (cf. Bailey and Jentoft 1990). Such 
prescription would discourage the governors from making overpromises in the delivery of 
governing outcomes. Overall, an original and site-specific ingenuity that takes account of 
the govemability of governing system should be widely encouraged. 
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One example of governing intervention aimed to improve governability of the governing 
system would involve strengthening accountability in the institutional structure (refer to 
Figure 5.2). In the hierarchical structure, the question of accountability comes into focus 
from two viewpoints- whether the existing governing mode can respond effectively to 
the governing challenges identified at the resource user level and be held accountable for 
the actions taken, and secondly, whether it bears accountability to the governing 
directives coming from the higher government level. Currently, neither of the two 
channels appears to be particularly effective in the SEA, as weak linkages are found in the 
governing structure chain. For example, village heads are sometimes regarded as 
ungovernable because they may not heed the opinions of the villagers, and at the same 
time harsh penalties for any malpractices are rarely imposed to vi.llage heads by the 
higher chain of command for various reasons that cite bribery, corruption, lack of 
financial and human resources, physical threat and witchcraft. Such situation appears to 
be common, bringing down the overall accountability in the governing system. Therefore, 
efforts to strengthen accountability by employing locally-feasible measures 13 could be 
one way of responding to the governing difficulty identified in the assessment. In the 
process, governing capacity is expected to rise, positively affecting the governability of 
the whole fisheries system as well. 
13 One example suggested was the strict adherence to the practice of note-taking at each official meeting at 
the village leve l, such as BVC or VDC meetings (pers. comm. Kachala). Once the practice becomes firmly 
established through legislations and appropriate incentives, the notes detailing the proceedings of each 
meeting would be kept for record for audit and other govern ing purposes. Thi process could prove to be 
beneficial in improving the accountability and transparency of the governing hierarchy in the SEA. 
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The low-to-moderate governability observed in the governing interactions is another 
important dimension of governance that must be carefully dealt with. Interactive 
governance theory posits that enhancing the quantity and quality of governing 
interactions could contribute to making the system more governable. Governing 
interactions could take various shapes, but in the SEA the issue of compliance and the 
communication/information flow emerge as two major factors that have a significant 
bearing on governability. As was said earlier, from the perspective of interactive 
governance, non-compliance and illegal fishing can be viewed as a manifestation of 
dissent or indifference on the part of the being-governed, or the lack of care on the part of 
the governing, resulting from inadequate governing interactions. When the regulations are 
well-received and commonly observed, a fisheries system is likely to be more governable. 
As inferred from this particular interaction, fisheries regulations themselves do not seem 
very governable in the SEA at the current time. Hence, divergent views and values 
concerning the regulations should be subject to a sincere forum of understanding, 
negotiation and compromises in order to bridge those differences and arrive at a more 
pr.oductive form of interaction that facilitates the overall governance process. 
Perhaps more easily conceived as a kind of governing interactions is how the governing 
system and the system-to-be-governed interact through communication and information 
flow. A discussion earlier in section 5.3 briefly assessed how the interaction has veered 
off from utilizing the BVCs as was designed and instead it is happening in a more 
haphazard fashion via fisheries extension workers. In this case, the interaction is 
somewhat governable through the position of the extension worker, but whether it is 
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robust enough to overcome the low capacity faced in the fishing community and 
eventually allow more open and fair information exchange is something to be considered 
by governance actors. To bring up the level of governing interactions, the existing modes 
of communication will need to be strengthened. This may require a more active 
mobilization of the Community Outreach Unit, committed support towards fisheries 
extension workers, and a continuation of a fisheries radio broadcast called 'Usodzi-wa-
lero'. Other forms of meaningful communication opportunities and information exchange 
are to be promoted. In doing so, however, attention must be paid to the appropriately-
judged governing capacity and the true needs of the system. This would ensure that 
communication and information flow genuinely engages the stakeholders' views and 
demands into the equation, and work as a facilitating element that enhances the quality of 
governing interactions. 
5.5 System-level governability and conservation principle 
For any governance measure being planned and implemented in the SEA fishery, inherent 
and constructed limitations affecting governability would need to be given due 
consideration. In this thesis, conservation measures are of particular concern. 
Recognizing that any specific issue is inherently linked to, and depends on, the system on 
which it is based, the governability of the SEA fishery assessed at the system-level also 
offers several implications to the issue of illegal fishing and conservation principle 
relevant in fishing communities. For example, the high complexity in the socio-economic 
relationship among the many involved actors can lead to condoning illegal fishing 
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activities rather than deterring it. Fishers and community members have multiple fisheries 
authorities with varying cultural and legal significance to negotiate when engaging in 
fishing practices. The village heads, BVCs, local fisheries extension officers and other 
government fisheries personnel can all be present in a fishing community with 
uncoordinated roles and vague responsibilities. The power dynamics and disagreement 
among the authorities could create confusion to fishers and may produce an environment 
where illegal fishing and disregard for conservation can be harboured and overlooked. 
Furthermore, the low governability stemming from the high dynamics in the natural 
system can render certain inflexible and stagnant conservation measures and regulations 
ineffective against deterring illegal fishing. For instance, high fish stock variability or 
unpredictable weather/climate conditions may be an important natural factor influencing 
fishers' circumstances for relinquishing their conservation principle. The generally low 
governability of the governing system in the SEA must also be duly acknowledged with 
regard to this issue. Resource-demanding, data-intensive and coercive measures would 
quickly have their limits in bringing up the conservation principle or minimizing illegal 
fishing. Similarly, overestimated enforcement capability and under-delivered enforcement 
action could engender poor conservation practices among resource-users. Also, the high 
complexity and ambiguity in the governance structure that exists in the system could 
create loopholes through which fishing takes place with no effective rules, whether 
formal or informal. Finally, the un-streamlined use of multiple institutional scales would 
confound the governors as much as the fishers. 
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Given this thinking on how the areas of low governability at the system-level would 
influence this particular issue of illegal fishing and conservation, the following chapter 
aims to investigate the issue from an empirical angle and actually find out to what extent 
the people in the communities hold regard for the conservation principle. The findings of 
this empirical analysis would complement the ongoing discussion of the governability of 
conservation measures in the SEA. 
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Chapter 6 Individual-level Governability Measurement of Conservation Principle 
Plate 6.1 Villagers gathering around a fi shing boat returning with catch 
Plate 6.2 Smoked fish being sun-dried Plate 6 .3 Fresh catch being sun-dried on a rack 
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This chapter is firstly about answering research question 2 posed in section 1.4, which 
seeks to ascertain individual's normative principle's relevance in influencing actual 
fishing practice. It utilizes a questionnaire survey and the conservation principle category 
to assess the degree of conservation awareness and inclination among people, generate 
understanding about individual 's conservation principle, and reveal a linkage between the 
conservation principle and the practice of illegal fishing. This chapter is also about 
assessing govemability, albeit quantitatively this time, as opposed to the qualitative one 
conducted in the previous chapter. The damage schedule approach is a pragmatic 
methodological tool of choice for facilitating the study of the conservation principle and 
measuring the govemability of conservation measures at the individual-level , that is, 
whether people agree with conservation from their internally-driven set of convictions. 
6.1 Data analysis using nonparametric statistical tests 
The paired comparison questionnaire survey result was analyzed using nonparametric 
statistical tests. Nonparametric tests were deemed suitable for two main reasons: data are 
inherently in ranks, and the tests allow the analysis of small sample sizes when the 
population distribution is not known (Siegel and Castellan 1988). The tests used here are 
Kendall T rank-order correlation coefficient, Kendall coefficient of agreement u and 
Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks. They are explained in fuller detail 
in the following sections. 
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6.1.1 Aggregate preference scores and rankings 
The first step taken in analyzing the paired comparison data was to compute the 
individual preference scores for each object, i.e. the number of times a single respondent 
prefers one object over others in the choice pairs (Peterson and Brown 1998). In each set 
with N as the total number of objects, each object has a maximum individual score of N-1. 
Next, the individual preference scores were aggregated across all respondents in each of 
the seven groups. For simplicity, the aggregated preference scores were then normalized 
to a scale of 0 to 100 using a proportional procedure (Dunn-Rankin 1983). These scores 
are refened to as aggregated preference scores or scale values. A ranking was assigned to 
these values in order to test for an agreement between the respondent groups using 
Kendall rank-order conelation coefficient T (Siegel and Castellan 1988). Table 6.1 shows 
the normalized score values and the rankings for both the paired comparison sets, and 
Table 6.4 has the result of the Kendall T. 
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Table 6.1 Aggregated preference scores for (a) the damaging fishing activities and (b) preferred community programmes- all 
groups (rankings are shown in parentheses) 
Gear Crew Processors/ Community Gear Crew Managers/ 
owners members Traders members owners members Scientists (East) (East) (West) (West) 
(a) Damaging fishing activities 
Fishing in spawning area 82 (1) 78 (I) 87 (I) 93 (I) 84 (I) 85 (I) 71 (I) 
Fishing using gears that disturb 68 (2) 76 (2) 72 (2) 70 (2) 50 (5) 55 (4) 62 (3) 
lake bottom 
Fishing using non-selective gear 55 (4) 65 (3) 64 (3) 66 (3) 65 (2) 72 (2) 68 (2) 
Catchingjuvenile fish 58 (3) 58 (4) 63 (4) 57 (4) 58 (3) 57 (3) 60 (4) 
Too many people fishing in one 38 (6) 34 (5) 36 (5) 29 (5) 28 (6) 25 (6) 56 (5) 
area 
Fishing using mechanized gear 40 (5) 30 (6) 23 (6) 25 (6) 55 (4) 52 (5) 28 (6) 
Fishing in offshore deep water 8 (7) 8 (7) 6 (7) II (7) 10 (7) 5 (7) 6 (7) 
Number of respondents k 20 20 20 20 21 17 26 
Kendall coefficient of agreement u 0.359 0.431 0.523 0.521 0.378 0.440 0.342 
Chi-square" 164.2 192.8 229.8 228.8 179.7 168.8 200.6 
•significant agreement at p < 0.00 I. 
136 
Gear Crew Gear Crew Managers/ Processors/ Community 
members owners members owners Scientists Traders members (East) (East) (West) (West) 
(b) Preferred community programmes 
Provide micro-credit loans to 85 (I) 90 (I) 91 (I) 95 (1) 85 (1) 86 (I) 24 (6) 
expand fishing-related work 
Protect fish habitat and fish 68 (2) 62 (3) 69 (2) 63 (2) 71 (2) 62 (2) 72 (1) 
species 
Promote scientific research on 50 (4) 68 (2) 64 (3) 51 (5) 54 (3) 56 (4) 54 (4) lake fisheries ecosystem 
Promote small-scale community 44 (5) 59 (4) 58 (4) 59 (3) 37 (6) 59 (3) 59 (3) fish cage culture 
Provide ownership of resources to 54 (3) 38 (5) 43 (5) 57 (4) 43 (5) 44 (5) 70 (2) local communities 
Ensure fishing access for local 40 (6) 25 (6) 18 (6) 22 (6) 45 (4) 41 (6) 22 (7) fishers and communities 
Help reduce fish spoilage during 8 (7) 8 (7) 6 (7) 3 (7) 14 (7) 2 (7) 50 (5) 
catching and processing 
Number of respondents k 20 20 20 20 21 17 26 
Kendall coefficient of agreement u 0.370 0.469 0.551 0.567 0.314 0.394 0.224 
Chi-square• 168.8 208.0 240.8 247.2 153 153.2 138.6 
"Significant agreement at p < 0.00 I. 
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6.1.2 Kendall coefficient of agreement u 
Kendall coefficient of agreement u measures the degree of similarity of rank ordering 
produced by k judges within a single respondent group. Unlike Kendall coefficient of 
concordance W, this test is suitable for ranking orderings specifically derived from paired 
comparison data (Siegel and Castellan 1988). Therefore, in this study, the level of 
agreement among individuals in a group was determined using the Kendall coefficient of 
agreement u, which is calculated using Eq. (6.1): 
(6.1) B(:E afrk :E ai1·) u = 1 k(k - l)N(N-1) 
where aii is the number of times that the object associated with column i is preferred to the 
object associated with row j , based on a sample preference matrix set up shown in Table 
6.2. The computed value of u for each respondent group is listed in Table 6.1. It should be 
worth noting that the value of u is one when there is a complete agreement among the 
respondents in a group. 
Table 6.2 Sample preference table set up to aid the calculation of coefficients of 
agreement u for 3 judges (Source: Siegel and Castellan 1998, p .274) 
objects a b c d e f 
a 2 2 2 2 2 
b I 0 
c 2 2 
d 2 2 
e 2 1 2 
f 3 2 2 2 
Testing the significance of u, the test statistics below, Eq. (6.2), can be used, which is 
closely related to the chi-square goodness-of-fit test: 
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(6.2) X 2 = N(N-1)[1+u(k-1)] 
2 
The null hypothesis is that there is no agreement among respondents, while the 
alternative supposes that the level of agreement is greater than what would occur by 
chance or at random (Siegel and Castellan 1988). Using chi-square to test the null 
hypothesis, the observed chi-square values were greater than critical values at the 0.001 
level for both damaging fishing activity and community prograrnme scenarios (Table 
6.1). Thus, rejecting the null hypothesis signified that there exists significant agreement 
among respondents in each group, and this justifies the number of respondents surveyed 
in each group. 
6.1.3 Kendall T rank-order correlation coefficient 
Kendall T rank-order correlation coefficient expresses the degree of association between 
two or more variables (i.e. respondent groups) measured in, or transforn1ed to, ranks 
(Siegel and Castellan 1998). It is measured by Eq. (6.3): 
(6.3) T = 2s 
N(N - 1) 
where S is denoted as the observed sum of the + 1 scores and - 1 scores for all pairs. How 
the+ 1 scores and -1 scores are computed is illustrated using the information in Table 6.3. 
First, the ranks of both judges are rearranged so that the ranks of judge X is displayed in 
natural order (i.e.1 , 2, ... , N). Focusing on the Judge Y 's ranks, the first pair (c - a: 2 - 3) 
represents a 'natural' order, so + I score is assigned. The next pair ( c - b: 2 - 1 ), however, 
represents an 'unnatural ' order hence garnering -1 score. In a similar manner, the final 
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pair (a - b: 3 - 1 ), also receives -1 score. The sum (S) ofthese scores is then -1, calculated 
as(+ 1) + (-1) + (-1). From using Eq. (6.3), Kendall Tfor this example is -0.333. 
Table 6.3 A sample ranking information for the purpose of illustrating how Kendall T is 
calculated 
Obtained ranking 
Judge X 
Judge Y 
a 
2 
3 
b 
3 
After rearranging the objects so that Judge X shows a ' natural ' order 
c 
2 
c a b 
Judge X 
Judge Y 2 
2 
3 
3 
Kendall T coefficient ranges from 1 meaning perfect agreement to -1 indicating perfect 
disagreement. As shown in Table 6.4, for damaging fishing activities, the Kendall T 
coefficients obtained between any two pairs of the seven respondent groups are close to 
the value of 1, indicating close-to-perfect correlation. The ranking of non-fishers (i.e. 
processors/traders and community members) significantly correlates to that of fishers (i.e. 
gear owners and crew members) at the 95% confidence level. In addition, what managers 
and scientists regard as damaging fishing activities significantly correlates with what the 
resource-dependent groups say as damaging activities. Therefore, the scale values of all 
groups were combined to form a single scale, as done in Table 6.5. With respect to 
fisheries-related community progran1mes, all resource-dependent groups show a similar-
looking set of preference rankings (Table 6.1 ), which is also reflected in the significant 
levels ofthe correlation (Table 6.4). Therefore, the scale values were aggregated to create 
a single scale for all resource-dependent groups. On the other hand, the 
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managers/scientists group displays a divergent set of preferences echoed by the 
coefficients that show little correlation to the rankings of any of the six resource-
dependent groups. Hence, we present the managers/scientists group separately in Table 
6.5. 
In testing the significance of Kendall T, the null hypothesis, Ho, is that there is no 
correlation between the respondent groups (i.e. an observed value ofT has occurred at 
random). For a set of objects greater than 10 (N > 1 0), the sampling distribution ofT may 
be approximated by the normal distribution. In this case, the nom1al approximation of the 
sampling distribution of T using Eq. (6.4) followed by consulting a table of normal 
distribution is deemed an appropriate way to test the hypothesis (Siegel and Castellan 
1998). In this study, however, where N = 7, determining the significance of observed 
correlations between the ranks of the respondent groups involves looking up a special 
table provided in the books such as Siegel and Castellan (1998) and Kendall (1970). 
Instead, for convenience of analysis, a statistical software package called SPSS 16.0 was 
used to perform this test14• 
(6.4) 3T )N(N- 1) z = -,;-F-z~cz~N=:=+=::=S~) 
14 A specific function used here is bivariate correlations using Kendall 's tau-b coefficients with one-tailed 
test of significance 
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Table 6.4 Kendall T rank-order correlation coefficients 
Gear Crew Processors/ Community Gear Crew Managers/ 
owners members Traders members owners members Scientists (Ea t) (East) (West) (West) 
Damaging fishing activities 
Gear owners (East) 
Crew members (East) 0.81 0** 
Processor/ Traders (East) 0.81 0** 1.000** 
Community members (East) 0.81 0** 1.000** 1.000** 
Gear owners (West) 0.619* 0.619* 0.619* 0.619* 
Crew members (West) 0.714* 0.7 14* 0.714* 0.714* 0.905** 
Managers/ Scientists 0.714* 0.905** 0.905** 0.905** 0.714* 0.81 0** 
Preferred community programmes 
Gear owners (East) 
Crew members (East) 0.714* 
Processor/ Traders (East) 0.810** 0.905** 
Community members (East) 0.810** 0.714* 0.810** 
Gear owners (West) 0.714* 0.619* 0.714* 0.524* 
Crew members (West) 0.714* 0.810** 0.905** 0.905** 0.619* 
Managers/ Scientists 0.333 0.048 0.143 0.333 0.048 0.238 
**Denotes significant correlation at p = 0.01 
* Denotes significant correlation at p = 0.05 
142 
Table 6.5 Combined aggregated preference scores for the damaging fishing activities and 
preferred community programmes based on significant correlations determined by 
Kendall T (rankings are shown in parentheses) 
Set A: Damaging fishing activities 
All respondents 
Fishing in spawning area 
Fishing using gears that disturb lake bottom 
Fishing using non-selective gear 
Catchingjuveni le fish 
Too many peop]e fishing in one area 
Fishing using mechanized gear 
Fishing in offshore deep water 
Number of respondents 
Set B: Preferred community programmes 
Provide micro-credit loans to expand fishing-related work 
Protect fish habitat and fish species 
Promote scientific research on lake fisheries ecosystem 
Promote small-scale community fi sh cage culture 
Provide ownership of resources to local communities 
Ensure fishing access for local fishers and communities 
Help reduce fish spoilage during catching and processing 
Number of respondents 
6.1.4 Circular triads 
82 (I) 
65 (2) 
65 (2) 
59 (4) 
36 (5) 
36 (5) 
8 (7) 
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Resource-
dependent group 
89 (I) 
66 (2) 
57 (3) 
53 (4) 
47 (5) 
32 (6) 
7 (7) 
118 
Manager/ 
Scientists 
24 (6) 
72 (I) 
54 (4) 
59 (3) 
70 (2) 
22 (7) 
50 (5) 
26 
With seven objects used in each paired comparison set (N= 7), a maximum of 14 circular 
triads is possible in an individual 's response (see David 1988). To check for the 
inconsistency of answers given by each respondent, the number of circular triads was 
calculated according to Eq. (6.5), which is: 
(6.5) N ( 2 ) 1 c=- N -1 --T 
24 2 
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where T = ,L(ai- ii) 2 , a= i (N- 1) and ai refers to individual preference score. 
As shown in Table 6.6, a majority (52%) of the respondents produced either zero or only 
one circular triad in their choices for damaging fishing activities, while 50% did so in 
selecting preferred community programmes. A quick comparison with the results 
obtained in another study 15 of similar methodological nature, Chuenpagdee et al. (2001), 
suggests that this study has achieved an adequate percentage of respondents who 
produced either zero or only one circular triad. This is one indication of reasonable 
consistency in the result. More specifically, the responses of the managers/scientists, fish 
processor/traders and community members were noticeably more consistent. On the other 
hand, fisher groups consisting of gear owners and crewmembers displayed lower 
consistency reflected by a slightly larger number of observed circular triads. This 
difference could be due to the fact that the survey and the paired comparison objects are 
mainly about fishing activities and programmes which are most directly related to the 
fishers ' livelihoods. Fishers presumably have more stakes in the matters presented in the 
survey, and it is possible that they perceived the choices to be more difficult. 
15 Chuenpagdee eta/. (200 I) also conducted two sets of paired comparison in which 3 1% and 43% of the 
respondents had either zero or one circular triad in their responses. 
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Table 6.6 Percentage of respondents who had zero or one circular triad in their answers 
(out of 14 possible maximum circular triads) 
Damaging Preferred 
fishing activities community programmes 
All respondents combined 52 50 
Gear owners (east) 25 50 
Crew members (east) 45 45 
Processors/traders 70 65 
Community members 70 55 
Gear owners (west) 33 43 
Crew members (west) 35 41 
Managers/scientists 77 50 
Another test for checking intransitivity in the responses involved removmg those 
responses that have a high degree of intransitivity from the sample and then comparing 
the resulting ranking to the original one obtained from having all responses in the sample. 
To do so, the responses of those individuals who produced 5 to 14 circular triads in their 
choices were excluded, which means the responses now contain only 0 to 4 circular 
triads. The comparison for each set is displayed in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8. Both the 
preference scores and the rankings for damaging fishing activities and for preferred 
community programmes largely remain unchanged with only minor variations. OveraJl, it 
was deemed that the level of inconsistency caused by adding the highly intransitive 
responses into the sample is not enough to markedly alter the scale vaJues and the 
rankings. Therefore, all respondents were included in the analysis despite the occurrence 
of circular triads. 
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Table 6.7 Comparison of preference scores and rankings for the damaging fishing 
activities after removing highly intransitive responses (rankings are shown in parentheses) 
Damaging fishing activities 
Fishing in spawning area 
Fishing using gears that disturb lake bottom 
Fishing using non-selective gear 
Catching juvenile fish 
Too many people fishing in one area 
Fishing using mechanized gear 
Fishing in offshore deep water 
Number of respondents 
All respondents 
Adding all Excluding 
intransitive responses with 5- 14 circular 
responses triads 
82 (1) 84 (I) 
65 (2) 65 (3) 
65 (2) 66 (2) 
59 (4) 60 (4) 
36 (5) 37 (5) 
36 (5) 33 (6) 
8 (7) 5 (7) 
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Table 6.8 Comparison of preference scores and rankings for the preferred community 
programmes after removing highly intransitive responses (rankings are shown in 
parentheses) 
Preferred community programmes 
Resource-dependent group Manager/ Scientists 
Adding all Excluding Adding all Excluding 
intransitive responses intransitive responses 
with 5- 14 with 5- 14 
responses 
circular triads responses circular triads 
Provide micro-credit loans to expand 
89 (I) 91 (I) 24 (6) 20 (7) 
fishing-related work 
Protect fish habitat and fish species 66 (2) 67 (2) 72 (I) 72 (I) 
Promote scientific research on lake 
57 (3) 58 (3) 54 (4) 56 (4) 
fisheries ecosystem 
Promote small-scale community fish cage 
53 (4) 53 (4) 59 (3) 59 (3) 
culture 
Provide ownership of resources to local 
47 (5) 46 (5) 70 (2) 72 (I) 
communities 
Ensure fishing access for local fishers and 
32 (6) 30 (6) 22 (7) 22 (6) 
communities 
Help reduce fish spoilage during catching 
7 (7) 5 (7) 50 (5) 50 (5) 
and processing 
Number of respondents 118 102 26 24 
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6.1.5 Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks 
The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks is a useful test for deciding 
whether l independent samples represent different populations (Siegel and Castellan 
1988). In this study, it was used to determine whether the respondent groups agree or 
differ with respect to the objects included in the two paired comparison sets. Since the 
degree of difference among the groups can be tested with respect to only one object at a 
time, 14 independent Kruskal-Wallis tests were performed. The computation of the test 
first involves arranging the preference scores in a matrix which has l columns 
representing groups, and the preference scores of the respondents belonging in each group 
forming rows underneath. Next, all the scores belonging to all respondent groups were 
ranked in a single series with the smallest score given rank 1 and the largest score given 
rank m, where m is the total number of scores from all I groups. With the rankings 
assigned, the sum (R1) and the average (R1) of the ranks for / 11 column are calculated. 
Finally, KW is calculated using Eq. (6.6), which is: 
(6.6) [ 12 ~l -z] KW = L..1·_ 1 n1· R1· - 3(N + 1) m(m+l) -
where n1 is the number of cases in the /
11 
san1ple. Testing of KW values can be performed 
using the chi-square test. Siegel and Castellan (1998) states that when the number of 
groups (l) is greater than 3 and the number of observations (j) in each group exceeds 5, 
the sampling distribution of KW is well-approximated by the;(- distribution with df = 
l - 1. The obtained KW values and the test of significance are listed in Table 6.9. 
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Table 6.9 Kruskal-Wallis test result and significant difference 
Set A: Damaging fishing activities 
Fishing in spawning area 
Fishing using gears that disturb lake bottom 
Fishing using non-selective gear 
Catchingjuvenile fish 
Too many people fishing in one area 
Fishing using mechanized gear 
Fishing in offshore deep water 
Set B: Preferred community programmes 
Provide micro-credit loans to expand fishing-related work 
Protect fish habitat and fish species 
Promote scientific research on lake fisheries ecosystem 
Promote small-scale community fish cage culture 
Provide ownership of resources to local communities 
Ensure fishing access for local fishers and communities 
Help reduce fish spoilage during catching and processing 
KW 
17.679* 
20.145* 
8.867 
1.511 
27.767* 
34.824* 
8.219 
65.501* 
8.318 
9.976 
16.246* 
28.912* 
25.262* 
71.051 * 
*denotes significant difference among the groups atp < 0.05 with chi-square value of 12.59 
For Set A, the groups do not differ with respect to three fishing activities - fishing using 
non-selective gear, catching juvenile fish, and fishing in offshore deep water, while they 
significantly differ with respect to the other four fishing activities. For Set B, only two 
programmes have resulted in strong agreement among all the groups - programme to 
protect fish habitat and fish species and progranune to promote scientific research on lake 
fisheries ecosystem, while according to the other five, the groups differ significantly. The 
result shows that although the comparison of relative rankings of the groups produced 
widespread correlation (see Table 6.4), when each object is compared individually and 
independently of others, the groups tend to differ in a greater degree. The notable findings 
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from this test will be discussed in the following sections in connection with the results of 
other tests. 
6.2 Result interpretation 
6.2.1 Damaging fishing activities 
According to all respondent groups, fishing in spawning area was identified to be the 
most damaging practice with the scale value of 82 out of l 00 (Table 6.5). This was 
followed by fishing using gears that disturb the lake bottom and using non-selective gear, 
which shared the identical scale value of 65. Catching juvenile fish was rated the next 
most damaging activity at 59. As for the comparably less damaging activities, too many 
fishers in one area was tied with fishing using mechanized gear at 36. With the scale 
value of 8, fishing in offshore deep water was judged to be by far th least damaging form 
of fishing activity. 
Understanding the ecological impact of pertinent fishing activities forms an essential part 
of realizing fisheries conservation. Here, not only is the result agreed by all surveyed 
groups in the SEA fishery, it is also consistent with the widely-held knowledge about 
fishing gears and their impacts in other fisheries worldwide. For instance, utmost 
attention on fishing in spawning area observed in the SEA corresponds with the high 
emphasis put on the role of marine reserves in enhancing spawning stocks and protecting 
juvenile production (Murawski el a!. 2000; Manriquez and Castilla 2001 ). Also, relatively 
severe damage from disturbing the lake bottom perceived by the respondents in the SEA 
149 
is also a contentious issue globally with special regard given to bottom-trawling (Watling 
and Norse 1998; Chuenpagdee el a/. 2003 ). Furthermore, the effect of gear selectivity and 
bycatch poses a concern to the health of ecosystem and resources (Crowder and 
Murawski 1998; McClanahan and Mangi 2004; Fuller et a!. 2008). Hence, the general 
correspondence of the survey result with the prevailing ecological issues in global 
fisheries adds to suggest that the stakeholder groups in the SEA hold a moderately high 
level of fisheries conservation understanding. 
This shared understanding could be largely attributed to the effective one-way 
communication in transmitting knowledge from the managers/scientists group (i.e. 
governors) to fishing communities via fisheries extension workers. Over the years, the 
top-down style of restricting and controlling harmful fishing activities has been the main 
form of conservation measures (Hara 2001). For instance, the Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Regulations of 2000, which cunently provides the governing rules for the 
fishing matters in the SEA, are featured with conservation provisions that predominantly 
attempt to control and manage the sort of fishing activities included in the Set A (GoM 
2000). In the fishing community, too, measures such as minimum mesh size, closed 
season, size limits of fish and prohibition of bottom-disturbing gears are upheld as the 
main fishing restrictions to be abided by (pers. observation; pers. comm. Masiye). In 
addition, a previous study by Hara (200 1) also reports fishers ' strong acquaintance with 
the fisheries regulation applicable to their day-to-day fishing exercises. Therefore, it 
appears that the fishing community has, for the most part, understood and accepted the 
conservation measures of the governing body. 
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In this light, popular claims such as "fishers must be taught conservation" as a way to 
promote conservation-oriented fishing practices does not fully hold truth, since the 
finding above suggests that the resource-dependent group, by and large, is cognizant of 
what is generally considered right or wrong, or good or bad, in terms of fisheries 
conservation for them to engage in prudent fishing practices. It appears that fruitful 
knowledge dissemination done in a top-down fashion has produced little effect in curbing 
the extent of illegal fishing on the ground. Hence, this finding calls for a re-examination 
of ' teaching conservation' to go beyond mere knowledge dissemination and routine 
awareness ra1smg initiatives. Instead, engaging in frank exchanges of ideas on other 
essential aspects such as conservation attitude, preference and habits to foster 
conservation practices could be one useful way of translating 'conservation lessons' into 
action, and therefore should be encouraged. 
6.2.2 Preferred community programmes 
A significant divergence of opinion existed between the resource-dependent group and 
the manager/scientists group when it comes to the preference ranking of fisheries-related 
community programmes (Table 6.5). While the resource-dependent group unequivocally 
preferred the programme to provide micro-credit loans for the expansion of their fishing-
related work, the same inclination was not found within the managers/scientists who 
ranked the programme near the bottom. The two programmes that have direct relevance 
to conservation, protecting fish habitat and species and promoting scientific research on 
lake ecosystem, were both ranked high by the two groups. The promotion of small-scale 
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community fish cage culture occupied the middle position at 3rd and 4th for both the 
manager/scientists group and the resource user group. The second notable difference 
between the two groups lies in the programme to provide ownership of resources to local 
communities which was ranked low for the resources-dependent group contrary to being 
the second most preferred programme for the managers/scientists. The third disagreement 
concerns the progranune to help reduce fish spoilage during catching and processing. 
This was, by far the least preferred progranune by the resource-dependent group with the 
scale value of 7. It contrasts with the scale value of 50 for the managers/scientists who 
ranked it at the 5th place. Finally, the programme to ensure fishing access to local fishers 
and communities was generally the least preferred one by both groups compared to the 
other six hypothetical progranunes. 
As Table 6.5 displays, the two conservation-oriented progranunes are positioned at the 
mid-to-high level in both groups' rankings. Choosing either of the two and ranking them 
above the other five progranunes, which may be driven by other interests and motivations 
that, for the most part, show little compatibility with the conservation objective, can be 
interpreted as a fair indication of their genuine inclination towards conservation. Hence, 
all groups seem to care about conservation to some degree. In addition, they are the only 
two programmes that have resulted in strong agreement among all the respondent groups 
according to the Kruskal-Wallis result (Table 6.9), while according to the other five, the 
groups differ significantly. Together with the shared understanding about the damaging 
fishing activities observed from the Set A, moderate potential in advancing conservation 
goals in the SEA fishery is suggested. In other words, it appears possible that all 
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stakeholders including fishing communities would be able to act in unison in favour of 
conservation. An important chaJJenge is noted, however, when looking at the top 
inclination of the two groups. While the managers/scientists group preferred the 
programme to protect fish habitats and species, the resource-dependent group showed a 
clear liking for the provision of loans that would enable the expansion of one' s fishing 
work. This difference must be recognized and reconciled before realizing the 
conservation potential. A compromising solution is likely to be required, since fisheries 
governance is not so much about exercising authority from the top-down as about isolated 
grassroots movement from below. As suggested by Chuenpagdee and Jentoft (2009), it is 
a process of constant interaction and negotiation where operating goals and strategies are 
at best imperfect compromises. 
6.2.3 Damage schedule 
A damage schedule is developed in Figure 6.1 to illustrate the rankings of conservation 
awareness and conservation inclination based on the results of the two paired comparison 
sets. The conservation awareness ranking corresponds with the list of damaging fishing 
activities in Table 6.5. Similarly, the conservation inclination ranking shown here is taken 
from the result of preferences for the community programmes in Table 6.5, with two 
groups showing a divergent set of conservation inclination. The damage schedule 
presented in Figure 6.1 can be regarded as a graphical form of Table 6.5. Aside from the 
displayed rankings of relative damage or importance, a 'true' damage schedule, as it has 
been conceived and used in the past, is accompanied by a set of policy 
decisions/recommendations specifically tied to the result of each ranking. Such policy 
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decisions/recommendations can take shape of a compensation scheme for potential 
damage occurring to the resources, severe restrictions on the most damaging activities, or 
even establishing MPAs in the case of threatened coastal resources. In this study, 
however, specific policy implications were not drawn from the result of the ranking. 
Instead, a categorization scheme that closely looks into the conservation principle was 
further applied to the data, and its result, in conjunction with the damage schedule 
developed here, formed the basis of policy inferences. The details of the categorization 
principle category are presented in section 6.3. 
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Conservation awareness ranking 
All respondents 
100 
Too many people fishing (36) · ........ 
Fishing using mechanized gear (36) ... · 
..... · 
Fishing in offshore deep water (8) 
0 
Conservation inclination ranking 
Resource-dependent group 
Loans for fishing expansion (89) 
Local ownership of resources (47) 
Ensuring local fishing access (32) 
Reducing fish spoilage (7) 
100 
Managers/scientists 
Reducing fish spoilage (50) 
Loans for fishing expansion (24) 
Ensuring local fishing access (22) 
Figure 6.1 Damage schedule of conservation awareness and conservation inclination 
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6.2.4 Sensitivity analysis based on 'Loans for fishing expansion' 
As seen in the damage schedule of conservation inclination (Figure 6.1), 'the programme 
to provide micro-credit loans to expand fishing-related work' displays the most severe 
discrepancy between the two groups. A sensitivity analysis was performed to find out 
whether the low overall correlation between what the two groups judge as more 
preferable or less preferable to fishing communities16, is in fact attributed to the large 
difference observed in this object, 'provision of loans for expansion of fishing-related 
work' . The sensitivity analysis removed this object from the individual responses, and the 
analysis procedures were re-applied to obtain a new set of rankings. Subsequently, 
Kendall T rank-order correlation was performed, with Table 6.10 comparing the two sets 
of rankings. The comparison reveals that the rankings between the two groups are 
noticeably better correlated when the object is removed. All correlation coefficients are 
improved, and in particular it produced significant correlations with two resource-
dependent groups. Therefore, the result of this sensitivity analysis helps validate the 
observed divergence in judgment between the two groups regarding which community 
programme is more preferred or less preferred, which holds an implication towards 
conservation inclination. 
16 as shown in the correlation results (Table 6.4) and the rankings of the resource-dependent group and the 
managers/scientists group (Table 6.5) 
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Table 6.10 Kendall T correlation coefficients comparing the difference in the ranking of 
community preference based on inclusion of the 'loans for fishing expansion' object 
Managers/scientists Managers/scientists 
with 'loans for without ' loans for 
fishing expansion' fishing expansion' 
included (N = 7) (N = 6) 
Gear owners (East) 0.333 0.690* 
Crew members (East) 0.048 0.276 
Processors/traders 0.143 0.414 
Community members 0.333 0.690* 
Gear owners (West) 0.048 0.276 
Crew members (West) 0.238 0.552 
* denotes significant correlation at p = 0.05 
6.2.5 Reasons for the fewer amount offish 
Figure 6.2 displays the result of an opinion question which asked respondents to directly 
select reason( s) they think are contributing to the decline of fish stocks in the SEA. Also, 
each respondent was allowed to select multiple reasons. In the figure, each bar denotes 
the percentage of respondents who believed that the specified reason is a contributing 
factor to the decline of fish stocks. As evident from the result, fishing using illegal gears 
is the most contentious issue relating to the decline of fish stocks among all respondents. 
Fishing during spawning season and catching juvenile fish are the two other popular 
claims identified to have caused negative implications to the health of the fish stocks. The 
following three reasons also deserve some attention as over half of the respondents have 
indicated their connections to fish decline; these are overfishing due to too many 
fishers/gears, fish habitat degradation and overfishing due to large-scale commercial 
boats. It is observed that what is identified in this question as the main reasons for causing 
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the decline of fish stocks holds general resemblance to the result obtained in the ranking 
of damaging fishing activities. High damaging fishing activities concerning juvenile fish, 
spawning season and area, disturbance of lake bottom all appear near the top of the graph 
in Figure 6.1. Similarly, low damaging fishing activities relating to the high number of 
fishers and the mechanization of fishing gear are also recognized in the graph as the less 
significant reasons affecting the fisheries resources. This correspondence supports the 
established ranking ofthe damaging fishing activities, and further it may be regarded as a 
basic validation process that cross-examines the result of the paired comparison method. 
More subtle findings contained in the result (Figure 6.2) will be brought out in the later 
chapter to aid the discussion of policy inference. 
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100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
Reasons for fewer amount of fish 
• Resource-dependent 
group (East) 
• Resource-dependent 
group (West) 
• Managers/scientists 
0 
Figure 6_2 Percentages of respondents in each group indicating the specified reasons to be 
the cause ofthe decline offish stocks in the SEA 
6.2.6 Participation of fishing community in the formulation of fisheries regulation 
One question in the survey aimed to gather the thoughts of respondents regarding the role 
of fishing community in the formulation of fisheries regulation vis-a-vis fishing authority 
(i.e. government). As shown in Figure 6.3, all seven groups overwhelmingly indicated 
that government and fishing community should work together to formulate the 
regulations. Especially, the managers/scientists group was in strong favour of having 
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fishing community jointly involved in the rule-making process, as 95% of them held this 
view. In addition, the five groups representing fishing-related occupations at the village 
level, namely, gear owners and crew members on both sides of the shore and 
processors/traders, displayed a high percentage of people who indicated that the joint 
participation of fishing community in rule-making is a desirable option, ranging between 
65% and 75%. Interestingly, the community member group, who are not directly involved 
in any fishing-related occupation by definition, had only 45% of the respondents choosing 
the joint formulation. Instead, 25% opted for regulation-making as the sole and full 
responsibility of the government, while another 20% indicated that the government 
should sti ll be in charge despite incorporating inputs of the fishing community. As 
someone who does not hold intimate connection to the fishing-related activities, hence 
not likely possessing great fishing-related knowledge and know-how, it is interesting to 
see that a higher percentage of community members favoured the government as the 
responsible body in rule-making than the fishing-related groups did. In general, both the 
fishing community and the fisheries managers/scientists seem to share the same vision of 
achieving a governance environment in which fishing communities and the government 
fishing authority can work in collaboration in fisheries regulation-making. 
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Gear owners - East {20) 
20 
Gear owners - West {21) 
0 
20 
Managers/Scientists (23} 
4 
• 1 
!32 
3 
1111 4 
§ 5 
• 1 
2 
3 
111 4 
§5 
Crew members - East {20) 
Crew members - West (17) 
6 
1 
Commu~ty members (20) 
5 
I 
45 
1. Government and fishing community work 
together to formulate fisheries regulations 
2. Government makes the regulation without 
inputs from fishing community 
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Figure 6.3 Percentages of respondents indicating their view on what level of participation 
a fishing commun ity should play in the formulation of fisheries regulation (the number of 
respondents in each group is in parenthesis) 
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6.3 Conservation principle category 
6.3.1 Description of categorization scheme 
In this section, I examine whether any plausible linkages between individual conservation 
principle and illegal gear use can be established. To accomplish this, the results of the two 
paired comparison sets are viewed in relation to each other using a simple categorization 
scheme. This step allows observing the relationship between the understanding and 
inclination component, which is an important tenet of the conservation principle that was 
postulated earlier. Revisiting the relationship, the inquiry is about how understanding is 
important but not sufficient alone in securing conservation principle, and how inclination 
together with understanding can be linked to the conservation principle. 
The remainder of this section briefly outlines the process taken in the categorization 
scheme. First, it starts with an establishment of weighting factors for each component (i .e. 
paired comparison set). For Set A, the more damaging the fishing activities are judged to 
be, the higher the weighting factor. For Set B, a higher weighting factor implies a higher 
degree of direct conservation benefit offered by a community programme. The weighting 
factors were multiplied with the individual preference scores of the paired comparison 
sets and aggregated across the objects to produce two weighed sums for each respondent 
each of the two sums respectively corresponding to Set A and B. A high weighted sum 
from Set A would mean that an individual is equipped with apt awareness or 
understanding of conservation knowledge, while a high score from Set B would indicate 
higher inclination towards achieving conservation. Next, the weighted sums were 
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averaged for all respondents resulting in a mean value for each set. Based on the mean, 
each individual's weighted sums for the two sets are categorized to be either L, if lower 
than the mean value, or H, if it is higher than the mean value. This scheme results in four 
different combinations into which an individual respondent could be categorized, i.e. HH, 
HL, LH and LL. For example, HH would signify that a respondent has not only high 
conservation awareness, but also relatively strong sense of inclination towards 
conservation. Similarly, HL would denote a case where despite having high conservation 
awareness, a respondent is equipped with relatively low penchant for conservation. 
6.3.2 Weighting factors 
Suitable weighting factors were developed for each paired comparison set, as shown in 
Table 6.11. For Set A, the agreed ranking provided by the respondents (see Figure 6.1) 
were used as a guide to establish the weighting factors, which reflect the severity of 
damages the different fishing activities inflict on fisheries resources. They range from 1 to 
4, 1 and 4 denoting the least and the most damaging form of fishing activities, 
respectively. The weighting factors for the Set B were established based on the elicited 
judgment of local fisheries experts in the SEA in conjunction with the obtained ranking 
data. Several key fisheries experts were asked to give a rating to the seven community 
programmes included in the survey according to their potential contribution to fisheries 
conservation in the SEA. Combining the data, two progranunes that directly promote 
conservation were given the top weighting, 3, which are 'protection of fish habitat and 
species' and 'promotion of scientific research on the Jake ecosystem'. Next, the weighting 
of 2 was assigned to two programmes that are anticipated to hold modest potential in 
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advancing conservation, as listed in Table 6.11. Lastly, three programmes that are 
associated with low or even negative conservation benefits were allotted the weighting of 
I. 
Table 6.11 Weighting factors derived for conservation principle category 
Set A: Damaging fishing activities 
Fishing in spawning area 
Fishing using gears that disturb lake bottom 
Fishing using non-selective gear 
Catching juvenile fish 
Too many people fishing in one area 
Fishing using mechanized gear 
Fishing in offshore deep water 
Set B: Preferred community programmes 
Protect fish habitat and fish species 
Promote scientific research on lake fisheries ecosystem 
Provide ownership of resources to local communities 
Promote small-scale community fish cage culture 
Ensure fishing access for local fishers and communities 
Help reduce fish spoilage during catching and processing 
Provide micro-credit loans to expand fishing-related work 
6.3.3 Categorization results 
Weighting 
factor 
4 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
Description 
Most damaging 
Generally accepted to 
be very damaging 
1-1 igh potential to be 
damaging 
Least damaging 
Direct promotion of 
conservation 
Modest potential in 
advancing conservation 
Low or even potentially 
adverse effect on 
con ervation 
The individual preference scores (i.e. the number of times a respondent has chosen 
specific objects over others) were multiplied by the weighting factors. A set of equations 
specifying the algorithm are provided through Equations 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9. A sample 
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calculation is also provided in Table 6.11 to illustrate the process. If we assume that a 
particular respondent has individual preference scores as shown in Table 6.11 for Set A, 
then the multiplied values are aggregated to produce a weighted sum, 60. This process is 
replicated for all remaining respondents, and the mean of the weighted sums is computed. 
The same procedure is undertaken to produce weighted sums and a mean value for Set B. 
The possible minimum and maximum weighted sum values for Set A are determined to 
be 42 and 66 by trial-and-error, and the respective values for Set B are 28 and 50. 
Appendix C provides a detailed calculation of the maximum and minimum weighted sum 
values for each set. 
(6.7) 
(6.8) 
(6.9) { 
LJ~=l Wj A v g = --"-----:.. 
k 
lfW) ~ Avg, 
otherwise, 
assign H 
assign L 
where W) is a weighted sum for / 11 respondent, ai refers to individual preference score for 
lh object; N refers to the number of objects; wi refers to weighting factor for ith object, j 
refers to /'1 respondent; and k refers to the total number of respondents Gudges). 
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Table 6.11 Table illustrating the process of acquiring a weighted sum for an individual 
respondent 
Fishing in Fishing Fishing Catching Too many Fishing Fishing in 
spawning using gears using non- juvenile people using offshore 
area that disturb selective fish fishing in mechanized deep 
lake bottom gear one area gear water 
Individual 
preference 5 6 3 3 0 2 
score 
X 
Weighting 4 3 3 3 2 2 factor 
Multiplied 20 18 9 9 0 2 2 
value 
Weighted 20 + I 8 + 9 + 9 + 0 + 2 + 2 = 60 
sum 
Figure 6.4 displays the histograms of the weighted swns for all 144 respondents. To 
reiterate the meaning of the weighted sum, given how the weighting factors are set up, a 
high weighted swn implies more apt conservation understanding obtained from the 
ranking of damaging fishing activities (Set A), and high inclination towards conservation 
obtained from the ranking of preferred community programmes (Set B). The 
'conservation awareness' histogram shown in Figure 6.4(a) indicates that the frequency 
distribution is skewed to the left (i.e. negative skew), meaning many respondents are 
located in the range of high conservation understanding. This trend of overall high 
conservation understanding is not very surprising considering (1) the significant 
agreement reached by all seven respondent groups, and (2) consistency of the ranking 
results with the commonly-held knowledge about fishing gears and their impacts in other 
fisheries worldwide (see section 6.2.1). The ' conservation inclination' histogram displays 
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a more symmetrical frequency distribution, though it is still left-skewed (Figure 6.4b ). 
The positive skew observed here is also a plausible outcome as we already have seen the 
two conservation-oriented programmes being ranked in the upper half by both the 
resource-dependent group and the managers/scientists group as shown in Figure 6.1. The 
weighted sum means for the conservation awareness set and the conservation inclination 
set are 62.7 and 42.1 , respectively. 
The next step involved categorizing the weighted sums of the respondents using the mean 
value. Simply, H was given if a weighted sum is bigger than the mean value, and L was 
assigned if it is lower. Repeating this step for both sets, each respondent was categorized 
to be one of the four possible combinations - HH, HL, LH and LL. This step categorized 
144 respondents into 41 HHs, 46 HLs, 24 LHs and 33 LLs. As more respondents were 
classified as HL than any other category, this result indicates that most commonly the 
respondents have relatively high conservation awareness, but relatively low inclination 
towards conservation. In other words, having a good understanding about what 
conservation is and how to promote it may not be necessarily accompanied by keen 
interest in promoting conservation among the resource-dependent group. Hence, it should 
not be readily assumed that knowing about it guarantees conservation in the SEA. 
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Figure 6.4 Histograms of (a) conservation awareness (Set A), and (b) conservation 
inclination (Set B) showing the frequency distribution of weighted sums (total frequency 
= 144, Set A mean = 62.69, and Set B mean = 42.10) 
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Another useful observation relates to the proportion of the occupations making up each 
category, as displayed in Figure 6.5. It can be noted that each of the four categories have 
all five groups represented, albeit with a varying degree of proportion. This suggests that 
no clear categorical pattern emerges from occupational information alone. For example, 
even some of the fisheries scientists and managers are considered to hold less adequate 
conservation understanding and/or inclination than some of the direct resource users. 
Given the rather effective one-way communication of conservation knowledge from 
fisheries managers to fishing communities as discussed earlier (section 6.2.1 ), this may be 
a surprising finding to some. However, the diverse fisheries backgrounds and expertise of 
the managers and scientists included in the survey are likely to contribute to the 
divergence of conservation-related opinions explaining why some of them are shown to 
hold relatively low conservation attributes. Another important observation is noted in 
Figure 6.5. Focusing on the LL category, which denotes both relatively low conservation 
awareness and inclination, the fisher group, composed of gear owners and crew members 
from both sides of the SEA, forms the clear majority of the LL category. Out of the 33 
LL-category respondents, 26 ofthem belong to fishers. Probing further by examining the 
categorical make-up of each occupational group (Table 6.13), a considerably large 
portion of the two fisher groups are assigned into LL with 41% of the gear owners and 
24% of the crew members, compared to 10%, 10% and 11 .5% of the other three groups. 
This suggests that the fisher group should continue to be the primary partner and recipient 
of any future conservation initiatives. However, given the open-access nature of the SEA 
fishery with an easy entry allowed to any one, community members and other resource-
dependent groups should not be excluded from the scope of such programmes. 
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Figure 6.5 Cumulative composition of each conservation principle category based on 
occupation 
Table 6.13 Percentages of respondent groups making up each conservation principle 
categoi·y 
HH HL LH LL Total 
Gear owners 12 27 20 41 100 
Crew members 27 35 14 24 100 
Processors/Traders 55 30 5 10 100 
Comm. members 20 65 5 10 100 
Managers/Scientists 42 11 .5 35 11.5 100 
170 
6.3.4 Conservation principle category by legal/illegal gear use 
Minimizing illegal fishing, or more specifically the use of illegal gears, can be attempted 
by numerous policy means, including enforcement and sanctions. One of the approaches 
that this study is interested in examining is to rely on the individual moral principle to 
conserve fisheries resources and encourage a voluntary ban on damaging fishing 
activities. Whether and how it can be relied upon to minimize the use of illegal gear 
depends first on establishing a linkage between the strength of the parameters that 
constitute conservation principle and the observed case of illegal gear use. Hence, this 
step focuses on the fisher group to uncover any relationship between the use of illegal 
gear (a bona-fide form of illegal fishing) and the presence of low or high conservation 
awareness and inclination (Figure 6.6). Out of the 78 fishers included in the survey, 25 
fishers indicated owning or operating illegal form of fishing gear, when asked to list all 
gears used or owned. Using the infom1ation listed in the Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Regulation of 2000 (GoM 2000), recommended gears (i.e. legally allowed) 
were differentiated from non-recommend gears (i.e. illegal gears). As shown in Figure 
6.6, the result indicates that fishers who use illegal gear are most frequently found in the 
LL category (12 fishers out of 26 in LL). On the other hand, most fishers who are 
categorized as HH are legal gear fishers (14 fishers out of 15), with only a tiny fraction of 
illegal gear fishers sharing the category. Based on this, a relationship between the 
conservation principle and the illegal gear use can be reasonably established. HH is 
predominantly associated with the use of legal gears, while illegal gear use is most 
dominantly associated with LL. In other words, it is reasonable to suspect that moving 
from LL to HH could induce the reduction of illegal gear use. This correlation serves as a 
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plausible sign that ra1smg conservation awareness and persuading them to favour 
conservation may in fact help decrease the number of fishers who admittedly own or 
operate illegal gears. Therefore, elevating individual conservation principle through 
raising the two components may indeed be an important governance option for mitigating 
the illegal fishing situation in the SEA. Aside from the legal/illegal gear use, the 
breakdowns of the conservation principle category by other pertinent criteria, such as the 
education level and gender of the respondents, are provided in Appendix C. 
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Figure 6.6 The number of fishers using illegal or legal gear displayed according to 
conservation principle category 
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6.4 Individual-level governability and conservation principle 
The general findings of this chapter reveal several key points about the governability of 
the measures intended for fisheries conservation and discouraging illegal fishing. First, 
relatively high degree of conservation understanding was observed among the survey 
respondents. This result includes respondents from both sides of the water body, and is 
shared by both the managers/scientists group (i.e. governors in the typical sense) and the 
resource-dependent group in communities (i.e. part of the system-to-be-governed). It thus 
highlights a potential for all groups to be able to, at least, agree on urgent conservation 
issues and damaging fishing activities, if not more, and therefore carries a positive note 
that conservation measures can be made more governable through capitalizing the shared 
understanding. Another encouraging empirical finding confirms the linkage between the 
conservation principle and the extent of illegal gear use, where ' stronger' conservation 
principles in individuals correspond to a lesser ownership/usage of illegal fishing gears. 
Thus, fostering conservation principle can be suggested as a reasonable governance 
option to improve the governability of conservation measures and subsequently reducing 
outcome uncertainties. In terms of inclination toward conservation, while a moderately 
high level of penchant for the direct promotion of conservation was noted by all 
respondent groups, a significant divergence in viewpoint between the managers/scientists 
group and the resource-dependent group poses a governability challenge requiring extra 
care and sensitivity. 
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This chapter has revealed several important empirical findings on the individuals general 
aptitude and regard for fisheries conservation, cast in the lens of governability. Here, the 
conservation principle was approached as something internally-held by individuals, 
independent from and uninfluenced by the system characteristics. In the governability 
assessment presented in Chapter 5, however, the conservation principle was approached 
as something that depends upon the overall governance picture shaped by high or low 
levels of the system properties. The connection between the system-level governability 
and the individual-level governability is left for more conceptual exploration and will be 
further elaborated in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 Discussion and Policy Recommendations 
Plate 7.1 Inland view of Kadango 
Plate 7.2 Kela beach in the morning 
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The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, it discusses and advances some key policy 
recommendations aimed at addressing the illegal fishing issue in the SEA. The inference 
made here and suggestions proposed are based on the obtained results of the 
questionnaire survey as well as the insights gathered from other methods such as informal 
interviews and field observation. Secondly, it attempts to weave together the two levels of 
governability measurement in order to generate an integrated discourse about the overall 
governability of conservation measures and illegal fishing in the SEA, and this will be 
done based on the assessed system properties and individuals' conservation principle. 
7.1 Economic/development incentive 
First, targeting the group of respondents with relatively high conservation understanding 
but relatively low inclination (HL), the policy response would logically focus on bringing 
up the inclination towards conserving fisheries resources. In Figure 6.1, the resource-
dependent group's leading preference was shown to be the expansion of one's fishing 
work by acquiring a capital through loans. In other words, resource-dependent group' s 
preference to economic expansion and development seems to clearly outpace other 
inclinations including conservation. This empirical finding is, in fact, in line with the 
general, prevailing line of thinking in Malawi, in fisheries or elsewhere, which revolves 
around the development agenda. Poverty alleviation and raising the standard of living 
through development, modernization and rapid economic growth are the main theme that 
reverberates in all sectors of government affair (GoM 2009). In fisheries, according to the 
2001 National Fisheries and Aquaculture policy, the major policy goals are aimed at 
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'maximizing the sustainable yield ... , to improve the efficiency of exploitation, processing 
and marketing ... , to promote investment in the fishing industry, rural fish farming units 
and exploit all opportunities to expand existing and develop new aquatic resources (GoM 
2001 p.5)'. Furthermore, the persistent attempt to expand fisheries further offshore, a 
production-oriented modernization agenda and examples of policy support for the 
industrial sector exemplify the government's pro-development position in steering the 
fisheries sector, although some inconsistencies and ambivalence had been observed in the 
fisheries development policy over the years (Chirwa 1996; Allison et al. 2002). The 
theme of poverty alleviation and development is also prominent in rural fishing villages at 
the community level as well as among resource users at the individual level (pers. 
observation; pers. comm. Masiye). Therefore, the economic motive involving the 
expansion of one' s fishing work appears to be an important factor hindering a more 
resilient expression of conservation principle in the SEA fisheries. 
The findings indicate that the short-term enhancement of standard-of-living is one of the 
resource-dependent group's main motivations, if not the strongest, that competes with the 
inclination towards conservation. From the perspective of policy-makers and governors, 
when promoting conservation, a compromising solution is likely required in responding 
to this real demand of resource-users. Simply, a policy recommendation that does not lead 
to enhanced standard-of-living would not be well-received. Therefore, management 
initiatives that supply the resource-dependent group with an economic incentive to 
conserve are strongly recommended. In the process, conservation will be cast in a positive 
light raising the level of inclination towards conservation over time. Such initiatives could 
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come m varwus forms such as conservation subsidies or a reward scheme. Milazzo 
(1998) defines conservation subsidies as 'programs that are designed to enhance the 
resource base, reduce fishing operations and capacity, and foster "cleaner" harvesting 
technologies' (p.64). Several common types of conservation subsidies are provided, 
which include: vessel and fishing permit buybacks, refitting of vessels to operate in less 
stressed fisheries, stock enhancement, re-training of fishers, and innovations in clean 
harvesting gear (Milazzo 1998). Given the specificities of the SEA fishery set in a 
developing world with an open-access character, certain types of conservation subsidies 
are regarded as more appropriate than others. For example, refitting of vessels to operate 
in the deeper part of the lake to relieve the heavy pressure put on the nearshore stocks and 
to target less-exploited offshore species has been, in fact, undertaking since 2003 as part 
of the Lake Malawi Artisanal Fisheries Development Project funded by the African 
Development Bank Group. Also, re-training of fishers, fish processors and traders have 
also been one of the foci of various donor-funded initiatives that indirectly aim to steer 
economic incentives towards meeting the conservation objectives. 
Alternately, a more direct approach to compensate people for their role in looking after 
fisheries resources can take place via direct conservation payments (or conservation 
performance payments) (Simpson and Sedjo 1996; Ferraro 2001; Ferraro and Simpson 
2002). Conventional development interventions attempt to reduce pressures on ecosystem 
by steering the economic development process towards the path that is compatible with 
ecosystem protection, through initiatives such as eco-tourism and aquaculture. However, 
this indirect way of encouraging conservation is often observed to be ill-suited for 
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properly aligning the economic incentives with the conservation goals. This is mainly due 
to the complexity of development interventions vis-a-vis the temporal and spatial scales at 
which conservation objectives must be achieved. This difficulty often creates little effect 
on conservation-related household behaviour (Ferraro 2001 ). The premise of the payment 
scheme is to offer a much more cost-effective way of ensuring conservation results than 
the conventional development projects by directly linking explicit payments to 
conservation progress. Although the direct payment system is not without its own set of 
shortcomings, which necessitate careful program design and implementation, past and 
ongoing examples can be found in several developing countries in the tropics, where they 
have been employed to protect ecosystems and promote stewardship of forest resources 
(Ferraro and Simpson 2002). For instance, Ferraro and Simpson (2002) reports that 
Guatemala' s example delivers direct payments to forest stewards through the Forest 
Incentives Program (World Bank 2000), while, in Costa Rica, institutional mechanisms 
were established to allow local, national, and international beneficiaries of ecosystem 
services to compensate those who protect ecosystems (Castro et al. 2000). As with these 
examples, such programmes can be made feasible through financial support garnered 
from national and international donors, NGOs and various interest groups around the 
world who share a keen interest in protecting particular ecosystems. 
Various forms of conservation subsidies and direct payments schemes should garner 
meaningful attention in meeting the economic/development demand of the resource-
dependent group in the SEA. This would be an important policy addition aimed to raise 
the level of inclination towards fisheries conservation, particularly of those categorized as 
179 
HL. As a result, activities that negate conservation (e.g. illegal fishing) are hoped to be 
discouraged out of their own conservation principle. 
7.2 Conservation education, understanding and 'love' 
Secondly, sustained focus on education and awareness raising is still needed to increase 
the level of conservation understanding of mainly those who are categorized to be LH and 
LL, despite the overall moderately high degree of knowledge suggested by the result of 
the Set A where various fishing activities were suitably differentiated according to the 
severity of impacts inflicted on the resources. The need is more acutely illustrated via 
Figure 6.6. Only 5 of 39 fishers in the higher awareness level (i.e. HH and HL) were 
reported to be using illegal gears compared to 20 out of 39 fishers in the lower half (i.e. 
LH or LL). This amounts to a large difference depending on the level of conservation 
understanding, as over half of the fishers (51%) with relatively lower conservation 
understanding are using illegal gears as opposed to a considerably smaller fraction (13%) 
by those equipped with relatively higher understanding. The result seems to suggest that 
reaching adequately high conservation awareness among fishers and other resource-
dependent members can create a tangible impact on reducing the extent of illegal gear 
use. The effort to elevate the conservation understanding could be implemented through 
various accessible means such as formal education, outreach and extension programmes, 
commuruty-based projects and the work of fisheries field officers. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, emphasis should be shifted from one-way knowledge dissemination to a 
more open form of dialogue that allows a two-way exchange of conservation-related 
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attitude and habits between various stakeholder groups. This shift can perhaps help the 
translation of an understanding into a genuine inclination, such that knowledge on 
conservation can induce creating passion and belief and furthermore spilling into the 
moral domain such as principles and norms. 
In a 1968 speech made to the general assembly ofinternational Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) in New Delhi, a well-respected Senegalese environmentalist, Baba 
Dioum, is quoted saying: "In the end we will conserve only what we love. We love only 
what we understand. We will understand only what we are taught ". His statement speaks 
volumes about the importance of educating people about conservation, since education is 
at the foundation of understanding and fostering love for conservation (Figure 7.1 ). As 
was shown in this study, however, apparently everything we understand is not what we 
love, and everything we love is not in the best interest of conservation. The common 
prevalence of HL category suggests that while people have knowledge about conservation 
and are aware of what promotes or hurts conservation, it does not necessarily translate 
into passion towards it. In addition, high penchant for the enhancement of short-term 
well-being clearly shown in the result has low or even potentially adverse effect on 
conservation (i.e. what people love may be incompatible with conservation). However, 
tapping into the conservation principle as a governance option, as potential was shown in 
this study (section 6.3), can be a promising way of realizing conservation such that what 
we understand and what we incline to do would in the end coincide more with 
conservation. 
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Figure 7.1 How conservation, love (i.e. inclination), understanding and education are 
related and overlap with each other. Seen this way, enlarging the circle of 'conservation' 
to match the size of 'education' would be the ultimate goal of conservation education 
7.3 Differences in the preferred fisheries-related community programmes 
7.3.1 Expansion of fishing work 
It is interesting to note that the resource-dependent groups' penchant for the programme 
to provide micro-credit loans to expand fishing-related work is contrasted with the low 
preference by the manager/scientists group (see Figure 6.1). This contrast is likely to 
explain the greatly significant difference observed among the groups in the result of the 
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Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 6.9). The divergence in opinion seems reasonable considering 
the widely-held view of the manager/scientists about the fully- or over-exploited status of 
fisheries resources and their concern for overfishing due to a large number of fishers and 
gears (also shown in Figure 6.2). Also, in the case of fisheries expansion to deeper waters, 
there is no effective way of making sure that fishers will not use the upgraded boats and 
gears to remain in the near shore and catch inshore stocks instead of targeting deepwater 
species as the loan intended to (pers. comm. Kachala). Hence, while still being an 
advocate of fisheries expansion and development, managers/scientists seem to prefer 
alternative initiatives that put less pressure on the issues of overfishing, such as 
experimental fish cage culture and advancing fish processing technology. 
In recent years, a private company, named Maldeco Aquaculture, has established a net 
cage system in the SEA with the intent of producing 1,200 metric tons of chambo per 
year (PressCorp. 2009). With potential shown for successful farming and harvest, the 
DoF has followed suit by constructing a cage culture system in the SEA in technical 
liaison with the Maldeco Aquaculture. The community-based model, as opposed to a 
private venture, is the main vision for the government-initiated cage culture. However, an 
experimental harvest that took place in April 2008 revealed a high mortality rate as well 
as generated a suspicion for the theft of fish, potentially perpetrated by nearby small-scale 
fishers out of jealousy or misunderstanding (pers. comm. Banda). Fish cage culture in the 
SEA is still at an early developmental stage. In order to achieve commercial viability and 
community benefits, several issues will need to be addressed, including the development 
of sui table technologies and garnering the support of fishing communities in the area. 
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As for deepwater fishing, despite the voiced concern of having no installed mechanism to 
ensure that deepwater fishing vessels do not target near-shore species, the currently 
ongoing Lake Malawi Artisanal Fisheries Development Project supported by the African 
Development Bank, intends to provide loans to more than 400 groups of fishers for 
upgrading of fishing boats and nets to enable them to fish in deep waters (pers. comm. 
Msukwa). 
7.3.2 Instituting local resource ownership 
Another interesting disagreement between the resource-dependent group and the 
managers/scientists group, as observed in the Kruskal-Wallis result (Table 6.9), occurs in 
the programme to promote local ownership of fisheries resources. Manager/scientists ' 
high preference is thought to spring from having knowledge of the widely discussed 
potential benefits of local involvement and participation in the management of resources. 
Conferring a certain degree of resource ownership, privilege and responsibility to local 
communities by seeking active participation of resource-dependent groups has been a 
popular scheme among practitioners as well as in the academic circle around the world 
(Wilson et a/. 2003 ; Bene and Neiland 2006). However, the efficacy and merit of the 
Participatory Fisheries Management Program, which was initiated in the SEA in 1997, is 
currently being reassessed as the program has not lived up to the expectation yielding 
little success and marginal achievements. (pers. comm. Bulirani; Njaya 2007). 
Nevertheless, it is shown in this study that managers and scientists still highly value the 
local community ownership of fisheries resources. 
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On the other hand, this study reveals that fishers and community members hold relatively 
low regard for the idea of local ownership even despite a decade long implementation of 
the participatory management initiative. The BVCs, which were established to facilitate 
the transition, though recognized at every major fishing beach, lack meaningful operation. 
In addition, several anecdotal evidences point to the similar conclusion. Many resource 
users see fisheries resources as something that belongs to the government, and they are 
just in it to take advantage of the resources that the government manages without sharing 
the ultimate responsibility (pers. comm. Masiye). Also, the high mobility of fishers and 
fish traders as a cultural norm in fishing casts a doubt as to whether rather static and 
permanent concept of local ownership would work (per. comm. Makanjira). Lastly, the 
notion of dividing a water body and conferring exclusive management and use rights to 
particular fishing communities, as one way of instituting local resource ownership, 
appeared to be an utterly foreign idea to many fishing villagers (per. comm. Nyungwa). 
Therefore, it is perhaps no surprise to find that the concept of local ownership has not 
taken a firm hold in the communities. 
Here, it must be noted that participation in fisheries governance by resource users is one 
thing, but the institution of local ownership of resources and instilling the sense of 
ownership and stewardship among the resource-dependent group is another. Drawing 
upon the interactive governance theory, participation falls in the domain of the first as 
well as the second order of governance, where the first order refers to human governing 
activities involving day-to-day management undertakings, and the second order deals 
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with the maintenance and design of institutions that enable the first order governing. In 
other words, it is about raising the level of participation among various stakeholders and 
creating an institutional arrangement that will facilitate the higher level of participation. 
On the other hand, instilling the sense of resource ownership and stewardship is likely 
part of the third order of governance, that is, being intervened and handled by the 
underlying principles and normative values that guide and underpin the processes of the 
first and the second order. Hence, promoting local ownership of resources would require 
a foremost attention on the normative aspect of governance. The interactive governance 
framework also provides an analytical tool with which this distinction can be better 
recognized and acted upon. 
As shown in Figure 6.3, respondents in this study have clearly expressed that fishing 
communities should be an equal partner in the rule-making process. However, how 
exactly this envisioned joint collaborative form of participation can be achieved using 
what type of governance mechanism remains a challenge. A greater challenge may lie in 
how to bring about the local ownership of resources so that the resource-dependent group 
would not only simply participate but have a greater role in governing the resources as 
legitimate owners. One conceptual point of departure for action could be putting a great 
commitment to enabling inputs in the words of Mahon el a!. (2008, p.l 07). 'Enabling 
inputs are those that seek to make it possible for the system to self-organize and adapt to 
change through internal interactions and activities' . Somewhat similar to the concept of 
empowering, they are likely to require relinquishing or re-distributing of power and 
governing authority. They are also seen complementary to regulatory inputs, a more 
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conventional kind implemented by the government. Suggestions that would facilitate the 
transition from a largely regulatory to an enabled environment include stakeholder 
analysis, use of traditional/local ecological knowledge, setting up of appropriate 
indicators, a shift of emphasis from technical to 'people' skills, and earning the trust of 
stakeholders (Mahon et al. 2008). 
7.3.3 Reducing fish spoilage 
The third major difference between the resource-dependent group and the 
managers/scientists group, indicated by both the result of Kruskal-Wallis (Table 6.9) and 
rankings (Figure 6.1 ), involves fish spoilage. This issue highlights a possibility of 
communication gap in a programme that is being implemented. A partial aim of the 
AUCC-CIDA sponsored project is to reduce post-harvest losses through improved 
processing technology of small-scale fishers and processors. It is noteworthy to see that 
the manager/scientists' medium preference on this programme is contrasted with a very 
low preference by the resource user group. The explanation for this can go both ways. It 
could be that for fish processors and traders, this is not an important issue as little or 
almost no fish spoilage occurs throughout much of the year. Only during a rainy season, 
fish spoilage can be a problem that results in both economic and nutritional value loss. 
Fish has become such a valuable commodity nowadays that processing work is conducted 
with utmost care (pers. comm. Masiye ). Hence, resource users may not see an urgent need 
for a programme that helps to reduce fish spoilage. Alternately, there may be potential in 
making a substantial value addition, in the form of profit gain or enhanced nutritional 
value, from reducing fish spoilage that is recognized by the managers and scientists, but 
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goes unnoticed by the resource users. In this case, the communication of the expected 
benefits from manager/scientists to resource user community would need to be 
strengthened. Overall, the success of one-way communication effort seen in the 
transmitting of the damaging impact of fishing activities is not apparent when it comes to 
the programmes and initiatives. 
7.4 Direct conservation measures 
Heightened promotion of direct conservation measures, such as protection of breeding 
sites and greater size limits of protected species, should be fully considered, given the 
finding that fishers and other resource-dependent groups do have a certain regard for 
conservation (see section 6.2.2). There is already recognition among various fisheries 
stakeholder groups in the SEA that direct conservation measures are imperative in 
sustaining the benefits of lake resources into the future. Extensive stakeholder 
consultations held in 2005 as part of the Mangochi Fisheries By-law formulation process 
have indicated that strict conservation objectives are being advocated and promoted. The 
importance of protecting breeding grounds and spawning fish stocks through restrictions 
on when and where to fish, prohibiting the catch of endangered fish species through gear 
control, and controlling access to fisheries through compliance with gear licensing and 
registration were some of the key points that were widely acknowledged as necessary. 
When other motives such as the short-term enhancement of standard-of-living are firmly 
ingrained in people's lives, a persistent push towards implementing direct conservation 
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measures could act as a necessary reminder to effectively uphold the existing care for 
conservation. 
7.5 Debates about large-scale commercial fishing 
A part of the fishing picture in the SEA not directly targeted in the survey portion is the 
large-scale commercial fishing sector, which currently involves one private company who 
operates 2 to 3 trawlers (90-385 hp), and 10 to 15 pair trawlers (20-40 hp, inboard engine) 
operated by individual owners. A history of large-scale commercial fishing reaches back 
to the colonial era in the 1930s when a group of European entrepreneurs began 
commercial fishing using seines and trawls (Banda 2001 ; McCracken 1987). In the mid 
1960s, a pair trawl fishery was established to target the demersal species in the shallow 
part of the SEA. The 1970s saw the introduction of stern trawlers for both bottom and 
mid-water trawling. More recently, the bottom trawling has expanded to deeper water up 
to 1 00 m by two boats with 3 80 hp. After a sustained growth throughout the decades, the 
yield from the pair trawl fishery has been in general decline since early 1990s producing 
less than 200 tons in subsequent years 1999 and 2000. The stern bottom trawl fishery has 
stabilized to yield around 5,600 tons per annum in the second halfofthe 1990s, while the 
stern mid-water trawling has produced about 1,000 tons in the same temporal period 
(Banda 2001 ). 
There is a noticeable geographical distinction observed in the large-scale fishing 
operation in the SEA. Most large-scale fishing units dock and land on the beaches on the 
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western side, and more specifically they base their operation out of the beaches located on 
the south-western end of the waterbody due to a larger human population and the 
proximity to the main market in Mangochi town. The survey result between the western-
side fishers and those found on the eastern side seems to capture this areal difference. 
First, both gear owners and crew members surveyed on the western shore judged 'fishing 
using mechanized gear' to be more damaging than the fishers interviewed in the eastern 
villages (Table 6.1 ). The ranks and the normalized scores are both higher with the score 
values of 55 and 52 out of 100 produced by the fishers on the western side compared to 
40 and 30 from the fishers found on the eastern shore. This pattern is perhaps more 
acutely presented in the survey result asking for the reasons of fisheries decline (Figure 
6.2). 79% of the fishers on the western shore attributed the fewer amounts of fish in the 
lake to the overfishing of large-scale commercial units, compared to 59% of the 
respondents surveyed in the eastern side. The divergence in the opinion as to how they 
view the large-scale fishing units is probably why 'fishing using mechanized gear' 
showed such a large degree of statistical difference between the groups according to the 
Kruskal-Wallis result (Table 6.9). 
The existence and operation of large-scale fishing in the SEA is a fairly contentious issue. 
Animosity towards large-scale fishing units is suspected to arise because they are 
perceived to compete with the small-scale fishers in many ways. They target the same 
species of fish and fish of similar size structure (Weyl et al. 2005) and also use the same 
beaches for landing. Moreover, some of the conservation regulations such as closed 
seasons have not been applied to the large-scale operations allowing them to fish freely 
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while small-scale fishers are subject to restrictions (GoM 2005). In addition, there have 
been occurrences of gill nets being destroyed by large boats fishing in the near shore 
despite the regulation provisions in place that separate the two fleets spatially and 
temporally (Banda 2001). Pair trawlers' non-compliance with the area restriction by 
fishing in the shallowest part of the SEA (designated as Area A) is being sighted 
frequently raising resentment among small-scale fishers (pers. comm. Usen). Hence, 
small-scale fishers tend to perceive the large-scale units as taking an wlfairly large 
quantity of catch while benefit is accumulated to only a small number of owners and 
managers of the fishing operation. Perceived unfairness extends into the leniency of 
fisheries regulations applied towards the large-scale fishing units, which may act to 
discourage small-scale fishers from abstaining from their own set of illegal fishing. 
Is the concern of small-scale fishers on the large-scale fishing partly attributed to envy 
and bitterness towards someone who is more powerful and prosperous? Are they simply 
placing blame on 'the other guys' for the problems that they are facing? Either scenario is 
indeed possible. Or are they genuinely worried about the extent of damage large-scale 
gear could cause to the ecosystem by disturbing the lake bottom and inflicting non-
selectivity? Many of the fishers have clearly expressed this ecologically-based reason as 
why they feel that large-scale fishing should be discouraged (pers. observation). 
Whatever the main origin of the sentiment may be, the point is that their concern about 
the damaging effect of the large-scale fishery should be given sincere consideration in the 
management of SEA fishery. Numerous studies already point at the potentially hazardous 
effect of future over-development in the large-scale fishery. Turner et al. (1995) advises 
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against the expansion of trawl fishery in the northern portion of the SEA (i.e. Area B and 
C) to the levels of exploitation seen to the southern portion (i.e. Area A). Likewise, Weyl 
et al. (2005) leaves two crucial recommendations that renewed investment and increased 
effort in pair trawl fishery should be avoided in the SEA, and that the pair trawl fishery 
should not be managed in isolation of the small-scale fishery. In addition, studied in a 
bigger context that included other major African Jakes, the findings of Jul-Larsen et al. 
(2003) warn that the high gear efficiency brought on by investment-driven growth is 
likely to result in serious bio-ecological problems for the lake. Furthermore, Mathew and 
Koshy (2008) has summarized a regional workshop discussion on the rights of small-
scale fishers in eastern and southern Africa in which Malawi is a part of, and offers a 
shared caution against heedless management and development of large-scale industrial 
fishing in recognition of the rights and responsibilities of often marginalized and less 
powerful small-scale fishers. In this respect, the voice of the fishers reflected in this study 
adds and complements the rising scientific and managerial recommendations that 
advocate prudent development of the large-scale fishing operation. 
Antagonism towards the large-scale fishery is a normative governance Issue that 
inevitably involves underlying values and principles of governance actors. Given the 
prevalence of the modernization/development agenda guiding the SEA fisheries in the 
past, the ' hard choices' often evident in fisheries, such as innovation versus precaution or 
short-term gain versus long-tem1 benefit, would have likely been resolved in favour of the 
large-scale fishery. Interactive governance theory urges that such underpinning values 
driving the policy decisions are to be made explicit so that the diverse views and the 
192 
opposing concerns of fishers and fishing communities can be heard and negotiated in a 
more transparent, legitimate and power-neutral governing environment. 
7.6 Other policy suggestions 
In the SEA, a pressing issue is the corruption of some traditional leaders who may permit 
illegal gears to operate in their villages in return for a weekly gift from fishers in the form 
of money or fish (GoM 2005; Njaya 2007; pers. comm. Masiye). This custom of giving 
gifts (or mawe) to traditional leaders as a token of appreciation and respect has long been 
in existence. However, when the power is being abused this way, illegal fishing can be 
condoned, encouraged and even protected, and the conservation principle of fishers 
naturally breaks down. Such situation would create a socio-political context in which 
illegal fishing persists and conservation does not prevail. Dealing with this issue is a 
governance problem. Njaya (2007) has recommended the formulation of clear 
management plans and by-laws as institutional mechanisms to guard against such 
malpractices. Furthermore, delving into the normative aspect (i.e. the third-order of 
governance or meta-governance as per Kooiman et al. 2005) would not only be a 
beneficial, but also an essential exercise, since how one views such subject that is 
intricately linked with politics and power dynamics is fundamentally value-ridden. In this 
sense, amid the long-running custom of giving and receiving mawe and the enduring 
village leadership structure, what constitutes a corruption (as opposed to a tradition) is in 
the eye of the beholder, based on one's biased perception. Some traditional leaders, or 
even fishers for that matter, may feel that the traditional leaders have the right and 
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authmity to impose certain gifts on fishers, even for the illegal forms of fishing gear, 
because more value may be put on the preserving cultural traditions rather than 
complying with the laws of the government. Therefore, in the design and implementation 
of appropriate institutional measures, governing interactions based on mutual respect, 
acknowledgment and appreciation of divergent worldviews must be accompanied to set 
rules that people can together agree on. Also, wide representation and inclusion of all 
fishing village leaders in the SEA into the discussion of corruption should be encouraged, 
given the mobility of fishers which allows them to easily fish under different village 
headship. Overall, raising the accountability and transparency of the governance structure 
would aid fostering a conservation-friendly environment. 
Aside from the fisheries-specific recommendations, policy options that have an 
implication to a wider society should also be continued to be explored. Fisheries in the 
SEA have always been closely connected to the events happening in the outside sectors 
and distant geographic locations. Through an economic and social feedback loop, 
fisheries and conservation issues are affected by dynamical mechanisms such as an influx 
of fishers and a sudden rise of demand for fish. Seen in this light, the development of 
alternative livelihood or income-generating options is a well-recognized strategy that 
could bring indirect benefits to fisheries conservation by potentially dissipating fishing 
effort into other sectors. Several initiatives that are currently underway in various stages 
of development include tourism operation and fish cage culture. 
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7.7 Integrating the two levels of governability 
Conservation measures would be more governable, and therefore more reliable in 
generating intended outcomes, if the people involved in and affected by those measures 
(i.e. fishing communities) hold conservation in high esteem or if the system properties 
characterizing the fisheries are conducive to the realization of conservation goals. In this 
thesis, these two inquiries were framed as a multi-level endeavour, enabled via the 
concept of govemability. The system-level assessment of the fisheries focusing on the 
system properties and interactive attributes examined what the inherent and constructed 
limitations are in the system and how they may influence the occurrence of conservation 
principle and illegal fishing in the SEA. At the individual-level, an empirical study that 
quantitatively estimates individual 's conservation principle was conducted to build a 
direct linkage to the governabi lity of the conservation measures. The issue of particular 
concern here, namely il1ega1 fishing, holds close linkage to conservation, and 
corresponding to the set up of this research, the prevalence of illegal fishing can be 
viewed as a dependent variable that is contingent upon how the system is set up and 
operates as well as an independent variable that is single-handedly controlled by one's 
robust or inadequate conservation principle. 
Both viewpoints of analyzing illegal fishing as the dependent and independent variables 
have been examined and discussed in this thesis so far with several notable findings that 
reveal the complexity of the issue (cf. section 5.5 and 6.4). The insights gathered from 
both perspectives point to the conclusion that dealing with illegal fishing in the SEA 
195 
would require multi-thronged approach taking various levels of governability problems 
into account. It is not reasonable to solely rely on one's internal moral conservation 
principle to enforce sustainable fishing activities while fishers are struggling to meet their 
basic living necessities, for example, or when everyone else in the community is openly 
disregarding conservation ethics. In a similar manner, the conditions of the fisheries and 
the wider society may be highly conducive to realizing conservation practices afforded by 
effective governance mechanisms, yet if individuals' value system does not appreciate 
conservation, illegal fishing may still persist. Hence, this is a two-sided coin - two 
integrated parts of the same issue. 
The next chapter binds the various strands of discussions presented in this chapter to 
reach a coherent train of thought about dealing with uncertainty of governing outcomes in 
fisheries and highlight the lessons learned. 
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- ------------ - - --------------
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
Plate 8.1 Children playing in the vegetated shore area 
Plate 8.2 A baobab tree in Kadango and a view towards the lake at dusk 
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In bringing trus study to a close, this chapter summarizes the research findings and 
provides responses to the research objectives posed in section 1.5. Also, key policy 
suggestions are reiterated in order to highlight the implications of trus study. Next, the 
central theoretical objective of dealing with uncertainty in governance options, with 
particular attention to conservation measures, is re-traced reflecting on the theory, study 
results and discussions presented in this thesis thus far. Answers to the two main research 
questions are also recapped. Finally, future research needs are discussed to offer a linkage 
towards future work. 
8.1 Revisiting research objectives 
1. To identify aspect(s) of the SEA fishery that are more, or less, governable 
based on the assessment scheme of governability 
Trus objective was primarily approached with the use of the governability assessment 
matrix. Governability is a concept that assesses how governable a certain aspect of 
fisheries is. High governability implies less demanding system properties 17 observed in a 
particular system - both the governing system and the system-to-be-governed, wrule low 
governability stems from interplay of high system properties. Any particular fisheries will 
likely be a mix of high and low governability. Identifying the aspect(s) in the fisheries 
that experience high or low governability would help gauge where and how much of the 
governing challenges are posed in the system as well as the governing capacity to deal 
with them. Based on extensive literature review, informal interviews with key informants 
17 Diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale 
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and field observation, a set of relevant questions were compiled for each assessment 
criterion, as displayed in Table 4.1 . The assessment fmdings point to several areas that 
appear to be more governable and less governable in the fisheries system of the SEA. 
First, focusing on more governable parts, the natural system seen through diversity, 
complexity and scale exhibits moderate-to-high governability. For the socio-economic 
system, diversity, dynamics and scale component indicate moderate-to-high 
govemability. Finally, only the dynamics of the governing system is regarded as highly 
governable. Looking at the less governable features of the SEA fisheries system, the 
dynamics happening in the natural system and the complexity of the socio-economic 
system appear to be the overwhelming characteristics leading to a low governability. The 
governing system on the whole is seen less governable with its system properties showing 
a high degree of diversity, complexity and scale issues. Lastly, governing interactions 
also display a low-to-moderate level of governability based on the interactive attributes 
such as representation/participation, information/conununication, and 
appreciation/collaboration. 
Based on the findings of system-level governability, several limitations emerge in the 
SEA fisheries. The dynamic nature of the natural system involving marked patterns of 
seasonal winds and rain, high variability in catch trend and rapid evolutionary speciation 
of mbuna cichlids is a force to be reckoned with in terms of its impact on the fisheries 
productivity and fluctuation in the fisheries sector. This can be appropriately seen as a 
governing limitation arising from the system-to-be-governed (more specifically, natural 
system) since what can be realistically affected by the human governing interventions is 
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likely contained by what is permitted by (or what cooperates with) the natural patterns 
and non-linear occurrences. For instance, governance measures for fisheries expansion 
should be planned with the full recognition of the dynamic character of the natural 
productivity, since it could affect the abundance of fish stocks abruptly and at any time, 
therefore limiting the success of the governance outcome. Likewise, the high socio-
economic complexity observed in fishing communities where various multi-faceted and 
intricate relationships prevail is another limitation that may restrict the outcome of a 
community-based fisheries programme. In the governing system, scarcity of financial and 
human capital is already a well-known limitation that hinders the build-up of governing 
capacity. From this study, a governance structure involving a wide range of 'governors' at 
various levels (i.e. high diversity) and tricky relationships and hidden power struggles 
among them (i.e. high complexity) could also pose as a limitation that could deter the 
attainment of the desired governance outcomes. 
2. To assess the level of awareness about the damaging impact of fishing 
activities among stakeholders and deduce about their conservation 
understanding 
The level of awareness regarding the damaging impact of fishing activities was assessed 
to be moderately high among the respondent groups. This was inferred from a ranking 
data produced in the survey. First, the deduction that led to a moderately high level of 
awareness stems from the significant agreement observed in the groups' responses. The 
resource-dependent group and the fisheries managers/scientists group have both identified 
'fishing in spawning area' as the most damaging one, and similarly 'fishing in offshore 
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deeper water' was judged to be the least damaging one. In addition, the relative positions 
of middle-ranged fishing activities featured in the survey were also similar in the groups' 
responses. Assuming that the managers/scientists are equipped with a high level of 
conservation knowledge derived from their expertise in fisheries, it is quite plausible to 
deduce that the similar responses obtained in the resource-dependent group reflect a 
similar level of understanding. The agreement in the conservation understanding is 
reaffirmed in the result of the question that asked reasons for the decline of fish stocks. 
As can be seen in Figure 6.2, both the resource-dependent group and the 
managers/scientists group have a similar pattern of reasons as to what is contributing to 
the fewer amount of fish in the SEA. Field observation and informal chats also add to the 
reasoning that fishers and community members alike are fairly cognizant of issues dealing 
with fisheries conservation. 
Secondly, aside from the rank correlation, examining the ranking of fishing activities 
itself suggests that a certain level of awareness exists. The top damaging activities judged 
by the respondent groups in the SEA, such as the harvest of spawning stocks, non-
selectivity, disruption of sea- or lake-bottom, and catching juvenile fish are consistent 
with the general ecological concerns echoed in the fisheries worldwide. Hence, a 
moderately high degree of conservation understanding among both fishers and managers 
can be reasonably inferred. This finding has an implication towards how knowledge 
dissemination and awareness raising should be approached and carried out. The 
widespread occurrence of illegal fishing, therefore, may not be wholly attributable to the 
lack or ineffectiveness of the knowledge transfer. Instead, intermittent and weak two-way 
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interactions between managers and fishing communities centering on conservation 
preference, attitude and habits may be a larger factor lending to illegal fishing practices. 
Thus, the collaboration-kind of governing interactions should be given more emphasis to 
help enable sincere exchanges and appreciation of diverse conservation outlooks among 
stakeholders. This could be one tangible way of improving the governability of 
conservation measures in the SEA. 
3. To gauge the level of inclination towards conservation among stakeholders 
The level of inclination towards conservation shows two divergent patterns in the 
surveyed groups, although there are some important similarities which must be 
highlighted. In terms of similarities, both the resource-dependent group and the 
managers/scientists group have indicated their moderate-to-high preference of the two 
pro-conservation programmes by placing them in the upper-half of the ranking above 
other fisheries-related community programmes, which are seen to hold less direct benefits 
towards conservation (Figure 6.1 ). This result indicates at least mild, if not medium-to-
high, inclination for promoting fisheries conservation. This is especially plausible 
considering that each survey was normally carried out in an individual and familiar 
setting away from the crowd from which social/external pressure could originate to 
influence their responses. In addition, the survey remained voluntary and anonymous. 
Therefore, the result seems to suggest that both the resource-dependent groups and the 
managers/scientists group possess certain care for conservation. This similarity is 
however, met with some divergent responses in the other programmes included in the 
survey. A major difference lies in the programme to provide loans for expansion of 
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fishing-related work. While the resource-dependent group unequivocally favoured the 
provision of the loan, even in a hypothetical sense as presented in the survey, the 
managers/scientists group regarded this as a considerably less preferred community 
programme. In addition, the managers/scientists group's mid-range preference towards 
reducing fish spoilage for fishing communities is contrasted with comparatively very little 
preference from the resource-dependent group. 
Despite the general occurrence of illegal fishing, this study confirms that fishing 
communities do care about conservation to a moderate degree, particularly when 
conservation inclination is examined in relative isolation with other influencing factors 18. 
Overall, moderate inclination towards conservation observed in the SEA is an 
encouraging finding that could be used to continue to promote conservation-oriented 
fisheries programmes in fishing communities. Expressed through the concept of 
governability, the moderate conservation inclination also implies a reasonable degree of 
governability towards securing stakeholders' genuine support for the conservation-
promoting measures. A problem, however, lies in the sensitive and compassionate 
bridging of the divergent preferences and motivations that exist in the SEA. Enabling 
such governing interaction, which carefully integrates various viewpoints, is seen needed 
to build a momentum and lasting commitment for the conservation measures. This would 
be an important govemability challenge. 
18 
such as self-interest and social nonn 
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4. To identify the level of agreement between various stakeholder groups on the 
topic of Question 2 and 3 
A significant level of correlation among all respondent groups was observed in the 
conservation understanding. The level of significance was statistically established by 
applying the ranking data to a non-parametric test of Kendall T rank-correlation 
coefficient (Table 6.4). This significant agreement allowed the ranking of all groups to be 
combined into one set using procedures detailed in Dunn-Rankin (1983). The combined 
ranking is displayed in the damaged schedule (Figure 6.1 ). The agreed and shared 
understanding leaves a positive impression on the future governance efforts in the SEA, 
especially ones relating to conservation. Although there is no guarantee that the 
stakeholder groups will all agree on the nitty-gritty of the conservation measures or on the 
future processes involving decision-making, the general consensus on what aspects of 
conservation should be given more urgent consideration is a good foundation to initiate 
the processes on. Perhaps this shared understanding can help create a shared vision for the 
fisheries. Hence, their agreement on what are more, or less, damaging fishing activities 
suggests that conservation potential exists, which could be harnessed to facilitate an 
effective rule-formulation and implementation process. 
As for the fisheries-related community programmes, some visible differences have 
already been observed from the damage schedule of conservation inclination (Figure 6.1 ). 
The result of the Kendall T rank-correlation coefficient confirms the divergence between 
the resource-dependent groups and the managers/scientists group (Table 6.4), which 
subsequently produces two sets of rankings, one for the resource-dependent group and the 
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other for the manager/scientists group as shown in Table 6.5. The governance implication 
of the obtained result can be explained as follows. The noted differences in preferences 
must be given adequate recognition and consideration by all parties when improving 
current conservation measures or devising new initiatives. As a pertinent example, if the 
demands of the resource-dependent group remain neglected or responded without 
sincerity, the issue of illegal fishing which negates conservation efforts may persist 
despite the best intention of the measures that attempt to control illegal fishing activities. 
Compromising solutions are likely required, which adequately reflect the key concerns 
and top preferences of the resource-dependent groups found in fishing communities in the 
SEA. 
5. To explore any plausible linkages that may exist be/ween individual 
conservation principle and illegal gear use, through the development and 
application of conservation principle category 
The use of the conservation principle category revealed a relationship between individual 
conservation principle and a form of illegal fishing (i.e. illegal gear use). Illegal gear use 
was most commonly found in fishers who exhibit both relatively low conservation 
tmderstanding and inclination. Contrastingly, fishers who hold higher than the average 
conservation understanding and inclination were most frequently associated with owning 
or operating legal gears (Figure 6.6). This relationship suggests that moving from low 
awareness and inclination to high awareness and inclination, in other words raising the 
conservation principle in individuals, can offer an alternative governance option in 
reducing the use of illegal fishing gear in the SEA. This linkage also presents a potential 
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for improving the governability of conservation measures by offering us a strategic policy 
avenue to reduce the extent of illegal fishing. 
6. To make policy inferences based on the examination of the conservation 
principle in regard to addressing the concerns of illegal fishing 
Several policy inferences were made in Chapter 7 to suggest how management initiatives 
can be devised such that conservation inclination could be better fostered in individuals 
and awareness-raising mean more than simple transfer of knowledge, but involves 
instilling of conservation values, attitudes and habits. In the SEA, for the most prevalent 
scenario of individuals holding relatively high conservation awareness and relatively low 
inclination, the provision of conservation measures that align with the resource-dependent 
group's economic/development motivation could be an effective means to raise the level 
of inclination towards conservation. Such measures could take the form of subsidies, 
reward schemes or direct payment schemes. In the short term, perhaps the economic 
incentives offered in such economically-driven conservation activities are the main agent 
that creates the inclination. However, in the long run, the. practice could become habitual 
and ingrained in individuals' minds to trigger a long-lasting, deeply-rooted inclination, as 
seen in the case of voluntary recycling studied by Hopper and Nielsen (1991) and Werner 
et a/. (1995). Other policy guidelines include awareness-raising which should go beyond 
a simple one-way knowledge transfer and a sustained focus on management measures that 
directly advance the protection of the lake ecosystem and fisheries resources. The direct 
promotion of conservation has reasonable hope for success since the resource-dependent 
group has already shown certain care for pro-conservation measures in this study as well 
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as in a recent proceeding of community consultations conducted for the Mangochi district 
fisheries by-laws formulation (GoM 2005). The continual push would, in a sense, help 
keep them reminded about conservation. Lastly, availability and accessibility of 
alternative livelihood and income options is expected to help discourage taking part in the 
illegal forms of fishing since some fishers would move out of fishing and also desperation 
for providing basic necessities is likely to be reduced if one has multiple options to derive 
their living from. However, provision of alternative livelihood strategies is inherently tied 
to the advances made in outside sectors. Therefore, viable opportunities would have to be 
sought in connection to the happenings of a wider society. 
8.2 Dealing with uncertainty in governance outcomes 
Many of the world's fisheries are expenencmg difficulties in achieving satisfactory 
ecological, social and economic outcomes. This thesis has taken a v1ew that the 
challenges facing fisheries are fundamentally tied to the issue of governance. More 
specifically, the uncertain nature of governance outcomes, aimed at alleviating some of 
the challenges, is approached here as a function of governability, taking place at multiple 
levels. The assumption is that high governability would help a governance measure 
achieve its desired outcomes in a more reliable fashion, whereas low governability would 
contribute to making governance outcomes less manageable. Furthermore, this thesis 
applies the view that any specific issue confounding governance measures, such as illegal 
fishing, is part of the governability function as both the dependent variable and the 
independent variable. Conservation measures are of particular concern in this thesis. 
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Given the general association that illegal fishing negates conservation measures while 
conservation principle promotes them, illegal fishing and conservation principle were, on 
one hand, approached as a dependent variable shaped by system characteristics, and in 
turn affecting the governability of conservation measures, and, on the other hand, framed 
as an independent variable having a direct linkage to the level of governability of 
conservation measures in the SEA. These two perspectives were facilitated with a set of 
complementing methodological tools - the governability assessment at the system-level 
and the damage schedule at the individual-level. 
Governance is, in a systematic sense, composed of the governing system (i.e. subject of 
governance), the system-to-be-governed (i.e. object of governance) and the governing 
interactions (i.e. dynamical relationship between the two systems that actually facilitate 
the governance process). This systematic view allows the fisheries challenges to be 
considered in an alternative fashion which may shed some new insights on how to 
effectively manage the difficulties. In this perspective, how the challenges are diagnosed 
relies on the manner with which the governing system measures itself against the system-
to-be-governed. The assumption is that the governing capacity of a particular governing 
system needs to be suitable enough to be able to match the challenges posed in the 
fisheries system. Of more crucial importance is, perhaps, not the adequate level of 
capacity necessarily, but the acknowledgement of the limits in the capacity of the 
governmg system and the limits in the system-to-be-governed as to what can be 
realistically effectuated by the governing interventions. As a result, the misjudgement of 
or insufficient regard to the governing capacity and the governing needs and demands 
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placed in the system-to-be-governed is believed to be a major source or uncertainty in the 
outcome of governance interventions. Taking the uncertainty in governance outcomes as 
both the cause and effect of the difficulty of guiding fisheries into the realm of ecological, 
social and economic viability, mitigating uncertainty in governance outcome in a 
responsible manner is likely to help lessen the degree of difficulty. 
Along with the system perspective, this thesis proposed another inquiry in negotiating the 
uncertainty in governance outcomes. This second approach, narrower in conceptual scale, 
concerns whether the intended governance options agree with the social actors who are 
being steered by the very policy measures. A particular focus is given to conservation 
measures, which would invariably affect the fishing practices of those who depend on the 
fisheries resources. For example, if the fishers' underlying values do not align with the 
tenets of the conservation initiatives, the intended conservation outcome may be met with 
resistance and therefore not be realized. Hence, inadequate consideration paid to the 
underlying motives of the involved stakeholders would lower the governability of, and 
subsequently add to the uncertainty of, governance outcomes. Learning about the 
resource-dependent group such as fishing community at the individual level can be a 
valuable addition complementing the system perspective. 
The multi-level approach to mitigating the uncertainty and to deliberating how 
conservation measures can be better delivered with more certainty is proceeded in this 
thesis by means of two research questions as previously stated in section 1.4. 
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1. Where and to what extent do governing capacity and governing challenges exist in 
the fisheries system of the SEA viewed through the application of the governability 
assessment framework? 
2. Can any plausible linkages between individual conservation principle and illegal 
gear use be uncovered, which would provide empirical support to the view that 
one 's underlying conservation principle has potential to influence one 's fishing 
choice and behaviour? 
First, the governability assessment framework was applied to the fisheries situation in the 
SEA of Lake Malawi to identify areas that are more, and less, governable. System 
property in which low governability is observed can be inferred as where the governing 
needs and demands are most urgent, also indicating where the governing uncertainty and 
difficulty likely stems from. For instance, the high dynamic nature of the natural system 
in the SEA, such as seasonal wind patterns, fluctuations in fish stocks and the variations 
in lake water level, has been noted to play a major role influencing and regulating the 
environmental aspect of fisheries. Environmental changes subsequently create 
ramifications for the socio-economic system of the fisheries. Also, the high complexity 
observed in the socio-economic system in the SEA fishery is a feature in the fisheries that 
make fisheries governance a challenging endeavour. Both the external circumstances such 
as income and livelihood concerns, extensive kinship and close-knit community structure, 
and the individuals' internally-driven normative mechanisms such as one's underlying 
principles and motivation are factors that warrant a careful handling. Such factors 
complicate a future direction for governance options in pertinent issues like illegal 
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fishing, and could create conditions where illegal fishing is incited and conservation 
principle is neglected. Policy measures must take such intricacies into account when 
planning for an appropriate policy response. 
Next, examining the governing capacity held by the governing system, the governability 
assessment (Table 5.1) shows that the attributes of the governing system concerning 
diversity, complexity and scale issues are associated with low governability making the 
governing system a less straight-forward entity to deal with. This fmding calls into 
question as to how the governing system can effectively respond to the challenges and 
smooth out the bottlenecks present in the system-to-be-governed (i.e. natural and socio-
economic system). A related crucial question would be whether the governing system's 
current set up and mechanism enables the fostering of adequate governing capacity 
needed to properly address the given challenges in the fishery. There are two ways to deal 
with the limitations in governing capacity. First, recognizing the less than satisfactory 
capacity of the governing system, policy goals should be set in a realistic flavour heeding 
the limits of what the governing system can realistically offer and also the limits of the 
system-to-be-governed in their propensity to be positively affected by governing actions. 
At the same time, raising the governing capacity should gamer a sustained focus. At the 
institutional level, the ongoing AUCC-CIDA project aimed at increasing the capacity of 
the local fisheries officers and training institutions is an encouraging example. In tenns of 
governance structure, accountability between the various levels of governors in the 
hierarchical structure must be improved to create a more responsive and responsible 
governing system. 
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An inquiry at the system level produces worthy insights, but the difficulty regarding the 
uncertainty in governing outcomes can be approached from an alternate angle, this time 
directing the focus to the 'people' level involving various stakeholders in the SEA 
fishery. The second research question was about a potential relationship between one's 
underlying principle towards conservation and the practice of illegal fishing, and to 
address this question, the damage schedule was used as the main method followed by the 
conservation principle category. Stemming from how the conservation principle was 
conceptualized made up of two components - awareness of conservation understanding 
and inclination towards conservation, a paired comparison survey was designed to 
facilitate the quantitative data collection of the two components. The obtained data was 
then applied to arithmetic procedures and statistical tests to produce scale values and 
rankings. 
A general level of conservation tmderstanding is shared by both fishers and 
managers/scientists, who identified spawning area, non-selectivity of gear, disturbing the 
lake bottom to be the key concerns that threaten the fisheries. Also, certain care for 
fisheries conservation was noted from the result of the preferred community programmes. 
The two separate findings were examined in relation to each other to reveal a plausible 
linkage between the conservation principle and the illegal gear using a simple algorithm 
and weighting factors devised to facilitate the process. The results uncovered a correlating 
relationship between the strength of the conservation principle and the usage of illegal 
gear with a higher degree of the conservation principle being associated with mostly legal 
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gear users whereas illegal gear users were mostly frequently found having a low degree of 
the conservation principle. This suggests that if a move from low conservation principle 
to high conservation principle can be achieved in fishers, it may also produce a shift in 
the gear use from illegal gears to legal forms. In other words, tapping into one's 
conservation principle by raising awareness and inclination towards fisheries 
conservation could contribute to the reduction in illegal gear use providing an alternate 
policy direction in addressing the illegal fishing issue in the SEA. 
As this study attempted, bringing out the internal tendencies of the stakeholders to surface 
can offer tangible benefits in reducing uncertainty in the outcomes of governance 
interventions aimed at promoting conservation. Reasonable support for the direct 
conservation measures can be expected in the SEA, especially those measures that 
attempt to tackle the most damaging fishing activities judged by the stakeholder groups in 
this study. This would particularly hold more validity if the conservation measures are 
sensitive towards other pressing demands of the resource-dependent group such as 
livelihood concerns and their robust entrepreneurial spirit. 
The two complementing governability inquiries, conducted at the system- and the 
individual-level, to examine the issue of illegal fishing and conservation principle have 
added to our understanding of the efficacy of conservation measures in the SEA fishery. 
The system-level assessment of governability has shown that the occurrence and 
prevalence of illegal fishing can be much dependent on the inherent and constructed 
characteristics of the fisheries. The capacity and the limitations that exist in the fisheries 
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system act to promote or weaken the level of compliance as well as the depth of 
conservation principle in individuals. On the other hand, the individual-level 
measurement of governability asserts that one's internal resolve about conservation 
referred to as the conservation principle can have an independent and direct effect in 
influencing the extent of illegal fishing, and therefore contributing to the efficacy of 
conservation measures. The two perspectives are two sides of the same coin, each 
imparting some useful insights about the common set of issues. Examined together, more 
complete and inclusive information about a fisheries system can be gathered to help 
lessen the uncertainty associated with governance outcomes, and therefore contributing to 
resolve some of the difficulties facing the fisheries. 
8.3 Future research needs 
8.3.1 System-level governability assessment 
In closing, several research needs were identified for the system-level analysis. First, the 
concept of governability is still in the process of constant refinement. Particularly, more 
deliberations on how governing interactions can enhance governability in a concrete and 
pragmatic sense and on what role governing interactions precisely play in the conceptual 
scheme of governability are two areas that require heightened attention. Also, there is a 
discord within the interactive governance discourse in regard to how directly 
governability is affected by the intensity of system properties observed in a fisheries 
system (cf. Bavinck in review). For example, the question that diverges the view is 'does 
high system property (e.g. high diversity or high complexity) make a system inherently 
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less governable?' In the essence of this debate is two levels of assessing govemability -
one at a sub-system level assessing the governability of each sub-system without 
incorporating the effect of the governing system and governing interactions, the other at 
an overall system level speaking of governability as a composite value that takes account 
of interactions among the systems through augmenting, matching or cancelling out of 
various system properties to arrive at an overall level of governability for the whole 
system. The latter view on assessing governability, although very useful, however, 
requires an elaborate scheme of sizing up governabilities of sub-systems in relation to 
each other to come up with a composite value - surely an arduous conceptual as well as a 
methodological challenge. As such, the governability concept will be undoubtedly subject 
to further debates, discussions and theoretical tinkering to solidify its meaning in the 
coming years. 
While governability is being presented with much promise as an alternate perspective to 
approach the issue of natural resource governance from, and also has garnered much 
scholarly interest over the years, whether its potential can be translated into usability and 
viability that connect with practitioners and policy makers in the practical realm remains 
to be seen. This study was one of the earlier attempts to operationalize the concept. The 
governability assessment matrix itself requires further refinement, and therefore it would 
benefit from additional empirical tests and a wider application to various fisheries 
systems around the world. Despite its crude edges, however, the operationalization of the 
concept, as done here, has yielded a few insights into the governance of the SEA fishery, 
which may give those who are interested in the SEA fishery something to mull over. 
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Although the system-level governability assessment was carried out v1a extensive 
literature review, personal interviews and field observation, it must be acknowledged that 
the findings and the suggestions presented in this paper are solely a result of the 
deliberation of the author as an independent entity that does not closely take part in the 
governing of any particular fisheries. The main practical aim of this study was to act as a 
working template for future studies in governability as much as trying to shed some 
practical insights on the SEA fishery using this approach. An assessment done and agreed 
by the various governance participants involved in their own fishery is imagined to hold 
more impetus in effectuating change. Therefore, such initiative is widely encouraged, and 
we hope that it will help making fisheries governance a less difficult proposition in the 
SEA and elsewhere. 
8.3.2 Individual-level governability measurement: conservation principle category 
The damage schedule has been applied in many studies in various settings over the years, 
successfully eliciting community preferences and judgment for important environmental 
concerns such as the severity of resource losses and the impacts of damaging activities. 
This study utilized the established methodology as a pragmatic governability tool to 
assess the general level of conservation understanding and conservation inclination of the 
pertinent stakeholder groups in the SEA, through eliciting their judgment on the 
damaging impact of fishing activities and community programme preferences. This 
procedure revealed interesting and valuable insights about stakeholders' internal 
orientation towards fisheries conservation in the SEA. Several encouraging findings that 
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are in-line with promotion of conservation were noted among both managers and fishers, 
which include a moderate high level of conservation awareness and moderate inclination 
for serving conservation needs. The conservation principle category is an extension of the 
damage schedule approach devised and fitted to meet the focus of this study. Using the 
developed algorithm and the weighting factors, the relationship between the conservation 
principle and illegal fishing ownership/usage was quantitatively inferred. 
Several future research needs were identified concerning the individual-level 
governability measurement. First, sensitivity analysis of the result can help ascertain the 
robustness of the study. While the sensitivity analysis can be done in various ways, this 
study has performed one kind of sensitivity analysis by removing the ' loans for fishing 
expansion' object from the paired comparison data and seeing that the main divergence in 
community programme preference between the resource-dependent group and the 
manager/scientists group is indeed explainable (section 6.2.4). More analysis would be 
beneficial in validating the study results. Secondly, this particular study has focused on 
the principle aspect in independently looking at the issue of illegal fishing. Although 
other factors that could potentially have significant influence in the illegal fishing 
practice, such as self-interest, enforcement and social pressure, were acknowledged and 
incorporated in the study as part of the system-level governability as essment, they were 
not given the equal weighting as the principle aspect, as per the study aim. Future 
research that focuses on and directly examines other factors could generate important 
insights that may supplement the findings of this analysis. Hence, such research would be 
worth an investigation. Lastly, the conservation principle category has potential for a 
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wider application to other fisheries . Whether a similar or congruous result about the 
conservation principle (i.e. awareness and inclination) will be obtained in other fisheries 
settings will be an interesting inquiry that would help draw out stronger and widely-
applicable implications about one's underlying principle regarding conservation. For 
example, whether different fisheries varying on the extent of illegal fishing, the level of 
reliance on the fisheries resources, the type of fisheries (e.g. capture fisheries vs. 
aquaculture) or the size/scale of the fisheries (e.g. large-scale vs. small-scale) have any 
bearing on individuals' conservation principle can perhaps be proceeded as a comparative 
study. In the process, the method and the algorithm would likely see a refinement, and 
more broadly, the normative aspect involved in fisheries governance will be subject to 
further attention that it deserves. 
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Appendix A Illustration of fishing gear 
Beach seine: shape (a) and operation (b-e) (Source: FAO 1993) 
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Chilimira: shape (a) and operation (b-e) (Source FAO 1993) 
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Appendix B Questionnaire survey 
11\~0DIATION FOR COl\rPLETll"G THE QUESTIOI"NAIRiE. 
GANJ JA 1YA USJ'O JAKUTI AJA JE 
This qll~tit~llllaire is about yotli opinion~! By couductin.g this st~rvey, \\'e \'ii~h o 
learn. more a bou what you thillk a bent fishing activities in the Southeast .. 1\rm of Lake 
M, awi and your prefer.enees for your eomnu'lllities_ Please not~ th:~t there i.~ no right 
or wrong answers_ We anticipate the questionnaire \\' ill require o nly about 3 0 minutes 
to complete_ \'\1 e would. appreciate it if you could c>Dmplete all que tions_ However, 
)•ou are not olbliged to alld m11· choose to stop a.t any rtime. 
j\Jausyoga gali n~usalra gani5yo .syawo_ Tulmpita cfuilsya-uJ_}'a, kJJti htliJinga 1ye 
hmjemajo rm ak'l~gcmichisya ya itendo !}~a lmlnga kwa somba ln\.•iwanda .kwa Jrono 
H'llgopochclo (vuw lya nyasa ja }lfalal'l.ri ni 'fl}Jakana aisac Je kum~rmgwawo hmo. 
Tuk"""•urnbecheya mawusyoga kujigale 30 miniri .lruti tunJalisye.. Tukal{fi wakondl a 
kuti a_icmje mar .:syo gosope uambo naga gakombola a.fanje rm chaionele l'lipo 
li:omboJek.a k;ulechela pe>.tala 
Your participation is comple ely voluntary and your responses \'•'ill be k·ept ~tridly 
c-onfid~tntiaJ and anon,"'nous,_ By netmnilllg th questiono.aire, it is understood tbal we 
have your permission to use fue informati.on for tlris study_ The questionnaire contains 
f.our sections. 
11ntiendekwa:yi ili yosope m~ •a kulipeleka kwawo nipo yosope ichih!mdekwe cltiiwe 
yaasili nipo giyimanyika .fruti ganifi jalyocltele k:wa m.untF-111 jati. Pa kwonga kw•awo 
f..-:wa mausyoga, rukmna irila foui ainrtupa. ulamtu wakuja kamulichisya. galli jaruperaji 
pa mojigall)'O genL Mar~syoga. gali minmdu mc]Jeche. 
·we ·trul}' appredat,e yQu. participation aud sincerely thank )"QU for ;our 
kind assistancf. 
T11li walwtogO"lel.a ligo11go {ya. lt.•mda Jli l>uta.na 11iu•e ua 1nbo· .:so1.ri siJ·om o 
lrtujiu;'i ligogo {r.a ddka.nm cldsy.ocld 
THA. K~OU. 
Sikomo kwejinji 
237 
Section A 
This brief section has a few questions about your occupation and. your involvemen in fishing 
activities. 
Mmrdinttfii mwana maWUSJ10 ga )''IJWUISBJJgo gmvo 1ri itf:IJdo )•tuateJula pa kuln.gp &om Q.a, 
L \J.fuat is }'Our ocrupati.on? - please tick all that .apply 
As:atenda r11ase:ngochi'?- alemb.e l'hinraeyizyo ella x mwibokosi pasipa mo.lin.g;a1m 11i lJUZ.>6JJgD 
go.sope ga :stendaga 
0 Gear owne-r 
.A:;yemcr likokn 
0 Farmer 
Wa ·n'lim.a 
0 Fis eries manager 
Waln~renclss;~•a ya 
Fislrerie& 
0 Crewmember 
.\flo •i 
0 Hou~w.ife 
Afama wapewasa 
D Scie.nti.:;t 
Wa }'a sayasi 
0 Fish processor 
K 1-arrika/ihn amba 
&omba 
0 Shop o\vuer 
0 Fish trader 
Kusumuya somba 
0 Teacher 
Asyene .zitolol okala Aticlu1la 
C Oiber(p ease sp:ec.ify): ____ _ 
J.fas.emgo ga.mr galigon.ss agasale) 
If you check·ed more than one lbox w.bich occupation represents you bes . 
• t.;raga alm11bir.e malo ga1mposa· gamo, asale ma:Hmgo gasama1u "kaJlago m 'nope· 
2. Indicate which gear von own or you me regularly o fish - please tlck all tha apply 
(I[y011 do not own or use a:ny gecu·. please go to Que.stiotJ< 3 
AlqjilB likoka ,i}'t1lnvete lrap61m .{,.•asaktmwlichi:zya mas61JgO "awiri-kmL?iri- alsmf>.e x 
rm ibokosim.o lmlt:ifila lrnti c m o k:apena gamba kamulichisya maserrgo 
Fishing gear Own Use 
~8116 Kom u lichiSJ!'Q 
Plank boat with engine 0 0 
Libori l;ra matambu a {rakwenclela in.gi11 i 
Plank boat without engine 0 a 
Liboti jJ'IJ· mmamb~Llll iyagali fngi11i 
Dug out cailloe rrato [ ' 0 
Gill net l'lochela c 0 
Chilimi~a net Clrilimila c 0 
Chambo seme Lilroka (va duzmbo 0 0 
Kanrbuzi seine Likolta iya lrumbw;i 0 .J 
Usipa seine Likoka .()·a usipa 0 0 
Longline bopo (kutega_l 0 0 
Mos.qu ·to net Masil..it.o 0 0 
Fish trap Misipu 0 0 
Nkatba ~eine .Nlracha 0 0 
Handline lsopo (kulopoc}rezya) 0 D 
Kand:win.dwi Kamlwintlwi 0 D 
OtheJ:: lnsptr 0 D 
P:roc:essiDg gear Own. Use 
S1.m-tby·iug 1ac:k 0 D 
IramJala yal.~wmichila :somba 
Smokmgkiln 0 0 
l':akochel'a sumba 
Other: lrrepe 0 D 
3. Hmv long have you been engaged m your current occ:upation? 
Memi ndawijelewu uli alfknmula maseng:o gaklnm.dana ni yo so mba? 
# ofy~ars: {If less than one year~ # of months: 
(l'{aga gam-ana chalra. mi,e:;;ij iling;wn) 
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Sed ion B 
EaclJ. page c.onfiain!f two s.ets of fishing :acth,:ities:, A and B. Please indicate, based ~on. yom opinion, \Vhicll 
aetirityyou consider MORE .DA!L>\.GINGt:o the fishe1y resotu ces in the Southeast A1J.U of Lake 
Maawi. 
Palisam.b:a lil'o.se lya c'1ikalata pan.a itendo iwiti-iwiU y.aku;ulqjila somba, A nt B. chom;/e alo .. sye, 
kuiyochela mr.~.ganisyo syawo , itend.ochi y akwiganicnisya ku.ti yako.rumga ~tmope sombasi 
111 ti:P'I_l'GJtJ ja Jlfnlm\!i jili mbali faJrono Wl!W'ti1Jda wagopojelo lyuwa uaf.nvtw~nda kW'G 
mbwadzrulll). 
In your o:pinioo, which of these ttvo actiivities- do yon consider more damaging to t>~e fishe:rie.s ~resom-oe.es 
in the Southeast Ann ofLa.ke Malawi? 
~\-iugan.isyo .SJ:-aw.o, muiteudo iwili-iw ili yiwapen1yi~ yapi yaJt,·-wiganicJJisya .lnlti yalconaga nmope 
kuut~ot. i 1tli ~'.iwanda klt•cmg·opoc:hero lyu ·a kwa ny.asaja Malawi? 
1) C:.atchiDg j·uvi!!nile fish 
Kuulaga somba .s:rawarUl-wan a 
2) Fishing .during :>pawning seascn 
Kimlaga so1'11ba r1dawijakutajila mat~danda k:apena koia· wanache 
3) Fishing using med1anized gear 
Kuulaga ~omba pakanwlicM.sya ir1ji11i 
4) Fishing using, gears iha:t disturb• lake bottom 
Kunlaga somb.a p alnmlajila i'tzdu Jr:akusokonesya nda:milo japlmsi pa nyas;a 
5) F i.sh:ing in offshore deep ·n•atet· 
Kzllagtz samll.a kwalmtczlicililil pa cltiko1 m11ya<,.sa) mtzlo ges.okaclle rrmope 
6) fi~g nsuc.g nQn-sele<:tive. ~ear 
Ipaugiso yagaasagulapalwlaga somb.a (syosope) 
7) ~ 1any people, fishing in o:ne .area 
Wandr1 waJfnJi Jnmlajill'l .somba pa-malo gamO' 
S) Fiililllg iu ;ueas tlli~t have illtificial t"eef 
Kuulajila .so·mb.a malo gagali ilundu yak.upagl'lnya 
240 
.---------------------------------------
Secti.on C 
Each page contains tw>D sets of h:ypotbetit'a I pr<t·gr:un mes for yom communities,. A and B . P ease 
indicate, ba:;ll!!:d on yo1u- opinion, i£ a p1·ogramme were to be impl emented im yotu- commuuity, which. one 
you PREFER. 
Lisamfm lililons e lya chifmlata liltwete mitrmdu jh't•ili ja pologa lam u gagamba lruvwmir.:hisya , 
Ani B. C11ond2 mug:a nisyo syawo alajile mapologalantu gapakana agate!"uie· mmu.timagwawomt ~ 
ni pulogalamuciu"japaka .ajimch~. 
If a progrJlllllle ntreTe l.o be :imp emeated in your comnnmit:y, in your opinl.on, which of hti!~ hwo 
p1·ogrammes. d.o you pLefur? 
Ana mugmrisyo .syaw·o poJogalamujatulijapakaruJ ajftende kuma.ngwawo k:r:rno, mapoltJgalamu 
g~wiligajnpi fapakJ1mJ nfi.melle. 
1) Pt·og~~·:mtru~ to pro.Mct fish habitat :md fi~h sp~~ie,; 
Pologalamuja l.."llstunala malo gakutama somba· irapena mtundu wa .somba 
2) Progr.a1J.UDe i:o promote scienffic r.esearch on lale fi.sheries .ecosyst.em 
Pologala.mujab1lola yaln"VeS)'Cll,yunda l;yapenani {l>'Gkusosa-sos.a {1: •.uaya.si) ,va somba Jli 
mlamil.o syakwe nru.n,vasanru 
3) Programme to set up a :rewa~-d pro~ram to ,encom:a.ge compliam:e of f:tsheri.es regulations 
PologalaJ11fljala1tijiUgmryeje :yakupeleka mituim ka·a wa11d11 walrupi.kanfla malam tJsi ga 
.)la.somba (ga fisheries) 
4) Pr>Dgnmme to prc;;.ride micro-<:redit loans t:oo upgL'ade fishing gear technology 
Pologalamuj a.h1peleka ngongo.le s:~vawa:na-wana lrutijijau.sye p-enani yitendo ~ aJmlajila 
so:mba 
5) Prognnnne to develop teclmology fo r>educe post-har.·e§t spoiLage. 
Pologalmm1jakukwes.•a Iund£r lyahmoud( •a bJonasilra kl a somba s;ulojidW'e 
6) Pr>DgraD.UD.e to promote smalt-scale commtmat}· fish c:l!ge cUI.tw e 
Pologa lmmz j nlaJti jiJrw.:s ·~ iru long a hva sm1tba syagD<Jiw6 (maJ~ji) Jl rrumm1 
7) PrograD.UDe to en:s.1.ue. b each ai:'cess fm· local fishe1-s a:ad communities 
Pol.ogallmmjnlmloln l..11ti wnftulaga samba ni waHdu ruope oknsilmmilnw1 mikulij.nmmrbnli 
1111-~·a nyasa 
S) Progrillllllle to pmvicle local ownership and stew;;uchh:ip of tishe-1-ie:s resotJrces 
Po.logalamt:tja kupeleka m.syen.e IIi Fm,samalid"tre !r..JJ,soJN inva yasomba tlinmsi.s;atcmraga A1va 
wantlar 
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S-ection D 
Tlris section contains se ·eral simple questions that seek ba~ic information about yourseU and 
about the f13heries by-taw pl'Ocess. 
Likuga ali {wmn maus,ro gagasausya Jmlmsakakumtnlyila y awawo ni ·nsati pakupangatiJ'Q' malamulo 
gmvt.ma-wana ga Frub.eries. 
1. What is your age? 
.Jna y aka yawo ilingwa. 
2. "What is yom gender? 
Ana l'achi? 
0 Male w:alume D Fema e wakor1g1 e 
3. 1V.lhat is yom ethnic origin? 
0 Chewa/Ny anj.a. ~ Ya.o 
0 1\nubnk.a 0 lAm we 
0 Sel1.3 0 Ofha·: 
4. Vilhat is the highe~t level of ~education you have completed? 
A:mr sukufu jan10 walifigD11J'i!:J!e ni kmnalichisya p,api? 
0 
0 
0 
0 Prim:ny Standard PHlaJ>imale Sitarulade 
0 Sec:ou d.ary Form Sekorrdale Fonm 
:I Tatioo:;- Ku UYJivesite 
J No :;chool~og GiJJijaulaleie bt sukulJI 
5. In which village (tO'!.vn) do you currently live? 
AfusicJJi kape.11a tmmi ja.satamaga. 
How many years have you li ·ed in tbat \'ill-age ( own)? 
• .ftsmi ;raka Hfrtgl~'Q m 'nm:;i mrmo 
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Tong.1 
);goni 
Do notl-uow 
6_ How mMly days in a year clo yon non:mally spe.nd away· from yoml.•illage C own) for your 
work (e. g. fishing , traaing, work trip etc)'? 
.Ina masiJm galingJ •a pa chaf.ra g,a::;atyoJtoga m ·musi 11JJ/l!O (tmmi jino) lnmula h viPJ e 
kuframula rna.~emgo (lrulaga .romba. ku.rwti.sa: ~omba. lrukamula m a>SBrtgo, rri imr-ir16 
0 Less than JO days 
0 1 - 2 momtPu 
0 3-6 moillfhs 
0 more tha!ll 6 months 
>Gahwma" ma.s:silm J,o 
Mww palrtJ m iytsiJi'wiJ·i 
.\leyesijiitatu paka 1'1! 'sa¥Jo ni mtzo 
, Kupeleta m~tJ•ssi m ".smzo 11i m.110 
7 _ In }•our opinion, what is the amount of fish in the Soullieast Arm these days compared to 
last year? 
Ana somba si:pali .symt<iJ~ji 1Mf11li lm .lrcmo i\<"ewancla lumgop.ocllelo !Plm 1f)'tJ!ia'ja ._\fa lawi. masilru 
,agalro pakmw;mi'chisya rJi clu~ka c-llipite 
0 Fewer fish 
Samba .s;)'tJ1~'mo 
0 Same amount 
.S'Omba sili UJIL.'J'«l-~\£'.lef e 
lf)'<lU illlSWeJOO ff'\"ier f~~h~ 
Naga qjqjile somba" ,s:yauo1r.o· 
J More flsh 
mu:s;vmre lele 
0 Do n ot kn ow 
gi-gumcm;riliw 
\.¥hat are the reasom for the fewe[ number offrnh? -pleJllse: tick all that applj' 
Ana li;gogo~ehi :somb.o. sikum:mdipa?- .ale.Jnbe cMmany i.zyo c lUJ' A' m:u:ibofro.:si'pas~ 
malingana Jli ma.s6nt;.o gosope ga stcmiar;a 
0 F ish b.abita1 de~adati.on 
ltJJpasulm· kwa nralo g.o.rmna :>ombn· 
0 Caichmg juve:uil~ fisb 
lr.amula somba ..,awa..tJa-w.::mn 
0 Too m uch fish sp oilage dtuing catchiug a:ndprocessang 
0 F.iili"n.g usillg il egl ~rs 
knlaga :;.on ba pc;,kam!dicirr:s.JY1 iJa J"agasosd:wa ni boma 
0 Emri:ronme:ntal!d imatic d u nge:s 
kusi1rda kw1:1 nda'*'i ni indtJ .Dac.kilmnbo chino 
0 Overfishin~ due to "" llliiD}' fuhers.lgea.rs 
Somba .simiJsile ligogo (yo '1-.-JtJupa k l'l\"1 wakwllag,a sl'J<mba 11i maboti ga.~"ltUJgfla somb.."l 
0 Overfi.shing due to large-sea e connnerciillboalS 
s.omfJa .riltrmJaia ligoga ,().'Q' walrulaga ;omlJa lHJ walJ'iQii garnakulJmgwa 
0 Superu,atur~l powers 
Yamasega 
0 W!!ak .Mlfor~·Mnent of l~gt'!l!a.tiOll!!: 
Kulepd.a h•ratcn1•a kqpen:a bval.amula l ml:fdw w akaJ:a mcrkrmulo 
24J 
0 Fishing during .spa'\vnmg season 
Kuulaga somba ltodawi jalru.t:qjila ma11daJJda Jtapena kola lMJU:chs 
8. J!ue yon a member of any fishing-related organizations such as BVC or Fishermen's 
Association (FA). 
A11a wawo ali guluja kw~yana r.ri ;vafrulaga :so mba mpel.'J B VC kapem1 Fishameni Aso.riyeshoni? 
0 Yes 
0 No 
Please indic:ate: ------------ Cfrcmde alemb.r apo 
'9'. Do you l'"D.ow who to speak with if}rou wish to voice opinion on fiShe-ries-related 
matters? 
.d.tJa kumml.}ilajapaka awebte naf!io pa ganija )-\tJkusana ni samba 1~aga ali ruachile bpeld:a 
ganiQ'O .SJ,IGWO 
0 Yes 0 No 
If Y e.s, l·laga Ees! 
Please indicae the name of the committee oT the position of the person: 
Ch01Jde alembe bna lya lmmi.nlijo kapem~ mpando wa wamu.rJt m(jo -----------
l 0. U7hat role do you think ·fiShing commwrity should play in the making of fisheries: 
regulations_ 
mugmti;>JIO syawo aJm wanrl'ru walmlaga. kuwamba ni ku.mmis.}~ somba palra atenclechi 
paf..·up.agan;ra mainm ulo ga fisiralesi.. 
0 Government make the regulatioru; with.out inputs .from n:s.h.mg community 
l ·anthuwa ampikmrile .b:wanaja kJifishalesi pa ~·a malamulo 
0 Go....-emmen mai.-Je the regulctions 1Vith inputs from fubing community 
waJJJ uwa api!lecheje ga11i.sJ o l;:wa bwmmjafislr.alesi nipo bwanqjo apaJlgtrll 'fU·s nrnlarnulo 
0 Go•1.-ernm.en• and fuhin;g c-ommunity \\rork togethe: o formulate the n~gulatio.ru 
, .'Oscpe 'Welle lP.mrw ja fislurlrui pamo 12i wanth:n aptmganyenge malmnuloga 
0 Fighing cOlllllluruty make the regu tions wjfu rlle a.d-o;ice of the government 
wmuJ:mwa apagan.JCB lilarmtlo 11ipo abwmta n\tJjisfr.alesi wa}ogolel<rje pa yakwenda 
0 Fish-ing commuilliiy make ib o.wn Teguhtions without ~oruulting to the go·vernment 
wauthmm apagtmye malamulo rn-wqji.lm mwagausa abm:nra wa fi:shalesi 
0 Dono know giguma'!,vilila 
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1 L How di you hear abou tbe fiSheries. by-law consultation piOoess? 
..dna 1 'apiksne uli ~'€1 m "rrda-rtda-tula wupita chaus.a •v.a1flthllpa :.up~Agmzyo. malarnlllo gm'IJ "misi 
ga.fis'ludesi 
0 Ne\rer he.al·d of it 
0 Fis eries extension offica· 
Girrimbilumeje 
.Alagisi ·wafr.s.hal£si 
Mamembnla ~a B VC 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
BVCmembers 
ViH gl! h.i!adnnn 
F1iend or family 
Radio or newsJI~per 
Other 
mmusi 
Kw12jm "D kape1mpewa.sa 
Pm ·ailci hlpe11JJ riJ!Usipepala 
Main/a gane agasale 
12. Do you think that me by-la,vs will help the fishing situation in the Southeast Arm of l.U:e 
Mala1vi? 
.Ana alruganisy a malamulo ga misi~a clrigaltamuchisye pa i.:ulaga lh~a .somb.a mbmij a 
kono ·awcmda wagoptJcJzelo m {l 1 a ' a J\!)'"asa ,ja _fa law; 
0 No helpful a all 
0 Mostly not hi!lpful 
0 Somewhat heL-pful 
0 MoSitl~· helpful 
0 Ve1y helpful 
0 Dono know 
• l..'lga,gamucllisya ko:;.I!J 
isng:amudiX)Ia pano 11di 
jsaga 111llrl•isya mb..'lli .riin& mm~bo .:i ir.Je u 'O.J>'i 
.}'as.am uchuya r..,~\tfiirifi 
.isag.a7Jmcltisya lc:wlfiirtii mnops-nope 
mumat'l}'iJila 
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Appendix C Conservation principle category 
Set A: Fishing activities 
Catching Fishing Fishing Fishing Fishing Too Fishing in Individual 
juvenile using using in using many spawning weighted 
fish mechanized gears offshore non- people area sum 
gear that deep selective fishing 
disturb water gear in one 
lake area 
bottom 
Weighting 3 2 3 3 2 4 factors 
Highest score 
Possible 
individual 3 5 0 4 2 6 preference 
score 
Weighted 9 2 15 0 12 4 24 66 individual score 
Lowest score 
Possible 
individual 3 5 2 6 4 0 preference 
score 
Weighted 9 10 6 6 3 8 0 42 individual score 
Mean value = 62.69 
Set B: Community programmes 
Protect Promote Provide Help Promote Ensure Provide Individual 
fish scientific micro- reduce fish small-scale fishing ownership of weighted 
habitat research credit spoilage community access for resources to sum 
and fi h on lake loans to during fish cage local fishers local 
species fisheries expand catching culture and communities 
ecosystem fishing- and communities 
related processing 
work 
Weighting 3 3 2 2 factors 
Hig hest score 
Possible 
individual 6 5 2 4 0 3 preference 
score 
Weighted 
individual 18 15 2 8 6 50 
score 
Lowest score 
Possible 
individual 0 6 5 3 4 2 preference 
score 
Weighted 
individual 3 0 6 5 6 4 4 28 
score 
Mean value = 42. 10 
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Conservation principle category of respondents 
HH HL LH LL Total 
Gear owners 5 II 8 17 41 
Crew members 10 13 5 9 37 
Processors/Traders II 6 2 20 
Community members 4 13 2 20 
Managers/Scientists II 3 9 3 26 
Total 41 46 24 33 144 
Conservation principle category by education level 
HH HL LH LL Total 
No schooling II 13 3 16 43 
Primary 1-4 7 10 4 6 27 
Primary 5-8 9 14 8 8 39 
Secondary (9-12) 6 6 I 0 13 
Tertiary 8 3 8 3 22 
Total 41 46 24 33 
Conservation principle category by gender 
HH HL LH LL Total 
Women II 12 0 4 27 
Men 30 34 24 29 I 17 
Total 41 46 24 33 
Conservation principle category of fishers by use oflegal/illegal gear 
HH HL LH LL Total 
Legal gear 
Gear owners 5 10 4 10 29 
Crew members 9 10 4 24 
Jllegal gear 
Gear owners 0 I 4 7 12 
Crew members I 3 4 5 13 
Total 15 24 13 26 78 
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Conservation principle category of fishers by education 
HH HL LH LL Total 
No schooling 5 8 3 15 31 
Primary 1-4 3 5 4 6 18 
Primary 5-8 6 7 6 5 24 
Secondary (9-12) 1 4 0 0 5 
Tertiary · 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 15 24 13 26 78 
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